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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Eighteen years have passed since the penalty of criminal forfei-
ture' was reintroduced into American law by the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act 2  ("RICO") and the
Continuing Criminal Enterprises Act ("CCE").3 Despite early disa-
greement, the courts have settled most doubts about the reach of
criminal forfeiture in favor of an expansive interpretation.4 Con-
gress effectively set its seal of approval on such interpretation by the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,5 ("CFA") which also ex-
panded RICO by adding predicate offenses, 6 by providing for pre-
1 Criminal forfeiture, also known as in personam forfeiture, is the taking of property
by the state as an incident of conviction for crime. United States v. Seifuddin, 820 F.2d
1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1987). It is thus opposed to civil or in rem forfeiture, the taking of
property in some way connected with the commission of a crime regardless of the crimi-
nal guilt of its possessor or owner. In civil forfeitures, the owner of the property has the
burden of proof once the government has shown probable cause to believe that the
property is "guilty," in other words, connected with the prohibited activity. The stan-
dard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. $250,000 in United
States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Brock, 747 F.2d
761, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
For centuries "forfeiture of estate," a form of criminal forfeiture, was a mandatory
incident of all common law and most statutory felony convictions. Forfeiture of estate
was the taking by the Crown of all of the felon's real and personal property. It went
hand in hand with "corruption of blood" or "attaint," the prohibition on tracing title to
property through the felon's estate, thus assuring that his descendants could inherit
nothing from more remote ancestors. "[T]he Corruption of Blood stops the Course of
regular Descent, as to Estates, over which the Criminal could have no Power, because he
never enjoyed them." C. YORKE, SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LAW OF FORFEITURE FOR
HIGH TREASON 26 (2d ed. 1746). Forfeiture of estate was abolished in the United States
in the early nineteenth century and in England by 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 23, but civil
forfeiture of, for example, contraband, smuggled goods and instrumentalities of crime,
has continued to the present day and indeed has been significantly expanded, see infra
notes 239-76 and accompanying text.
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
3 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
4 See infra notes 57-81 and accompanying text.
5 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 2040
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985))("any property consti-
tuting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly,
from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection .... ).
6 Including any state felony for dealing in obscene matter, Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020(1). 98 Stat. 2143 (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985)), and any indictable violation of the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act, Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 9 01(g)( 2 ), 98 Stat. 2136 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (Supp. III 1985)).
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indictment and post-indictment restraining orders on the transfer of
property subject to forfeiture free of the procedural barriers erected
by some courts, 7 and by codifying the "relation-back" theory of for-
feiture,8 the theory that title to forfeitable property vests in the gov-
ernment from the moment the criminal act is committed, potentially
making voidable all later transfers.9 In addition, Congress has ex-
tended the penalty of criminal forfeiture to most federal drug of-
fenses 0 and to trafficking in child pornography."
This endorsement and expansion of criminal forfeiture, which
made it possible for the government to seek forfeiture more aggres-
sively and with a greater likelihood of success, has created a schol-
arly and public uproar. So far commentators have focused on an
important but narrow set of issues: the constitutionality and propri-
ety of restraining orders which prevent defendants from paying
their attorneys, and the threat of forfeiture of attorney's fees already
paid upon conviction. 12 All the circuit courts of appeal which have
considered the matter have agreed that Congress intended to au-
thorize such forfeitures and that they do not violate the fifth or sixth
amendment rights of defendants.13
The focus on attorneys' fees has unfortunately diverted atten-
tion from larger and more important questions. Criminal forfeiture
is, in effect, the first new punishment for crime since the rise of the
penitentiary in the early nineteenth century.14 Why was so obvious
a penalty enacted after being so long overlooked? What is its appro-
priate relationship to other criminal and civil penalties? To what
extent can criminal forfeiture be justified in terms of such traditional
7 See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
8 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. III 1985).
9 Id.
10 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (Supp. III 1985).
11 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, § 6, 98 Stat. 205 (amending 18
U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. III 1985)).
12 See, e.g., Note, Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees: Should Defendants be Allowed to Retain the
"Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the "Fruits of the Crime"?, 39 STAN. L. REv. 663 (1987);
Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys'Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to Define Individ-
ual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1; Note, Attorneys' Fees Forfeiture under the Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Can We Protect Against Sham Transfers to Attorneys?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 734 (1987); Note, Against Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO:
Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 124 (1986);
Note, Forfeitability of Attorney's Fees Traceable as Proceeds From a RICO Violation Under the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1499 (1986).
13 See infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
14 For the introduction of the penitentiary as the usual punishment for serious crime




objectives of punishment as deterrence and retribution? 15 Finally,
should criminal forfeiture be imposed as a penalty for all crimes
committed for gain?
The first step in answering these questions is to distinguish the
various sorts of property subject to RICO and CCE forfeiture.
These are the proceeds or gross receipts of crime, 16 the "instrumen-
talities of crime," such as property, both real and personal, em-
ployed (sometimes very tangentially) in the commission of the
offense, 17 and "interests" in a RICO "enterprise" operated through
or acquired by a "pattern of racketeering activity."' 8 This Article
begins by tracing the process of case interpretation and statutory
amendment by which the proceeds of crime became a necessary ob-
ject of forfeiture despite the difficulty of interpreting 1970 RICO to
justify such forfeitures. 19 It concludes that such proceeds are in fact
the only appropriate object of forfeiture.
The forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime, however, is an in-
appropriate criminal penalty.20 Such forfeitures are closely mod-
elled upon existing civil forfeitures. Civil forfeiture is a farrago of
injustices sanctified by tradition. Its historical justifications, such as
they are, have been left behind by its alarming extension in recent
years, and its adoption as a criminal punishment, when its validity
has always depended on its status as a civil penalty, is
unprincipled. 2'
Finally, the Article criticizes enterprise forfeiture as a criminal
penalty. Enterprise forfeiture is a central innovation of RICO. It
treats the criminal's whole business as proceeds of crime or as an
instrumentality thereof, with the aim of separating racketeers from
their rackets. Certainly criminals should forfeit legitimate busi-
nesses which are themselves the proceeds of crime. This Article ar-
gues, however, that it is usually wrong to forfeit a legitimate
business because its owner has committed a crime in the course of
its operation. Such forfeitures too often result in arbitrary and dis-
15 Another traditional objective of punishment is, of course, rehabilitation. No one
supposes, however, that the purpose of forfeiture is rehabilitation, and its introduction
is in fact closely associated with the revival of retributivist theories of criminal jurispru-
dence. One motive for such revival has been loss of faith in the possibility of rehabilita-
tion. See infra notes 381-86 and accompanying text.
16 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 848(a); 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
17 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
18 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
19 See infra notes 55-105 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 239-79 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
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proportionate punishments for white-collar offenses. 22 Criminal
control of legitimate businesses is a problem best attacked by civil
divestiture. 23
If, however, "enterprise" and "instrumentality" forfeiture are
rejected as criminal punishments, leaving only proceeds of crime as
an appropriate object of forfeiture, there is no compelling reason to
limit criminal forfeiture to RICO and drug offenders. After all, no
offender should be permitted to retain his ill-gotten gains. This
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that RICO is not, on its face,
restricted to the prosecution of activities traditionally associated
with organized crime and has not been so limited in practice. The
Congressional notion that organized crime has particular character-
istics which make criminal forfeiture peculiarly necessary, never
well-supported logically or empirically, has all but vanished. 24
Moreover, there are signs that both state legislatures and Congress
have come to see the enactment of criminal forfeiture penalties as a
popular way of demonstrating toughness on crime and as a method
of supplementing appropriations for the administration of criminal
justice.25 Many states have passed RICO statutes, 26 and the Justice
Department has officially recommended forfeiture as a new punish-
ment for other crimes. 27 In this climate, the limitation of criminal
forfeiture to RICO and drug offenses may well be an anomaly and a
potential source of unfairness. 28
22 See infra notes 280-314 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 334-41 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 145-68 and accompanying text.
26 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to 2316 (1985); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186-186.8
(West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-101 to 18-17-109 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 53-393 to 403 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1501-1511 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 895.01-.09 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1 to -15 (1986); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 842-1 to -12 (1972); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7801 to -7805 (1986); IND. CODE §§ 35-45-6-
1, 35-45-6-2, 34-4-30.5-1 to -6 (1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-1 to -11 (1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 207.350-.520 (1985); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2C:41-1 to 2C:41-6 (1986); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-I to -14 (1986); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-01 to -08 (1986); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2931.31 to -.36 (Baldwin
1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.715 to -.735 (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Pur-
don 1985); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 7-15-1 to -11 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to -
1608 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 946.80-.87 (West 1986); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 25,
§§ 971-971(p) (1985). 1P
27 See, e.g., ATr'Y. GEN. COMM. ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT, 433 (July, 1986) and
the Child Protection and Enforcement Act of 1988, S. 2033, § 202, 134 CONG. REc. 638-
39. See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
28 The prosecutor's discretion in deciding whether to seek forfeiture and, if she does,
of what property is easily abused. Although forfeiture is ostensibly mandatory under
RICO, see infra note 34 and accompanying text, the prosecutor is not obligated to iden-
tify particular property as subject to forfeiture or indeed to seek a RICO indictment. He
or she may choose rather to indict only for the underlying predicate offenses. See Lynch,
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This Article contends that the forfeiture of the profits of crime
should be general and mandatory. It is the minimum just penalty,
because it ensures that the offender shall not benefit by his wrong-
doing. However, criminal forfeiture has more in common with civil
restitution than with traditional punishments. Like restitution, it
merely restores the status quo ante and, thus lacks the expressive qual-
ity of traditional punishments which have the capacity to express the
moral opprobrium of the community. Therefore other punish-
ments, such as fine and imprisonment, should ordinarily supple-
ment criminal forfeiture. 29
The penalty of forfeiture of criminal profits is closely related to
civil restitution on the one hand and enforceable orders of restitu-
tion imposed as part of the sentence on the other.30 All three are
RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661, 718-21
(1987)[hereinafter Lynch, Parts I & II].
29 Throughout this Article, the forfeiture of criminal proceeds is referred to as a
"penalty" rather than a "punishment." Punishments are penalties, but the reverse is not
always true. Unlike penalties, punishments are intended to express moral obloquy
through the public infliction of harm. They are addressed not only to the offender but
also to the public, announcing to all that certain behavior deserves the stigma of punish-
ment. Bogart, Punishment and the Subordination of Law to Morality, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 421, 426-27 (1987)(characterizing this as the "denunciatory theory" of punish-
ment.) The harm inflicted by punishment may be roughly proportional to the wrong
done, but it is not possible to demonstrate that it is in any sense equivalent.
Prison is the archetypal modern punishment because it carries the message that the
convict is not fit to associate with law abiding persons, whose safety requires the con-
vict's forcible segregation from other citizens. It is impossible, however, to demonstrate
that the harm the criminal suffers from a certain amount of deprivation of liberty is
commensurate with the injury the criminal inflicted by wrongs as disparate as insider
trading, bank robbery, and rape. The infliction of such harm upon the criminal does not
in any way remedy the injury. Therefore it is not surprising that punishments are often
highly discretionary. Discretion is necessary because the criminal's deserts are not and
cannot be measured by the mere classification of his offense.
Penalties, on the other hand, do not "reprove the transgression." Spjut, Criminal
Law, Punishment, and Penalties, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL S-UD. 33, 44 (1985). The offender is
usually penalized because he has breached a standard of conduct applicable to a particu-
lar relationship. Society does not draw the inference that by his or her breach the crimi-
nal has demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with the law in general. Id. at 44.
Unlike punishments, penalties are not individuated, because they are fixed upon the
assumption that the injury caused by the offense can be accurately measured and sub-
stantially remedied. This limits the expressive function of penalties, for they cannot be
modified to express recognition of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
The forfeiture of criminal profits is an archetypal penalty because it merely returns
the offender to the position he occupied before committing the offense. Symbolically,
therefore, it treats the offense as limited in its effects to the person or persons wronged.
30 Since 1984 federal judges have had the power to order the defendant to make
restitution to his victims as part of his criminal sentence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3580
(1982). These sections have been recodified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664 by the Senten-
cing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987 (effective No-
vember 1, 1987). Before this restitution could only be ordered as a condition of
probation. See infra notes 393-400 and accompanying text.
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intended to effectuate the principle that criminals should not profit
by their crimes. However the existing criminal forfeitures under
RICO and CCE largely disregard the fatal inconsistency between re-
storing the proceeds of crime to the victim and forfeiting them to
the state. In fact, under federal law, the proceeds of crime are auto-
matically forfeited to the government upon conviction, whereas the
judge may sentence the defendant to make restitution to his victims
out of his own funds. Far from having a right to restitution, victims
without legal title to forfeited property must petition the Attorney
General for a discretionary remission of forfeiture. 3 1
Any general forfeiture statute must address these contradic-
tions. The punitive purpose of forfeiture is accomplished when the
defendant is deprived of the proceeds of his or her crime; the crimi-
nal has no interest in the identity of the recipient. All individual
claims against the convicted defendant, whether by victims, attor-
neys, general creditors, or even dependents, therefore should be
prior to those of the state. In particular, the appearance of justice
requires an end to the Assets Forfeiture Fund, which gives the
United States Attorney and local law enforcement officials with
whom he must cooperate a budgetary stake in the vindication of the
government's claim to the property. 32 The amount of forfeiture
should equal the greater of either the provable proceeds of crime,
without any requirement or pretense of tracing, or the provable
losses suffered by the victims. All sums collected from the offender,
whether as fines or forfeitures, should be allocated in accordance
with a scheme of priorities. Perhaps an independent Custodian of
Forfeited Property could be appointed to receive, administer and
distribute such property. Of course, victims will retain their right to
bring civil actions to recover all their losses, less sums actually
received.
This approach has the incidental merit of resolving the struggle
over attorneys' fees. Attorneys are creditors of the defendant like
31 18 U.S.C. § 1963(h)(1),(j) (Supp. III 1985). See, e.g., United States v. Mageean,
649 F. Supp. 820, 823 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd 822 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1987). Despite the
statutory authorization, the regulations for the remission or mitigation of civil and crimi-
nal forfeitures promulgated to date do not appear to address victims' claims for remis-
sion. Regulations Governing the Remission or Mitigation of Civil and Criminal
Forfeitures, 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.7 (1987) [hereinafter Forfeiture Regulations]. Rather
they concern remissions in favor of innocent third parties with a valid claim of title. See
infra notes 429-31 and accompanying text.
32 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) authorizes the equitable transfer of
civilly and criminally forfeited property to cooperating local law enforcement agencies.
See Attorney General's Guidelines on Seized and Forfeited Property, 50 Fed. Reg.
24,052 (1985). See also 19 U.S.C. § 1613a (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See infra notes 149-
72 and accompanying text.
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any other, provided that they are not laundering the proceeds of
crime through fraudulent fee arrangements. Indeed, attorneys re-
quire a special priority because of their indispensable role in the
adversary system. However, it is fundamentally unfair to give an ab-
solute preference to the attorney's claims over those of the defend-
ant's victims, other creditors, and dependents. This Article
recommends that the attorney's fee, if derived from the proceeds of
the crime, be treated as a voidable preference which must be re-
turned to the Custodian of Forfeited Property upon the defendant's
conviction, and then should be distributed to claimants, of whom
the attorney is one. The attorney will, however, have a claim prior
to those of other creditors for reasonable compensation as deter-
mined by the court.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE SINCE 1970:
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND CONGRESSIONAL REACTION
RICO and CCE forfeiture was, when introduced in 1970, an in-
novation virtually without precedent in American law. In one im-
portant respect it paralleled the nearly forgotten common law
penalty of forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood. 33 RICO for-
feiture, like forfeiture of estate, was an automatic consequence of
conviction for RICO violations rather than a punishment set by the
judge and discretionary with him or her within statutory limits. 3 4
33 See supra note 1.
34 United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 810 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
833 (1980), held that RICO forfeiture is indeed mandatory upon conviction. The trial
judge has no equitable discretion to protect the interests of third parties by refusing to
enter an order of forfeiture. Accord United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
Of course, RICO and CCE forfeiture was and is "automatic" only when the govern-
ment exercises its discretion to seek the forfeiture of property identified in the indict-
ment or accompanying bill of particulars. The finder of fact must also determine that
such property is indeed subject to forfeiture. Such limitation was not explicit in 18
U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) before its amendment by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984. See supra note 5. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in 1972,
however, requiring the government to request a special verdict establishing that the de-
fendant had a forfeitable interest in a RICO "enterprise." FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (e). See,
e.g., United States v. Hess, 691 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1982)(authorizing forfeiture upon
stipulation as to the defendants' respective ownership interests in the enterprise, in lieu
of a special verdict).
Forfeiture of estate, by contrast, the taking by the Crown of all of the felon's real
and personal property, was a consequence of any common law or statutory felony con-
viction, although forfeited real property was restored to the defendant who enjoyed
"benefit of clergy" as a first offender. 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 387-88 (London
1800). "Some Felonies are allowed the Benefit of Clergy, which saves Life, and the
Inheritance of Land, tho' not the immediate Profits." C. YORKE, supra note 1, at 84.
Many offenses were non-clergiable. I J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
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RICO forfeitures are thus in personam, but the 1970 statute simply
borrowed the procedures long mandated for in rem customs forfeit-
ures,35 relegating third party claimants to an administrative petition
for remission or mitigation. 36 The original statute made no attempt
to answer such vexing questions as when the government's title to
forfeited property first attached and how the property might be se-
cured from dissipation or concealment before or after indictment.
Perhaps more important, there was great uncertainty about the
meaning of fundamental RICO concepts such as "pattern of racke-
teering" 37 and "RICO enterprise. ' 38 In the last analysis, this uncer-
tainty derived from the more pervasive uncertainty about the
objectives of RICO and whether such objectives could be achieved
constitutionally.
There is little point, at this late date, in attempting to establish
the true meaning and purpose of the forfeiture provisions in RICO
and CCE in their 1970 form. 39 The pre-1984 cases embody two
competing methods of resolving the uncertainties about RICO for-
feiture. According to what may be called the "strict interpretation,"
RICO is essentially a measure of economic regulation, an anti-trust
act intended to prevent the corruption of the free market by the
importation of mob tactics financed by the proceeds of illegitimate
crime. RICO forfeiture is therefore an instrumental penalty aimed
at the establishment of a cordon sanitaire between the mob and legiti-
mate businesses by forcing the divestiture of interests in such legiti-
mate businesses acquired, maintained, or fostered by corrupt
means. Its effect as punishment is real but incidental to its primary
ENGLAND 463 (1883). All property was forfeit, without any requirement of a "nexus"
between the property and the offense. Thus there was nothing for the finder of fact to
determine, a basic difference between forfeiture of estate and RICO forfeiture.
35 For the difference between in rem and in personam forfeitures, see supra note 1.
36 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1970)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(n) (Supp. III
1985)). For the civil forfeiture authority of the Customs Service, see 21 U.S.C. § 881
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)(controlled substances and property used to facilitate their dis-
tribution); 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-84 (1982) (vehicles carrying contraband); 19 U.S.C. § 1703
(1982)(vessels used in smuggling); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1982)(conveyances used to trans-
porting contraband).
37 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). See generally Moran, The
Meaning of Pattern in RICO, 62 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 139 (1985); Note, The Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organization Act: An Analysis of the Confusion in its Application and a Proposal
for Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441, 450-53 (1980).
38 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4) (1982). See generally Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q.
1009, 1023-28 (1982).
39 For exhaustive discussions of the legislative history of the 1970 Act as a guide to
Congressional intent, see Lynch, Parts I & II, supra note 28, at 664-94; REPORT OF THE AD
Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND




The "loose interpretation," on the other hand, added the for-
feiture of proceeds and of substitute assets to the RICO arsenal. Its
proponents did not deny, of course, that RICO provides for "enter-
prise forfeiture." Rather, they emphasized the independent deter-
rent value of forfeiture as a means of taking the profit out of crime.
They argued that the broader purposes of RICO are not served by
treating the profits of organized crime as sacrosanct until such prof-
its are invested or by an insistence upon the necessity of tracing.
The strict interpretation excluding the forfeiture of profits ac-
cords better with the legislative history of 1970 RICO and with a
careful reading of the text. It is not, however, the more practical
interpretation and it has serious, although inchoate, theoretical diffi-
culties.4' Not surprisingly, the courts have largely rejected it. At-
tempts to apply the strict interpretation created the impression that
RICO was full of loopholes and essentially unworkable. Once cor-
rupt interests in legitimate business were subject to forfeiture, a ban
on the forfeiture of profits and proceeds began to look like an arbi-
trary and unjustified restriction in the war on crime.42 Congress
agreed and ratified the loose interpretation in the 1984 Comprehen-
sive Forfeitures Act and the 1986 amendments, which authorized
the forfeiture of substitute assets.43
There is thus a substantial consensus that the central purpose
of RICO forfeiture is to deter crime by removing the profit. If this is
so, the non-application of in personam forfeiture to all economic and
white-collar crime begins to look anomalous. It may be useful to
trace the process by which this consensus developed from 1970 to
the present before taking a broader and more theoretical
perspective.
40 See, e.g., United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 814 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 833 (1980)(trial judge is without discretion to suspend forfeiture because its
primary purpose is not punishment but separation of the racketeer from his economic
base). The view of RICO forfeiture as predominantly a prophylactic penaltyjustifies the
forfeiture of the assets of a tainted enterprise even if such assets were not acquired
through racketeering activity or "tainted" by use in connection with such activity, see,
e.g., United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 917-18 (11 th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 788
F.2d 1570 (1986)(forfeiture of building housing nightclub whose owner attempted to
eliminate competitor through arson). Such a penalty bears no necessary relation to the
profit made from the crime. See infra notes 280-311 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
42 Judge Cecil F. Poole of the Ninth Circuit complained of this very anomaly in his
dissent in United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 89 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
959 (1983)(Poole, J., dissenting)("In effect, all income except that which is kept in a
mattress would be forfeitable.")
43 See infra note 78.
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A. THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF IN PERSONAM FORFEITURE:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY COMMENT.
The legislative history and contemporary comment about the
re-introduction of criminal or in personam forfeiture into American
law are sketchy. One commentator described RICO as having its
"genesis in social science theory," 44 including economic theory,
about the nature of organized crime and its deleterious effect on
civil society. The remedy was the erection of a wall around organ-
ized crime by criminalizing the investment of proceeds from organ-
ized crime in legitimate business and providing for the forfeiture of
interests so acquired. The proponents of Title IX did not advocate
forfeiture as the appropriate measure of punishment 45 but merely as
a means to this desired separation. As one commentator stated,
"No suggestion appears [in the legislative history] that Congress in-
tended to reach beyond the relevant 'enterprise,' or to forfeit fruits
or profits of racketeering except when used to acquire control of an
'enterprise.' Indeed, there is much evidence to the contrary." 46
The critics of the RICO bill largely aimed their attack at the
impossibility of limiting RICO to this laudable purpose, especially in
view of the absence and constitutional difficulty of any statutory def-
inition of organized crime, 47 the possibility that unrelated convic-
tions might make up a "pattern of racketeering activity," 48 and the
broad reach of the predicate offenses, which included several, such
as stock fraud, not typically associated with organized crime.49 No
critic foresaw that RICO would or could be read to require the for-
44 Baker, Nationalizing Criminal Law: Does Organized Crime Make It Necessary Or Proper?,
16 RUTGERS L.J. 495, 560 (1985).
45 See, e.g. Organized Crime Control, 1970: Hearings on S.30 and Related Proposals Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1970)(state-
ment of Sen. McClellan) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings]. ("[T]itle IX would pun-
ish the criminal appropriately by forfeiting to the government his ill-acquired interests
in a legitimate business, and directly aid the business community by expelling him from
the legitimate business he had abused."). Id. at 107.
46 Taylor, Foreiture under 18 US.C. § 1963: RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 379, 384 (1980).
47 H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (81-96), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4007, 4076-91 (dissenting views of Reps. Conyers, Mikva, and
Ryan on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970)[hereinafterjud. Comm. Rep.]. The
difficulty comes from the necessity of avoiding the creation of a "status offense." See
generally Blakey, Definition of Organized Crime in Statutes and Law Enforcement Administration, in
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 511
(1986) [hereinafter THE IMPACT].
48 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 45, at 490, 499 (statement of Lawrence Speiser,
Dir., Wash. Office, American Civil Liberties Union). This particular fear was laid to rest,
at least for civil RICO, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14,
(1985) (dictum) ("pattern of racketeering" implies related acts).
49 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 45, at 517 (statement of Lawrence Speiser)("theft
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feiture of uninvested criminal proceeds. This possibility may have
been overlooked because of the second major criticism of RICO:
that it was fundamentally unworkable. No prosecutor, it was said,
would take on the additional burden of proving a "pattern" of rack-
eteering activity if he or she could prove the underlying offenses, 50
and the tracing of proceeds was too notoriously difficult to bother
with.5 1 If these predictions were accurate, there would be little rea-
son for alarm about the potential scope of criminal forfeiture. 52 The
critics instead attacked RICO forfeitures as a revival of "forfeiture of
estate,"53 and even as a reversal of 18 U.S.C. § 3563, which has pro-
hibited "corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate" since
1790.54
B. RICO FORFEITURES IN PRACTICE: 1970-1984.
Federal prosecutors made little use of the RICO forfeiture pro-
visions for several years after their adoption,55 as was predicted by
from interstate shipment" regardless of value is an inappropriate predicate offense since
it has no necessary connection to racketeering activity).
50 Unless, of course, the underlying offenses were violations of state, not federal law.
51 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 45, at 329. Id. at 369-70 (testimony of Sheldon H.
Elsen, Chairman, Committee on Federal Legislation, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York).
52 The criminal law section of the American Bar Association, which opposed the pas-
sage of S. 30, did not seriously attack the forfeiture provisions. Subcommittee Hearings,
supra note 45, at 552, 556 (statement of the Section of Criminal Law of the American Bar
Association).
53 Jud Comm. Rep., supra note 47, at 188; Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 45, at 402
(report of the Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York County Lawyers Asso-
ciation). In a letter to Senator McClellan, Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst
defended the constitutionality of the criminal forfeiture provision, "limited as it is ... to
one's interest in the enterprise which is the subject of the specific offense. Jud.
Comm. Rep., supra note 47, at 188.
54 Former 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982), 62 Stat. 837, was repealed by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 212(a)(1), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2031,
effective November 1, 1987. The court in United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980), held that the statute did not prohibit
anything other than forfeiture of a defendant's entire estate as imposed by the common
law for conviction of a felony. The statute, supposedly derived by necessary implication
from the constitutional prohibition of forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood as a
punishment for treason, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2, has several times been adduced
as a bar to the forfeiture of substitute assets. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11-12 (1984), available on Cong. Info. Service H-523-21 (1984) (microfiche) ("giant
step in the direction of 'forfeiture of estate' "). In other words, there is a widespread
opinion that only the actual proceeds of crime may be forfeited. Tracing is therefore
mandatory. This is a dubious argument. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
55 During the decade from 1970-1980, federal grand juries returned indictments
seeking forfeiture under RICO or CCE in only 98 cases with 258 named defendants.
The government sought the forfeiture of only $2 million worth of property. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG
TRAFFICKING 10 (1981)[hereinafter GAO Report]. Practical and institutional difficulties,
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critics. There is no doubt that during the same period, the Drug
Enforcement Authority's civil forfeitures of contraband and instru-
mentalities of drug dealing were of far greater significance. This is
particularly true after 1978, when the DEA obtained statutory au-
thority for the civil forfeiture of assets traceable to narcotics transac-
tions and the cash involved in narcotics dealings.56
As a result of this lag, the courts had little occasion to rule on
the problems of RICO and CCE forfeitures until the late 197 0s. De-
spite some hesitation, which aroused the annoyance of critics, 57 the
practical problems of administering RICO forfeitures then drove
the courts toward a theory of forfeiture as punishment rather than
prophylactic. The key step was the determination that RICO did
not apply only to the victimization of legitimate enterprises by a
"pattern of racketeering." The circuit courts overwhelmingly held
that a criminal conspirary could be a RICO enterprise,58 despite
more than legal and theoretical considerations, prevented the significant use of RICO
forfeitures during their first decade. Assistant United States Attorneys were, quite natu-
rally, judged and rewarded for numbers of convictions obtained, not for the value of
property forfeited. Id. at 23-24. Introducing a forfeiture count into an indictment vastly
increased the burden of investigation and proof and thus the time spent on each case to
the detriment of the conviction rate. Moreover, each delay in prosecution necessitated
by the preparation of the forfeiture case increased the risk that the criminal would get
away at a time when the essential facts establishing his guilt were already known. Id. at
58, 68. Finally, even the use of RICO might be an unnecessary complication quite apart
from the difficulties of forfeiture. It might be cleaner and simpler to prosecute for the
predicate offenses alone, which would have to be proved in any event. Id. at 60-61. See
Dombrink and Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution: The Use and Abuse of RICO, 16 RUTGERS
L.J. 633, 649 (1985)(illustrating difficulties added to prosecution when forfeiture is
sought).
These practical and institutional considerations obviously did not vanish after 1980
and in fact to some extent survived the 1984 adoption of the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME,
BUSINESS AND LABOR UNIONS 307 (1986)[hereinafter THE EDGE].
56 The Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(1), 92 Stat.
3777 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1982)).
The effectiveness of DEA civil forfeitures after 1978 is clear: in 1980, the DEA
seized $90 million in assets, of which $42 million was forfeited. Forfeiture in Drug Cases:
Hearings on H.R. 2646, H.R. 2910, H.R. 4110, and H.R. 5371 Before the Subcomm. on Crime
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 49 (1983), available on
Cong. Info. Service H-521-60 (1983) (microfiche) [hereinafter 1981-82 Hearings]
(statement of Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman).
57 See, e.g., Note, RICO: Are the Courts Construing the Legislative History Rather Than the
Statute Itself., 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 777 (1980) (questioning United States v. Sutton, 605
F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (1980)(en banc)). See infra note 59 and
accompanying text.
58 See United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d 1001, 1006-09 (6th Cir. 1980)(en banc), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 992-93 (3rd Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568-69 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 896-98 (5th Cir. 1978),
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powerful arguments to the contrary. 59 In United States v. Turkette60
the Supreme Court agreed, holding that an association organized
solely for criminal purposes, including the commission of the of-
fenses charged as a predicate to RICO liability, could be a RICO
"enterprise."' 6' This interpretation, eliminating any requirement
that an "enterprise" be the target or beneficiary of criminal corrup-
tion, effectively proscribed the predicate offenses directly. 62 One re-
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977),
vacated and reo'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978), 591 F.2d 278, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
854 (1979). United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975).
59 See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd 452 U.S. 576
(1981); United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 264-69, n.44 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated 642
F.2d 1001 (1980)(en banc). The principal argument is that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1970)
prohibits participating in the affairs of an "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering
activity; it would be redundant to read this as creating the independent federal crime of
participating in a criminal organization by committing the very crimes the group was
organized to commit. Therefore the statute must refer to an entity distinct from the
cooperative criminal efforts of the defendants. This interpretation is consistent with the
legislative history, which showed with "remarkable clarity" that the act was aimed at
prohibiting the infiltration of legitimate business and the investment of illegally earned
income therein. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 266. Such infiltration is supposedly a new evil, as
opposed to "the age old problem of crime for crime's sake." Sutton, 605 F.2d at 268.
The court in Sutton acknowledged that the RICO definition of "enterprise," 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4) (1982), is broad enough to include criminal associations which might have an
identifiable existence and function apart from the particular predicate acts which go to
make up the pattern of racketeering activity. But the statute does not suggest what facts
would go to show the existence of such a criminal enterprise, and therefore gives no
notice to potential violators of what activities would bring them within the ambit of
RICO.
60 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
61 Id. at 580-81.
62 The Supreme Court did insist that the existence of the criminal enterprise as an
"ongoing organization, formal or informal," was a distinct element of the offense; but it
acknowledged that in many instances the proof of such element may "coalesce" with the
proof of the predicate racketeering activity by the members of the organization. Turkette,
452 U.S. at 583. See, e.g., United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 362 (D.C. Cir.
1988) ("... the existence of the enterprise may be inferred from proof of the pattern");
United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 849
(1983)("crime family" engaged in illegal gambling and loan sharking). The court in
Riccobene stated: "The function of overseeing and coordinating the commission of sev-
eral different predicate offenses and other activities on an ongoing basis is adequate to
satisfy the separate existence requirement." Id. at 224 (footnote omitted). Accord United
States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1094 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 228 (1987)
(no jury instruction required "breaking down the elements of an enterprise.")
The courts have effectively rendered the "enterprise" requirement nugatory. For
example, in United States v. Brennan, 629 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), aft'd, 798 F.2d
581 (2d Cir. 1986), a justice of the Queens Supreme Court was convicted of violating
RICO by soliciting and accepting bribes. The court held the Queens Supreme Court to
be the "enterprise" which the judge was conducting through a pattern of racketeering.
See also United States v. Yonan, 800 F.2d 164, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1986)(defense attorney
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sult, as the Supreme Court acknowledged, 63 was the expansion of
federal jurisdiction over state crimes. The Supreme Court regarded
such expanded jurisdiction as a deliberate response by Congress to
the aggravated threat posed by organized crime to the social
fabric. 64 Since organized crime obtains the resources with which it
corrupts legitimate business from wholly criminal activities, 65 it
would be absurd to prevent the government from using RICO di-
rectly against such activities. 66
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Turkette has significant impli-
cations for forfeitures. 67 If RICO enterprises include the organized
criminal activities themselves, then the criminals' "interests" therein
must be forfeitable. However, organized crime rings are not formed
as corporations or partnerships and the participants are not share-
holders. Rather each criminal's "partnership share" is equivalent to
his share of the proceeds of the criminal enterprise. 68 Such pro-
ceeds should be forfeitable as an "interest" acquired in violation of
§ 1962 whether invested in a legitimate business and real or per-
sonal property or simply banked or buried in a basement. In fact,
the attack upon the resources mustered by organized crime can be
most effectively carried out by their forfeiture at the earliest possible
moment. Thus RICO, to be of any use, must authorize the forfei-
ture of criminal proceeds in whatever form they are held.
In 1983, the Supreme Court endorsed this highly pragmatic
reading of RICO in Russello v. United States.69 Curiously, two of the
three Circuit Courts of Appeals which had previously considered the
issue had held that forfeitable interests under RICO did not include
proceeds from the crime despite the Supreme Court's earlier antici-
pation of this result in Turkette.70 These courts relied heavily on the
guilty of participating in affairs of state's attorney's office through pattern of bribing
prosecutors), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 930 (1987).
63 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87.
64 Id. at 588-89.
65 Id. at 591-92.
66 Id. at 590, 592-93.
67 Id. at 585, 591-93.
68 Of course, the "partnership share" of each criminal conspirator may be defined as
property contributed to the enterprise in kind or its value. In reality such property will
ordinarily be loaned to the enterprise, for example, a vehicle used for the transportation
of contraband. Such a vehicle is subject to civil and criminal forfeiture quite apart from
RICO. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985); cf. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985). See infra notes 236-48 and accompanying text. See Taylor, supra note 46, at
392 (Congress did not intend RICO forfeitures to include instrumentalities of crime).
69 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
70 Russello affirmed the opinion of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Martino, 681
F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982). Contra United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763
(9th Cir. 1980)(government not entitled to forfeit all sums paid or payable under con-
342 [Vol. 79
RATIONALIZING CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
fact that the CCE, enacted by Congress in the same month as RICO,
authorized the forfeiture of profits from drug offenses earned
through a "continuing criminal enterprise."' 7' They argued that if
Congress had intended the same result in RICO forfeitures, it
would have explicitly stated this. 72
Of course, if the dominant purpose of RICO is "to divest the
[criminal] association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains," 73 there is
no apparent reason why forfeiture should be limited to the actual
proceeds and assets into which the proceeds have been provably
transformed. Such a limitation only rewards the racketeer who dis-
sipates his loot untraceably 74 or launders it successfully. 75 Rather
the convicted defendant should forfeit from his total wealth prop-
erty equal in value to his criminal gains, equal in value to his crimi-
nal gains-in short, "substitute assets." 76
tracts obtained by misuse of confidential bidding information obtained by bribery);
United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276, 283-87 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated, 464 U.S. 979
(1983)(government was denied forfeiture of legal fees paid for procuring lower tax as-
sessments by bribery). See also United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga.
1979)("the 'interest' subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) is limited to the
interest in the enterprise and does not extend to fruits or profits generated from the
enterprise"), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982);
United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977)(dictum)(the govern-
ment did not seek forfeiture, having conceded that the defendant ceased to participate
in the RICO enterprise before his indictment; but even if it had, profits or fruits received
from the enterprise are not forfeitable as an interest in the enterprise or a source of
influence over it).
71 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982), repealed by Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 305(a)(3), 98 Stat. 2050. The penalties for CCE violations, in
common with other federal drug violations, now include forfeiture of proceeds. 21
U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
72 The Supreme Court's treatment of this objection in Russello was less than cogent.
Besides simply denying the relevance of the CCE penalties to RICO, the Supreme Court
said that the narcotics business, in contrast to organized crime, "usually generates only
monetary profits .. " Russello, 464 U.S. at 25. However, illegal gambling, which is the
second most important source of organized crime income, is no less a cash business.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AMERICA'S HABIT: DRUG ABUSE, DRUG
TRAFFICKING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME 6-7 (1986)[hereinafter AMERICA'S HABIT] (Drug
trafficking is the most lucrative organized crime activity, but accounts for less than 38
percent of all organized crime activity).
73 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 585.
74 "[A] racketeer who dissipates the profits or proceeds of his racketeering activity on
wine, women and song has profited from organized crime to the same extent as if he had
put the money in his bank account." United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th
Cir. 1985).
75 United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
76 Some courts and commentators were of the opinion that there is a statutory or
even constitutional requirement of a "nexus" between the crime and the property for-
feited. They claimed that the forfeiture of an equivalent value of substitute assets re-
sembles "forfeiture of estate," particularly in the common case of the criminal whose
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The courts endorsed these conclusions by holding that 1970
RICO permitted the forfeiture of substitute assets;77 then Congress
amended RICO to provide explicitly for such forfeitures. 78 But
RICO forfeiture has still not been transformed from a method of
compelling divestiture of criminal interests in legitimate business
into a simple and automatic measure of retribution, for specified
crimes. 79 The "loose interpretation" of the statute has not sup-
planted the "strict interpretation;- 8 0 it has merely extended the
reach of forfeiture. Now that substitute assets in the amount of ille-
property is traceable to illegal activity and whose illegal gains over time exceed the value
of his current assets. United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 806 (7th Cir. 1986)(Rip-
ple, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 475 U.S.10 11 (1986). There is, however, a sharp distinc-
tion between the forfeiture of the value of ill-gotten gains and the forfeiture of all one's
property upon conviction of any felony. If substitute assets are forfeited, they are, or
should be, limited in value to the provable proceeds of the very crimes of which the
defendant stands convicted. Such limitation provides a sufficient "nexus" to the crime.
GAO Report, supra note 55, at 4-5, 34-35.
77 See United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1011 (1986)(en banc) (forfeiture of amount of legal fee received in connection with
tax appeals facilitated by the payment of bribes, regardless of tracing); United States v.
Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 969 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986)(or-
dered forfeiture of proceeds of fraudulently obtained loans, only a small portion of
which were traceable into specific assets). Contra United States v. McManigal, 723 F.2d
580, 581 (7th Cir. 1983)(government was denied forfeiture of legal fees paid for procur-
ing lowered tax assessments by bribery). Ginsburg reversed the conclusions of a Seventh
Circuit panel in United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 1984)(If the
proceeds have been dissipated on "wine, women and song," the defendant may still be
adequately punished by fine and imprisonment.).
78 The Department ofJustice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-570, § 1153(a), 100 Stat. 3207-13 authorized the forfeiture of substitute assets
by amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. III 1985), adding a new subsection:
(n) if any of the property described in subsection (a), as a result of any act or omis-
sion of the defendant-
(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without
difficulty; the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant
up to the value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).
See also 21 U.S.C.S. § 853(p) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1988). Curiously, the Comprehen-
sive Forfeiture Act of 1984 both adopted and repealed provisions for the forfeiture of
substitute assets identical with new 18 U.S.C. § 1963(n). Compare Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 302, 98 Stat. 2040, adding new subsection 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d), and Pub. L. No. 98-
473, § 303, 98 Stat. 2045, adding new subsection 21 U.S.C. § 853(d), with Pub. L. No.
473, § 2301(b), (e)(1), 98 Stat. 2192-93, deleting the same subsections. The adoption of
these provisions was apparently an accident, see United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp.
1332, 1336 (D. Colo. 1985); the House-Senate Conference Committee intended to de-
lete them from the final bill, H.R. REP. No. 1159, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Amend. No.
159(15), at 419 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182.
79 It is the thesis of this Article that such a transformation is desirable. See infra notes
376-82 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 339-43 and accompanying text.
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gal proceeds are subject to forfeiture, there is less need to trace the
proceeds themselves. Attempting to extract the proceeds from third
parties may still be easier. Of course, criminals will still try to con-
ceal their assets, but the United States, as a judgment creditor, has
the power to rescind any fraudulent conveyances and/or attach as-
sets in the hands of third parties.81
The Comprehensive Forfeitures Act of 1984, however, did not,
as finally adopted, authorize the forfeiture of substitute assets,8 2
although it provided for a substantial equivalent by imposing an op-
tional fine of up to twice the gross profits from the offense.83 It
therefore seemed necessary to provide for restraints upon the trans-
fer of property subject to forfeiture at the earliest possible moment
and to reach such property in the hands of others. 84 The 1970 Act,
while authorizing such restraints, did not provide any standards or
procedures for imposing them,8 5 and the courts manifested extreme
hesitation in developing such procedures. At least one court held,
despite the statutory authorization, that a pre-conviction restraining
order was incompatible with the presumption of innocence and a
defendant's right not to incriminate himself 8 6 The courts also were
troubled by the seizure or attachment of the defendant's property
81 See infra notes 93 and 94 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 78.
83 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. III 1985); 21 U.S.C. § 855 (Supp. III 1985) states: "In
lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this section, a defendant who derives profits or
other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or
other proceeds."
84 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, supra note 5. Under subsection (e)(1), the
issuance of a restraining order is discretionary with the court, but no special showing is
required to restrain the transfer of forfeitable property named in the indictment or, ap-
parently, in a bill of particulars. Some courts have held that a hearing is required and
the government must show a substantial likelihood that the property is subject to forfei-
ture. See, e.g., United States v. Perholtz, 622 F. Supp. 1253, 1259 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd
842 F..2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
85 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1970) simply provided that "the district courts.., shall have
jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other ac-
tions ... in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under
this section, as it shall deem proper." The same language appeared in 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(d) (1970)(continuing criminal enterprises), repealed by Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 305, 98 Stat. 2050.
86 United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 683 (D. Md. 1976):
A finding that the government would be likely to prevail on the merits at trial, which
would appear necessary to enter such an order, is equivalent to a determination that
the defendants are likely to lose at trial. It constitutes a pretrial determination that
the defendants are probably guilty .... Further, a hearing would compel the de-
fendants to defend themselves against the government's allegations. If they choose
to speak, what they say may later be used against them at trial.
The court suggested, however, that a restraining order might issue when the govern-
ment met its burden of showing a likelihood that the defendants would transfer or dissi-
pate their assets before trial. Id. at 683-84.
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upon an ex parte application. The entry of an indictment identify-
ing certain property as subject to forfeiture was no substitute for the
immediate adversary hearing required by Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and indeed by due process.8 7 Finally, most
courts held that the United States must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that it will be able to establish the guilt of the defend-
ant and the forfeitability of the named property beyond a reasonable
doubt.8 8
C. THE 1984 REFORMS AND THE REACTION OF THE COURTS.
Congress attempted to reverse these results in the Comprehen-
sive Forfeiture Act of 1984 ("CFA").89 From a theoretical stand-
point, the most remarkable innovation in the CFA was "relation
back," the principle that the government's title to property subject
to forfeiture vests at the moment of the crime.90 Because the crimi-
nal cannot pass a title he does not have, the effect of "relation back"
is to invalidate transfers made after the crime, with the statutory ex-
ception of transfers to "a bonafide purchaser for value.., who at the
time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the
property was subject to forfeiture. . ."91 This principle, which is
87 United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 994 (1985); United States v. Crozier (Crozier 1), 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir.
1982), vacated, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984)(grant of interlocutory appeal from the issuance of a
temporary restraining order ex parte); United States v. Veon (Veon I), 538 F. Supp. 237,
244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1982)("principle of lenity" in interpreting criminal statutes requires
resolution of supposed ambiguity in CCE procedures in favor of a timely post-seizure
hearing).
88 See United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Crozier (Crozier I), 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Long, 654
F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Veon (Veon I), 538 F. Supp. 237, 246,
(E.D. Cal. 1982). Cf. United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488, 490 (E.D. Mich.
1983)("clear and convincing evidence").
89 See supra note 5.
90 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. III 1985); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. III 1985).
91 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (Supp. III 1985). The 1984 Act also extended the relation
back principle to civil in rem forfeiture of controlled substances and property used in the
commission of drug offenses. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (Supp. III 1985). This statute pro-
vides no exception for bona fide transferees for value without notice. Id. Presumably
such a transferee is relegated to an administrative petition for remission of forfeiture,
Forfeiture Regulations, supra note 31, in which he or she may establish his or her good
faith, innocence, and lack of "knowledge of the particular violation which subjected the
property to seizure and forfeiture." The standards set forth in the administrative regula-
tions are difficult to reconcile with the "relation back" theory, because the petitioner
must also establish a "valid ... interest in the seized property," id. at § 9.5(c)(1), which
is not possible if title was vested in the United States at the time the property was trans-
ferred to him.
"Relation back" was anticipated in United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3rd Cir.
1981), a pre-CFA case. The Third Circuit, by upholding the issuance of a restraining
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essentially without historical precedent,9 2'provides a theoretical jus-
tification for pre-indictment restraining orders and for the seizure of
property in the hands of third-party transferees for value, most no-
tably including both retainers to defense attorneys and fees already
paid for services rendered.9 3 The statutes specifically authorize
such restraining orders and seizures.9 4 Congress also provided that
order prohibiting the further transfer of an airplane sold by a defendant to his attorneys
before indictment, impliedly treated the interest of the United States in forfeitable drug
proceeds as attaching at the time of the offense. The attorneys paid $31,000 in cash for
the plane, but kept $50,000 as a retainer, $29,000 as an advance against the future ex-
penses of representation, and $30,000 to discharge the client's existing debt. At the
time of the sale, the defendant was about to be indicted, as the attorneys knew. The
court never addressed the fact that the sale was partially in satisfaction of past indebted-
ness and did not say whether the attorneys ultimately would be able to enforce a lien
against the plane for $30,000.
92 Forfeitures of estate in cases of treason related back to the time of the offense as to
realty but not as to chattels precisely because "chattels are of so vague and fluctuating a
nature. . ." that an attempt to undo intermediate transactions with respect to them
would result in confusion and injustice. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *421. See also
United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 18 (1890); United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 415 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting). As Yorke stated, "As to the
Forfeiture of Goods... before Sentence [the offender] may apply them to the Payment
of Debts to the Subsistence of himself and Family, and is prevented only from a fraudu-
lent Sale to disappoint the Forfeiture." C. YORKE, supra note 1, at 70-71.
An influential author who otherwise defended forfeiture of estate found the relation
back of the government's title to real property to the time of the offense to be objection-
able because it might result in the dispossession of "fair purchasers" and leave "honest
creditors" without remedy. W. EDEN, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAw 40-41 (1771).
In 1779, the New York legislature, like that of other states, passed a bill of attainder
directed against Tories who had fled the state. This bill provided for the forfeiture of all
property which the Tories possessed as of July 9, 1776, unless they presented them-
selves by a date certain to stand trial for high treason. The New York State Council of
Revision objected on the grounds, inter alia, that the forfeitures related back to the New
York declaration of independence without making any provision for the payment of
debts contracted in the interim or for the interests of bonafide purchasers from the trai-
tors. Objections of the Council of Revision to the Bill Entitled "An Act for Forfeitures and Confisca-
tions andfor Declaring the Sovereignty of the People of this State," 10 (March 14, 1779)(available
in Harvard Law Library).
In the case of civil forfeiture, the traditional rule was "[t]hat in the absence of any
express terms in the statute declaring an instantaneous forfeiture, the forfeiture relates
back to the time of seizure only." United States v. 396 Barrels Distilled Spirits, 28 F.
Cas. 121, 125 (E.D. Mo. 1866). See Stowell, 133 U.S. at 19 (interest ofinnocentmortga-
gee of brewery in which illegal distilling operations were carried out protected against
forfeiture, but mortgagor's quitclaim deed, given in lieu of foreclosure after the offense
had been committed, was ineffective); Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at
Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 780 (1977).
93 United States v. Truglio, 660 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. W. Va. 1987), interpreting pre-
1984 RICO, upheld the validity of the defendant's assignment to his counsel, in pay-
ment of bona fide attorney's fees, of cash which the government had seized before his
indictment and which was adjudged forfeit at trial. See infra note 111 and accompanying
text.
94 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(2) (Supp. III 1985) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(l)(B) (Supp. III
1985), in identical language, authorize the entry of 10 day exparte temporary restraining
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restraining orders or injunctions may be entered upon the filing of
an indictment or information alleging that the identified property
would be subject to forfeiture upon conviction. 95 This was an at-
tempt to forestall the hearings mandated by the courts under 1970
RICO and CCE which tended to become mini-trials on the defend-
ant's guilt of the underlying offense. 96 Congress further denied
standing to intervene and the right to commence an independent
action to any third party who asserts an interest in property subject
to forfeiture, until the defendant has been convicted. 97
On the whole, the courts have not been friendly to these proce-
dural innovations. Several courts have held that, although a tempo-
rary restraining order against the transfer of the defendant's assets
may issue without notice or hearing after indictment, the defendant
is entitled within ten days to a new hearing, at which the govern-
ment has the burden of proof.98 However, the "relation-back" fic-
orders before indictment on a showing of "probable cause to believe that the property
.. would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture ... and that provision of
notice will jeopardize the availability of the property ...... 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)
(2)(Supp. III 1985) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (Supp. III 1985) authorize the entry of
temporary restraining orders for 90 days which may be extended for good cause before
indictment after notice and hearing upon a determination that:
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the issue of
forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will result in property being destroyed,
removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise being made unavailable for
forfeiture; and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of the
requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom the order is to
be entered.
95 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1)(A) (Supp. III
1985).
96 The particular problem supposedly solved by these provisions was the reluctance
of federal prosecutors to tip their hands by the introduction of most or all of the evi-
dence of the defendant's guilt at the hearing on the issuance of a post-indictment re-
straining order. Supposedly prosecutors were deterred from seeking such an order at
all. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, 195-196, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3374, 3378-79. See United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 386
(10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482, 486 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
97 18 U.S.C. § 1963(j) (Supp. III 1985); 21 U.S.C. § 853(k) (Supp. III 1985). The
Ninth Circuit has declared these provisions unconstitutional. United States v. Crozier
(Crozier II), 777 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1985). See Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 747, 761
(1985): "Intentionally or not.., the procedural changes enacted by the CFA reflect an
unusual and unarticulated congressional judgment that the property interests of an in-
dicted criminal defendant warrant greater procedural due process safeguards than the
property interests of innocent third parties." See also Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeit-
able Interests, and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. REv. 57, 79-80 (1983)(due process re-
quires that third parties whose property interests are affected must be permitted to
intervene and present evidence to the jury before forfeiture).
98 The court in United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1468 (5th Cir. 1986), held that
an order restraining the defendant from transferring that portion of his property alleg-
edly subject to forfeiture may be issued after indictment without notice or hearing. The
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tion has important substantive consequences as well. By
indictment supplies the necessary notice and probable cause; the likelihood that the gov-
ernment will suffer irreparable injury is assumed. Id. at 1469. Such an order, however,
like any temporary restraining order under FED. R. Civ. P. 65, expires after 10 days. The
government then has the burden of proof on the traditional four elements for the issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction:
(1) There is a substantial likelihood that the government will prevail on the merits
of its claim;
(2) The government risks irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued;
(3) The threatened injury to the government from non-issuance must outweigh
the risk of harm to the defendant from the injunction.
(4) The entry of the injunction must be consistent with the public interest.
Id. at 1470.
This decision leaves unresolved the question of how the government's interest in
assuring the availability of property for forfeiture is to be weighed against the interest of
the defendant in having funds available for the purposes of his defense and the support
of his family. See 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 56, at 189-190 (testimony ofJeffrey Har-
ris, Deputy Associate Attorney General). Because forfeiture is a penalty mandated by
law, it is difficult to conceive under what circumstances an injunction in aid of forfeiture,
intended to preserve property of the government, might be considered inconsistent with
the public interest.
United States v. Perholtz, 622 F. Supp. 1253 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 842 F.2d 343
(D.C. Cir. 1988) more realistically eschewed any abstract balancing of injuries and inter-
ests. Rather, the government must show, besides a likelihood of success on the merits:
[A] substantial likelihood (1) that failure to enter the order will result in the prop-
erty being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court or otherwise made
unavailable for forfeiture; and (2) that the need to preserve the availability of the
property outweighs the hardship that the order may impose on the party against
whom the order is entered.
Id. at 1259.
United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1343 (D. Colo. 1985), endorsed the
standard approved in Thier as one possible test. Id. at 1345. The court argued that
because the entry of a post-indictment restraining order or injunction is not mandatory,
18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985), the court must exercise its discretion with
reference to some standard. The court declined to issue a restraining order on the
strength of the indictment alone because the conclusory allegations in the indictment
were inadequate to meet any due process standard. Id. at 1351. The court's under-
standing of what process is required, however, was inseparable from its conclusion that
RICO does not mandate the forfeiture of attorney's fees paid in good faith for services
rendered, id. at 1349, even if they are paid after the indictment has put the lawyer on
notice, and that a blanket restraining order might impermissibly burden the defendant's
sixth amendment right to the counsel of his choice. Id. at 1349-50. Therefore, the gov-
ernment must show at a hearing that the proposed injunction would not so burden the
defendant's rights and must exempt therefrom sums reasonably necessary to pay for the
defense, unless the defendant will enjoy appointed counsel of his choice.
United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987), reh 'g granted, (Jan. 29, 1988),
on the other hand, upheld attorney fee forfeiture against constitutional challenge. See
infra notes 110-131 and accompanying text. However, the court still agreed that the
mere fact that the property is listed in the indictment does not establish with sufficient
certainty that it is tainted by crime. Whenever the defendant's ability to pay attorney's
fees is in question, a hearing at which the government has the burden of demonstrating
the likelihood that the assets are forfeitable is constitutionally required. The court re-
fused to take into account the injury the defendant might suffer from the restraining
order, however, thus differing from Perholtz, 622 F. Supp. at 1259.
In United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1986), however, the district
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invalidating most third-party transfers after the commission of the
offense giving rise to forfeiture, and putting the burden on the
transferee to prove, not just his good faith, but his ignorance of the
transferor's criminal activities, the CFA in effect established a new
class of collateral civil forfeitures. 99 The proceeds of crime or their
traceable derivatives are now forfeitable in the hands of persons,
innocent of any criminal offense, who have had knowing business
dealings with criminals, although such dealings were at arm's length
and for value. This result is an extension of familiar principles of
civil forfeiture.' 00 It has, until recently, been true that one who, for
example, lends an automobile to a bootlegger is at risk of forfeiture
if untaxed liquor is found in the car regardless of the owner's lack of
guilty knowledge.' 10 The rationale is that instrumentalities of
crime, no less than contraband, are "guilty" and therefore subject to
condemnation. 0 2 The innocence of the seller is beside the point.10 3
The central innovation of the CFA is to treat the profits and pro-
ceeds of crime no differently. All law-abiding people henceforth
may have commercial dealings with known criminals only at their
peril. Under the CFA, the heart surgeon who performs a by-pass
upon a patient widely reputed to be a mobster may forfeit his fee,
because he may have reason to believe that the money used to pay
him originated in crimes chargeable under RICO. 10 4 In fact, the or-
dinary citizen who sells his house to a known racketeer may forfeit
the sales price, even though the racketeer has converted the pro-
ceeds of his crime into a traceable and attachable asset which is also
court issued an order restraining the transfer of certain property of the defendants on
the basis of allegations in their indictment for drug racketeering. The Tenth Circuit
held that the defendants were not entitled to a subsequent hearing on their claims that
no nexus existed between the property whose transfer was restrained and the acts of
racketeering alleged. Although the indictment alleged the existence of such a nexus in
merely conclusory terms, the court indulged a conclusive presumption that the grand
jury had heard sufficient evidence of the connection. Id. at 386. For a criticism of this
view, see Reed, supra note 97, at 764 (grand juries do not in fact pass separately on the
forfeitability of each scheduled asset).
99 Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302 (1984), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(1)(6)(B)
(West Supp. 1987).
100 See injia notes 241-74 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g.,J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
102 Id. at 510-11.
103 In recent years, the Supreme Court has impliedly introduced a negligence stan-
dard into civil forfeiture law, permitting an innocent owner to recover if he meets a high
standard of care in his dealings. See infra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
104 Congressman WilliamJ. Hughes of New Jersey raised the hypothetical forfeiture
of a surgeon's fee. Forfeiture Issues: Hearings on H.R. 273 and 1193 before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciam,, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1985) [hereinafter
1985 Forfeiture Hearings].
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subject to forfeiture.10 5
Whatever one may think of these consequences of the CFA as
policy, 106 they are a natural development from RICO, which seeks
to drive a wedge between organized crime and the rest of society. If
the attempts to effectuate this purpose by regulating the activities of
criminals have largely failed, the next logical step is to penalize and
criminalize dealings with criminals by those who are not otherwise
wrongdoers. 10 7 There is no indication in the legislative history of
the CFA that Congress understood that it was imposing a collateral
civil forfeiture upon innocent persons dealing with RICO offend-
ers,' 0 8 a fact which should count for little against the clear and un-
ambiguous language of the statute. The Justice Department
apparently recognized that it could have such an collateral effect:
105 Only one court has so far recognized this possibility in dictum. In re Caplin &
Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 644 (4th Cir. 1988)(en banc)("Neither restraining orders nor a
merchant's refusal to sell to the defendant for fear of future forfeiture violates that de-
fendant's rights."). TheJustice Department has not sought such a forfeiture in any re-
ported case. Cf. United States v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 647 F. Supp. 732
(W.D.N.C. 1986) discussed infra at note 110.
106 See infra notes 239-79 and accompanying text.
107 Congress has taken this step more directly in the Money Laundering Control Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, Subtitle H, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.S. §§ 1956, 1957 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)), which imposed a criminal penalty of
fine or imprisonment for a term of up to ten years for knowingly engaging "in a mone-
tary transaction in criminally derived property.., derived from specified unlawful activ-
ity," 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). "Criminally derived property" is
defined as "any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a crimi-
nal offense," 18 U.S.C.S. § 1957(f)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). "Specified unlawful
activity" includes all RICO and CCE predicate offenses, miscellaneous other federal of-
fenses, and offenses against the drug control laws of foreign nations. Compare 18
U.S.C.S. § 1957(f)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) with 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(c)(7) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987). A "monetary transaction" is "the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or ex-
change . . . of funds . . . by, through, or to a financial institution." 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 1957(0(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). Arguably this would penalize, for example, the
arm's length vendor of a house to a buyer who paid with the proceeds of crime, at least if
a check was used to pay any portion of the purchase price. It is doubtful that Congress
intended this result.
In addition to the criminal penalties mentioned above, one convicted of violating
the Money Laundering Control Act forfeits "any property, real or personal, which repre-
sents the gross receipts ... obtained ... as a result of such offense, or which is traceable
to such gross receipts." 18 U.S.C.S. § 982(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). The Attorney
General may also seize and civilly forfeit such receipts. 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(a)(1)(A) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1987). Nojudicial decree of forfeiture is required if the value of the prop-
erty is under $100,000 unless the claimant files a claim stating his interest in the prop-
erty and posts bond within 20 days. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 1607-1609 (Law Co-op. Supp.
1987). The constitutionality of such administrative forfeitures, including the bond re-
quirement, was upheld in Faldraga v. Cames, 674 F. Supp. 845, 849 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
108 In the 1982 hearings on predecessor bills to the CFA before the House Subcom-
mittee on Crime, one private witness, William W. Taylor, characterized "relation back"
as effectively introducing a new in rem forfeiture. 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 56, at
203.
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"[S]ome lawyers may decline to represent a CCE or RICO defend-
ant.., from the natural caution that anyone might exercise in decid-
ing not to deal with a defendant facing a CCE or RICO charge
unless there are reasonable assurances that any money received is
from a legitimate source."109
To date, however, lawyers are the only non-criminal third par-
ties who have been threatened with this extended civil forfeiture. 10
As a result, every case dealing with the "relation-back" principle of
the CFA has turned on the defendant's qualified sixth amendment
right to counsel. Most of the district courts that have considered the
question have simply denied that Congress intended for bonafide at-
torney's fees to be forfeited despite the "relation back" principle,
which necessarily gives the government a title prior to that of the
attorney defending the case in which forfeiture is sought.' 1 t They
109 Forfeiture of Assets Intended for Use as Attorneys Fees, 1986: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 Forfeiture Hear-
ings](statement of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General)(emphasis added), avail-
able at Cong. Inf. Service S521-15 (1987).
110 In United States v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 647 F. Supp. 732 (W.D.N.C.
1986), the government seized $10,000 from a corporation on a warrant obtained exparte
with a view toward civil forfeiture. The defendant in a pending criminal action had paid
the money for corporate stock, apparently in a good faith arm's length transaction. The
government alleged that the money was the proceeds of the sale of controlled sub-
stances. The court quashed the seizure on the ground that the procedures authorized in
21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) violate due process because a clerk, as op-
posed to a "neutral magistrate," may issue the warrant without probable cause. The
facts suggest no reason why the government was not content to seize the stock.
111 United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1986), is the purest exam-
ple. After the defendant was convicted and his property was forfeited under 21 U.S.C.
§ 853 (Supp. III 1985), his court-appointed counsel petitioned for payment of his fee
from such property. Clearly counsel had no "legal right, title or interest in the property
...," 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (Supp. III 1985), title to which was vested in the United
States government. Nor was he a bona fide purchaser who, at the time of purchase, was
"reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture .... 21
U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (Supp. III 1985). Nonetheless the court granted the petition:
"determining that the forfeited money provides a source of funds available for paying
[counsel's] attorney's fees would not conflict with the forfeiture statute's purpose of
preventing pre-conviction transactions designed to avoid forfeiture." 645 F. Supp. at
456-57.
See also United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1986); United
States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F.
Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D.
Colo. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 245 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1985)(en banc)(dictum), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); contra Payden v. United
States, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1985). Cf. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981)(upholding an order re-
straining attorneys from transferring an airplane, probably proceeds of crime, which
they had received from their client); United States v. Seventy Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy Six Dollars in U.S. Currency, 677 F. Supp. 639, 643 (N.D. Cal. 1987)(dic-
turn) (Congress did not resolve the issue whether attorney's fees are exempt from forfei-
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have so held despite the manifest inability of defense counsel to
qualify as good faith purchasers "reasonably without cause to be-
lieve that the property was subject to forfeiture .... -112
In so interpreting the statute the courts have not been rigor-
ously analytical. Perhaps the courts have not been quite honest
either. The legislative history, they have claimed, reveals that the
third party forfeiture provisions were aimed only at sham transfers,
money laundering, and fraudulent conveyances. 1t3 In particular,
some courts have claimed that Congress did not intend to subject
bona fide attorney's fees to forfeiture.' 14 The threat of forfeiture
upon conviction and of restraining orders preventing the payment
of retainers before trial may induce defense counsel to refuse RICO
cases" 15 and such refusal tends to deprive defendants of their quali-
fied right to counsel of their choice. 116 Congress could not have
intended such an unconstitutional result and any statutory ambigui-
ties should therefore be resolved so as to save the constitutionality
ture under 21 U.S.C. § 853). The court in United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 929
(4th Cir. 1987), upheld the result in United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md.
1986). The court in Harvey held that the forfeiture of attorney's fees was indeed uncon-
stitutional, but acknowledged that Congress had intended to provide for such forfeiture.
112 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1987); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (Supp. III
1985).
113 See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1342, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985).
114 Id. at 1347.
115 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 245 n.3 (2d Cir.
1985)(en banc)(dictum)("the potential loss of attorney's fees under forfeiture provisions
of RICO presents problem of retaining any lawyer."), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 1108 (1986);
United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (E.D. Va. 1986); United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(attorney of target of grand jury
investigation subpoenaed, with intent to discover fees paid which might be subject to
forfeiture).
In contrast, when the government subpoenaed the already indicted defendant's
newly retained counsel, seeking to discover his fee arrangements, with a view toward
forfeiture, another federal district court denied that the threat of forfeiture would have
any impact on the quality of the representation, saying that the ethical attorney will rep-
resent his client zealously regardless of the risk of non-payment. In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839, 848-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
There is some empirical evidence that this fear is well founded. Genego, Reports
from the Field. Prosecutorial Practices Compromising Effective Criminal Defense, The Champion
(May 1986), reprinted in 1986 Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 109, at 163-74. Genego re-
counts the results of a survey of members of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers with respect to a variety of government tactics allegedly intended to
intimidate and harass criminal defense attorneys. Only 14% of those responding said
that they had declined to take one or more cases, presumably because they feared that
their fees might be forfeited. Id. at 12. Sixteen attorneys said that they had given up
federal criminal practice completely. Three lawyers claimed that the government had
promised them that fee forfeiture would not be sought if their clients pleaded guilty.




As three circuit court of appeals have now recognized, 1 s this is
a false reading of the legislative history 1 9 and more importantly an
impermissible deviation from the plain meaning of the statute. The
introduction of "relation-back" was not addressed solely to sham
transfers. The government has always possessed the implicit au-
thority to set aside sham or fraudulent transfers intended to avoid in
rem forfeitures 120 and enjoyed the same authority as to in personam
forfeitures under 1970 RICO.' 2' The "relation-back" principle is of
universal application, and it is disingenuous to say that Congress
cannot have intended to apply it to defense attorneys because they
were not specifically mentioned. There is, in any case, no justifica-
tion for relying upon legislative history when the statutory language
is clear and, when applied, leads to an intelligible result.' 22 If the
117 United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Badala-
menti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The court in Bassett acknowledged that its
interpretation contradicts the plain meaning of the statute, but justified its reliance on
legislative history because of Congress' failure to specify under what circumstances a
criminal defense lawyer will be held to have "reasonable cause to believe" that his fee
came from the proceeds of crime. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1311-12.
118 In United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 84 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit
followed United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 922-23 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. In re Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 643-44 (4th Cir. 1988)(en banc)
stating that the CFA unambiguously authorizes the forfeiture of legitimate attorney's
fees and pre-trial restraints upon the transfer of property in payment of such fees. Accord
United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1492-93 (10th Cir. 1988).
119 See generally Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeiture
on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493 (1986). Professor Brickey pointed out that the
Colorado District Court in United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo.
1985), actually misquoted the legislative history in support of its position by adding the
word "only" to the Senate Report, S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 209 n.47,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3374, 3392 n.47: "The provision
should be construed to deny relief [only] to third parties acting as nominees of the de-
fendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transactions." Brickey at
499-500.
120 See, e.g., United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 408
(1814)(Story, J., dissenting). In fact, the Crown could set aside a fraudulent conveyance
of personalty to avoid forfeiture of estate, just as it could any fraudulent conveyance. 2
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *421.
121 See United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1981); Taylor, supra note
46, at 388.
122 Leading authorities condemn the practice of treating the casual and often tenden-
tious remarks of legislators about pending bills as "co-equal with the statute." R. DICK-
ERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 83 (1975); see Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers, 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951)(Jackson, J., concurring)("It is the
business of Congress to sum up its own debates in its legislation."). The "plain mean-
ing" rule does not preclude the consideration of legislative materials as part of the "con-
text" of a statute, but Professor Dickerson goes so far as to characterize the improper
use of legislative history as unconstitutional, because it gives the force of statutory law to
the "unenacted utterance[s]" of legislators. Id. at 143-44.
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sixth amendment forbids the forfeiture of attorney's fees, then the
statute, to the extent it authorizes such forfeiture, is unconstitu-
tional. The presumption that Congress acted in a constitutional
manner exists for the resolution of ambiguities and not for the crea-
tion of exceptions unjustified by the plain meaning of the statute. 125
To be fair, Congress may have invited this ironic treatment of
its intentions. Almost none of the decided cases, either before or
after the CFA was enacted, deal with orders for the forfeiture of at-
torney's fees.124 Rather these cases deal with the validity of subpoe-
nas to attorneys seeking to discover the-amount of fees paid or of
restraining orders making it impossible for the defendant to pay his
lawyer pending trial. The HouseJudiciary Committee Report stated
that "Nothing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's
sixth amendment right to counsel. The Committee, therefore, does
not resolve the conflict in district court opinions on the use of re-
straining orders that impinge on a person's right to retain counsel in"
a criminal case."' 125 Thus the Judiciary Committee acknowledged
the existence of a constitutional difficulty and left it for resolution by
the courts. The Committee may well have sought to make the
courts bear the opprobrium of appearing to condone the payment
of attorney's fees out of criminal proceeds.' 26 By blandly holding
that Congress merely intended to invalidate sham transfers, on the
grounds that any other result would raise constitutional difficulties,
the district courts cast the onus back upon the legislature.
The three circuit courts that have considered the matter, how-
ever, have held that RICO and CCE defendants have no sixth
amendment right to pay their attorneys with tainted assets, and that
the transfer of such assets may be restrained before trial even if the
defendant is thus rendered indigent. 27 It is not the purpose of this
123 j. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.11 (4th ed. 1984).
In Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 622 (1976), the
Court stated: "Even assuming that a more explicit limiting interpretation of the ordi-
nance could remedy the flaws we pointed out... we are without power to remedy the
defects by giving the ordinance constitutionally precise content."
For a defense of the conclusion that Congress did not intend to authorize the forfei-
ture of attorney's fees, see Note, Against Foreiture of Attorney's Fees under RICO: Protecting
the Constitutional Rights of Criminal Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 124, 150 n.146 (1986).
124 The sole reported exception is United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453 (W.D.
Pa. 1986).
125 H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 n.1 (1984), available on (Cong. Info.
Service H-523-2 1)(1984) (microfiche).
126 For a more charitable interpretation of an admittedly "cryptic" passage, see United
States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 918 (4th Cir. 1987)("It may merely disclaim any inten-
tion to enact legislation thought to be unconstitutional, or it may merely express a belief
that the provisions as written do not violate constitutional right.").
127 United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1498-99 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Caplin &
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Article to discuss the limits of the constitutional right to counsel of
one's choice when it collides with RICO and CCE forfeiture. It will
suffice to make two points: First, attorney fee forfeiture raises con-
stitutional and policy difficulties distinct from those raised by other
third party forfeitures. Society specifically licenses lawyers to pro-
vide services to suspected criminals. Lawyers have better reason
than most people, by the nature of their job, to know that their cli-
ents' funds are derived from crime. 128 Their knowledge is often
gained under the seal of the attorney-client privilege, which makes it
difficult for a lawyer to establish his or her lack of knowledge in a
subsequent hearing. 29 The legislature may wish to adopt prophy-
lactic rules making it risky for law-abiding citizens to deal with
criminals,' 30 but society specifically licenses lawyers to have such
dealings. It seems to be an open question whether the adversary
system can survive the imposition of the same or greater risks upon
defense attorneys.' 3 '
The second point is more germane to the subject of this Article.
There may be no constitutional right to pay a defense attorney with
the proceeds of crime, 3 2 but the defendant's creditors, including
his or her lawyer, have a legitimate interest in the defendant's assets,
subject, of course, to that of his or her victims, but adverse to that of
the government. It is not self-evident that the government should
Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 643 (4th Cir. 1988)(en banc); United States v. Monsanto, 836
F.2d 74, 83 (2d Cir. 1987).
128 The Justice Department has asserted that attorneys are chargeable with "actual
knowledge" that clients' assets are derived from criminal misconduct if the government
has moved before indictment to restrain the transfer of such assets, apparently without
regard to whether such motion is successful. Justice Department Guidelines on Forfeiture of
Attorney's Fees, 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3004, § 9-111.511, Oct. 2, 1985. Thus,
knowledge that the government has claimed that a specific asset is subject to forfeiture is
equated with reasonable grounds to believe that the asset actually was derived from
criminal misconduct.
129 See Note, Forfeitability of Attorneys' Fees Traceable as Proceeds from a RICO Violation under
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1499, 1510 (1986).
130 See infra notes 266-74 and notes 453-56 and accompanying text.
131 United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 87 (2d Cir. 1987) (OakesJ., dissenting);
see generally Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to
Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1.
132 United States v. Bailey, 666 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (E.D. Ark. 1987)("[T]he Sixth
Amendment does not require that a defendant in a federal criminal case be allowed to
use monies made from illegal drug transactions to pay an attorney of the defendant's
choice.") But a panel of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905,
924-25 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub nom. In re Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1988)(en banc) did not hesitate to say that the right to counsel was established upon the
assumption that some defendants, ultimately found guilty, will in the meantime have
paid their lawyers with ill-gotten gains, and that this assumption is so ingrained in our
criminal justice system that many district courts found it almost impossible to believe
that Congress intended to overturn it.
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prevail.' 3 3 Moreover, the decided cases fail entirely to recognize
that RICO and CCE authorize the forfeiture of assets not traceable
to crime and far in excess of criminal profits. It begs the question to
assert that defendants may not pay their lawyers with assets not in
fact acquired by crime, of which the government proposes to de-
prive them as a punishment, on the grounds that they have no title
to such assets. 134
It is evident that Congress should resolve these difficulties. At-
torneys should have a claim against forfeited assets, including fines,
prior to that of creditors and even victims, but only for the reason-
able value of their services as determined by the court and only to
the extent attorneys are unable to satisfy their claims from assets not
subject to forfeiture. 135
III. THE PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
As often occurs in the law, the remarkable development of
criminal forfeiture since 1970 has taken place without benefit of
much theory. Congress, the courts and the commentators have as-
sumed that criminal forfeiture is a broadly appropriate remedy,
although they have not agreed upon the evils at which it is directed.
There has been little effort in this country, however, to describe its
appropriate role in the battery of available criminal remedies,136 and
still less to define its proper place in the jurisprudence of criminal
punishment. The casual justifications scattered throughout the case
law and literature have naturally evolved in tandem with the broad
evolution from the "strict interpretation" to the "loose interpreta-
133 See infra notes 447-52 and accompanying text.
134 The dissenters made this argument in both United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d
1485, 1509 (10th Cir. 1988) and In re Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 652 (4th Cir.
1988):
[T]he ultimate constitutional issue might well be framed precisely as whether
Congress may use this wholly fictive device of property law [relation back] to cut off
this fundamental right of the accused in a criminal case. If the right [to counsel]
must yield here to countervailing governmental interests, the relation back device
undoubtedly could be used to implement the governmental interests, but surely it
cannot serve as a substitute for them.
Caplin & Drysdale concerned the forfeiture of property allegedly the proceeds of crime;
Judge Phillips' point applies with still more force to, for example, the forfeiture of a
legitimate enterprise allegedly conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity.
135 See infra note 495-96 and accompanying text.
136 D. HODGsON, PROFrrs OF CRIME AND THEIR RECOVERY (1984). Hodgson con-
ducted a comprehensive British law reform study which attempted to work out the
proper relationship among fines, orders of restitution ("compensation,") forfeiture of
profits ("confiscation,") forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime, and imprisonment.
Hodgson recommended legislative reforms based thereon.
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tion" of RICO and CCE described in the previous section.1 37
This Article endorses the trend toward the extension of forfei-
ture to additional crimes but rejects a number of the goals ostensi-
bly served by existing forfeiture statutes. Forfeiture as a criminal
penalty should be confined to the proceeds of crime narrowly de-
fined, excluding the forfeiture of interests in an enterprise and in-
strumentalities of crime, which belongs on the civil side only.' 38
Within these limits, forfeiture is a uniquely appropriate minimum
penalty which should be extended to cover most criminal offenses
involving economic gain. Such a minimum penalty would serve to
enforce a rough proportionality between crime and punishment and
would tend to eliminate the perception that existing punishments
are a tariff whose payment entitles the criminal to enjoy his gains in
peace. Paradoxically, criminal forfeiture lacks most of the qualities
of punishment and more closely resembles a civil penalty. Criminal
forfeiture, like civil restitution, only requires the criminal to pay
back what he has taken, thus restoring the status quo ante. For this
reason it carries no particular moral opprobrium. Nor does criminal
forfeiture have any special rehabilitative or deterrent value, contrary
to some claims. Thus forfeiture must be combined in most cases
with fine or imprisonment to punish adequately.
The existing forfeiture statutes, however, did not originate in
any theory of punishment, but were an ad hoc attack on certain per-
ceived evils. They cannot be generalized in their present form. On
the one hand, they aim at a very worthy objective: the prevention of
the domination of certain businesses and labor unions by organized
crime, which uses violent coercion for oligopoly power and plain
theft. Congress wanted to accomplish this objective by compelling
the forfeiture of the interests of organized criminals in such enter-
prises as an incident of their criminal convictions. However, Con-
gress could better accomplish this essentially economic objective
civilly, as indeed RICO permits, by targeting those industries and
unions, few in number, which are in fact controlled by organized
crime. Or failing this, the "pattern of racketeering" which may re-
sult in enterprise forfeiture should be limited to instances where the
use of violence or the threat of violence accompanies the conduct of
the business. The hallmark of organized crime activity in legitimate
business is precisely the use of violent means to establish a monop-
oly or cartel. Such an approach would put an end to the imposition
137 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
138 See infra notes 236-342 and accompanying text.
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of the penalty of enterprise forfeiture under RICO to isolated ille-
galities committed by ordinary businesspersons.
Similarly, existing forfeiture statutes enlarge traditional in rem
forfeitures, such as the forfeiture of contraband and the instruments
of crime, and make them mandatory punishments for crimes. There
is no theoretical justification for this extension.' 39 Civil forfeiture is
problematic enough from a due process standpoint, particularly
when third parties have interests in the property.' 40 These
problems are aggravated in criminal proceedings, in which third
parties have no standing to intervene.
In an attempt to justify these tentative conclusions, it is helpful
to classify and review the explicit and implicit justifications for crimi-
nal forfeiture advanced to date. These are, beginning with the least
plausible:
(1) The utility of criminal forfeiture as a means of financing in-
creased law enforcement efforts and making such efforts at least par-
tially self-supporting;
(2) The deterrent effect of criminal forfeiture against hardened of-
fenders who regard the threat of imprisonment with equanimity as
merely a cost of doing business;
(3) The general deterrent effect of the possibility of disproportionate
penalties, such as the loss of one's entire business, for relatively small
offenses;
(4) The usefulness of criminal forfeiture as a means of disrupting the
organizational continuity of racketeering by separating racketeers
from legitimate businesses which they have corrupted;
(5) The retributive advantages of the forfeiture of criminal profits as
a penalty which is and is seen to be precisely tailored to the offense.
All these justifications except number five are fatally flawed.
The use of forfeiture as a source of government revenue places seri-
ous institutional temptations in the way of prosecutors and exacer-
bates the conflict between the government and innocent third
parties such as victims, persons claiming a property interest, credi-
tors and dependents.' 4 1 Criminal forfeiture is an insignificant de-
terrent against racketeers and is not much more effective against
ordinary white-collar criminals.' 42 Draconian forfeitures of cars,
houses, stock, salaries, and businesses as penalties for petty or first
offenses are presumably more effective deterrents. Such criminal
forfeitures have been established by analogy with existing civil for-
feitures. Such civil forfeitures are mostly wrong in principle while
139 See infra notes 236-79 and accompanying text.
140 See infra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 146-72 and accompanying text.
142 See infra notes 173-94 and accompanying text.
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often unjust in practice, and they are not improved by their transmi-
gration.' 43 Finally, the separation of racketeers from their corrupt
businesses is best pursued as a distinct goal through carefully lim-
ited civil actions, and not as an incident of criminal conviction. 144
A. "A HUGE BUSINESS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:" 145
FORFEITURE AS PRIVATEERING.
No one really knows, of course, how much organized crime
earns from illegal gambling, loansharking, drug dealing, and other
activities. 146 It seems that no one has even attempted to estimate
the take from all the predicate offenses for which a RICO indictment
143 See infra notes 236-79 and accompanying text.
144 See infra notes 280-337 and accompanying text.
145 1985 Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 104, at 72 (statement of Rep. E. Clay Shaw, Jr.,
of Florida). As Representative Shaw stated, "By the act that we passed one year ago, we
really developed a huge business for the Federal Government."
146 The most comprehensive estimates to date of the income attributable to crime
were prepared for the Internal Revenue Service by outside consultants. ABT Associ-
ATES, UNREPORTED TAXABLE INCOME FROM SELECTED ILLEGAL AcivrrrmEs (September
1984) [hereinafter ABT REPORT]. The report is "primarily a synthesis of previous data
collection and research . . ." Id. at 332. The researchers acknowledged the extreme
scantiness and unreliability of the data available with respect to some crimes, such as
prostitution, arson for profit and fraud upon governmental programs. As the IRS is
only concerned with unreported taxable income, the authors did not attempt to estimate
the very substantial income derived from the illegal conduct of legitimate business, on
which taxes are normally paid. Such business income includes that from insider trading
and antitrust violations. Id. at 3-4. Much white collar crime was thus excluded. Id. at
304-11.
The latest estimates provided in 1982 are nonetheless of interest. The retail value
of various narcotics sold was estimated: heroin sold, $7.88 billion, id. at 35; cocaine
sold, $11.34 billion, id. at 47; and marijuana sold, $7.42 billion. Id. at 55. As the authors
pointed out, retail value exceeds net income, because some drugs are consumed by deal-
ers or sold to consumers at wholesale. Id. at 34, 56. These estimates should be con-
trasted with much higher estimates bruited about by Congress (drug trafficking was
described as a $65 billion annual business in 1981. 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 56, at
13 (statement of Rep. Harold S. Sawyer)). H.R. REP. No. 98, 845, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
55 (1984), estimated gross receipts from the sale of illegal drugs at $54 billion in 1979,
and $100 billion in 1984.
The ABT Report estimated illegal income from the numbers racket of $1.636 bil-
lion in 1982, ABT REPORT at 91; from illegal bettting on horses, $348 million, Id. at 98;
and from illegal betting on sports, $430 million. Id. at 105. The report's estimate for
total unreported illegal income from gambling for 1982 was $2.392 billion. Id. at 108.
This includes illegal casino gambling, which amounted to $19 million in proceeds, as
well as numbers, horses, and sports, but it excludes illegal gambling income reported to
the IRS under another rubric. All of these figures are merely extrapolations from a
comprehensive household survey of gambling habits done in 1974. M. KALLICK, D.
SUITs, T. DIELMAN, &J. HYBELS, A SURVEY OF AMERICAN GAMBLING ATTITUDES AND BE-
HAVIOR (1979).
The ABT Report estimated 1982 net income of thieves and fences at $3.888 billion,
ABT REPORT at 169; from employee theft and shoplifting at $5.301 billion, id. at 186;
from thefts of trucking cargo at $528 million, id. at 194; from air cargo thefts at $3
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would lie. It is probably safe to assume that the gross receipts, in a
four trillion dollar economy,1 47 are not less than $200 billion or five
percent, largely untaxed, and they could run far higher.' 48 Much of
million, id. at 199; and from rail cargo thefts in the United States, Canada, and Mexico at
$31.5 million, id. at 202.
Other 1982 estimates of income from crime include: robbery and burglary from
business, $617 million, id. at 214; insurance company payouts for damage or destruction
caused by arson for profit, $440 million, id. at 234; reported losses to banks from embez-
zlement, $281.8 million, id. at 238; and cigarette smuggling, $202 million. Id. at 252.
Government benefit programs are apparently defrauded of very large sums,
although such losses are extremely difficult to estimate. The ABT Report provided
some admittedly speculative estimates for fiscal year 1982: fraud by recipients of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, $222 million, id. at 263; by recipients of food stamps,
$454 million, id. at 266; by recipients of unemployment insurance payments, $451 mil-
lion, id. at 280; by recipients of Supplemental Security Income payments, $20 million, id.
at 272; by beneficiaries of Medicaid, $1.181 billion, id. at 284; by Medicaid health care
providers, $715 million, id. at 293; and by Medicare health care providers, $1.469 bil-
lion. Id. at 303.
The President's Commission on Organized Crime also commissioned an estimate of
the income from organized crime, as opposed to crime in general, from Wharton
Econometric Forecasting Associates. A survey of law enforcement agencies conducted
by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration estimated the number of members
of organized crime. A study of closed IRS prosecutions determined the average income
of such members. The product of these numbers is the income attributable to organized
crime. THE IMPACT, supra note 47, at 413, 422, 465, 471-72. This method is apparently
unique to the Wharton study. Its peculiar merit is that it necessarily includes all income
earned by the participation of organized criminals in legitimate business, largely using
racketeering methods.
The method's demerit is the extreme uncertainty of the data. For example, the
Wharton study used an estimate of 9,787 for the number of members of La Cosa Nostra,
and 40,440 for associates, id. at 476, 478; but the Director of the FBI testified that La
Cosa Nostra has only 1,700 members and 17,000 associates. Id. at 36, 488. The Whar-
ton study provided an alternative estimate of total income based in part on this figure,
but otherwise hewing to the LEAA survey results for non-traditional organized crime.
Id. at 489. This disparity may render the survey utterly unreliable. Similarly, the Whar-
ton study estimated the 1981 average income of each member of organized crime, in-
cluding such "non-traditional" groups as the Hell's Angels, the Pagans, the Chinese
tongs and triads, and the Aryan Nation, as $296,699 in 1986 dollars, with each associate
supposedly earning $80,999. Id. at 478. The IRS study on which these estimates are
based, however, concentrated on La Cosa Nostra members and on income earned from
the sale of narcotics. Id. at 480. In any case, these estimates yield a total mean income
in 1986 dollars of $55.4 billion. Id. at 479.
147 Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates estimated that the 1986 gross na-
tional product would reach $4.123 trillion. THE IMPACT, supra note 47, at 423.
148 The yearly income of white collar criminals alone has been recently estimated at
$35.9 to $43.48 billion. The Mob on Trial: The Cost of Organized Crime, "Mobsters Feel at
Home in Pin Stripes," Newsday (September 8, 1986).
Unfortunately, the ABT REPORT, supra note 146, provides no estimates of net in-
come earned from insurance fraud, consumer fraud, mail fraud, maritime cargo theft,
customs violations, fraud in retirement and survivors' insurance, fraud in veterans' ben-
efits, loansharking, business embezzlement, bribery, securities theft and counterfeiting,
computer crime, alcohol and petroleum excise tax evasion, theft of pension assets, ille-
gal firearms trading, credit card fraud, and check fraud. Id. at 305. These crimes are
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this money is earned by the sale of illicit goods and services to will-
ing buyers who are knowing participants in a criminal transaction,
so that there is no identifiable owner or victim with a prior claim.
It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been a tendency to
view forfeiture as a method of expropriating some of this wealth for
the benefit of the government and specifically for the benefit of law
enforcement agencies. Forfeitures, especially administrative civil
forfeitures, 49 can become a source of fast cars, boats and planes for
undercover and interdiction efforts, and of cash to supplement ap-
propriations, to pay rewards to informants, 50 and to finance drug
buys.' 51 A share in the booty can be used to reward cooperation
from other federal agencies and local law enforcers, 52 and the
promise of a share may induce such cooperation. As a result, strug-
gles for turf may be intensified as additional agencies seek statutory
authorization for a share. 153 The dollar value of forfeited property
becomes a convenient way to measure the success of enforcement
efforts in general and to distinguish between the performance of in-
dividual officers. Finally, other agencies, more remotely connected
to law enforcement, have begun to argue that they are entitled to a
share for such purposes as drug education and rehabilitation pro-
grams, claiming that such an application of forfeited funds is a form
of restitution to the victims of "victimless" crime' 54 and a means of
drying up the market by cutting demand. 155
This process has been in full swing for about a decade, and it
seems likely that an appetite for forfeited assets and a growing de-
excluded either because they do not result in significant tax losses and/or because the
data are too poor. Id. at 304.
149 Vessels, vehicles and aircraft of any dollar value used for the transportation of
controlled substances have been subject to administrative forfeiture since 1984. 19
U.S.C. § 1607(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985), amended by Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 311, 98 Stat. 2053.
150 28 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(I)(B),(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
151 28 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(1)(G) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
152 28 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); Attorney General's Guide-
lines on Seized and Forfeited Property III.D, 50 Fed. Reg. 24,052, 24,053 (1985). In
fiscal year 1986, $17,127,972 was so shared with state and local law enforcement agen-
cies. 1986 DEP. JUST. ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND ANN. REP. 3, [hereinafter 1986 ANN.
REP.].
153 See infra note 163.
154 1985 Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 104 at 242 (testimony of Matthew Gissen, presi-
dent of Therapeutic Communities of America, an organization of 300 drug treatment
programs). Not surprisingly, the FBI opposed the "dilution" of the Asset Forfeiture
Fund by using it for drug rehabilitation. Id. at 63 (testimony ofJoseph V. Corless).
155 AMERICA'S HABIT, supra note 72, at 464. "The cost of this Nation's antidrug efforts
can be subsidized to a great extent by the seizure and forfeiture of drug traffickers' as-
sets. That portion of the Federal government's asset forfeiture fund derived from drug
cases should be devoted exclusively to anti-drug programs."
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pendence upon them in an age of budgetary cutbacks and deficits 156
has helped drive the substantive changes previously discussed. The
1981 Report of the Comptroller General on the failure of asset for-
feiture to limit drug trafficking1 57 tended to measure the success of
RICO forfeiture by the dollar value of property criminally forfeited.
The Comptroller General justified his proposal to subject criminal
proceeds and substitute assets to forfeiture simply as a means to
"increase the amount of assets subject to forfeiture,"' 158 without any
appeal to theoretical considerations. The substantive expansion of
civil forfeiture during this period and its administrative simplifica-
tion have been still more significant factors in increasing the take. 159
The CFA in 1984 created the Assets Forfeiture Fund to collect, ad-
minister, and distribute the proceeds of both civil and criminal for-
feitures. 160 The principal purpose of the Fund was to enable the
Justice Department and the Customs Bureau to defray incidental
costs of forfeiture such as the repair, storage and sale of forfeited
property. 161 Congress has amended the statutory provisions gov-
erning the Fund to increase the number of agencies entitled to share
in the spoils 16 2 and the objects for which they may be paid out.163
156 1985 Forfeiture Hearings, supra note 104 at 30 (details the 1981-82 funding cuts for
the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Bureau of Tobacco, Alcohol and Firearms);
1981-82 Hearings, supra note 56, at 20 (Coast Guard interdiction efforts halted for lack of
fuel), 233-34 (testimony of Irvin B. Nathan)("many priority enforcement programs ...
do not presently have adequate funding."). The following exchange is perhaps worth
reproducing:
Mr. HARRIS. The potential in this area is really unlimited. My guess is that, with
adequate forfeiture laws, we could-
Senator DENTON. We could balance the budget.
Mr. HARRIS ....
There clearly would be millions and hundreds of millions of dollars available. This
would inure to the benefit of the Treasury generally.
Drug Enforcement Administration Oversight and Authorization: Hearings on S. 2320 Before the
Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
37 (1982)(available on Cong. Info. Service S-521-67 (1982)(microfiche))(testimony of
Jeffrey Harris, Deputy Associate Attorney General).
157 GAO Report, supra note 55.
158 Id. at 43.
159 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
160 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 310, 2303, 98 Stat.
2052, 2193, adding 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(l)(Supp. III 1985).
161 1986 ANN. REP., supra note 152, at 1.
162 Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
646, § 27(a), 100 Stat. 3597 (1986)(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(1)(F)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)), added the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United
States Marshals Service to the list of agencies whose vehicles could be equipped for drug
law enforcement functions with Asset Forfeiture Fund monies.
163 The proceeds of the sale of forfeited assets may now be applied "for equipping for
drug law enforcement functions any government owned or leased vessels, vehicles, and
aircraft available for official use by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal
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Potentially more significant, however, is the removal of the in-
terim ceiling on the sums retained in the Assets Forfeiture Fund and
Customs Forfeiture Fund from year to year after all authorized pay-
ments. Originally all sums in the Assets Forfeiture Fund in excess of
$5 million were to be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury
each year. 164 Congress has now followed the recommendation of
the President's Commission on Organized Crime 165 and removed
the ceiling. 166 The change will make up to $500 million in unappro-
Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or the United
States Marshals Service." 28 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(1)(F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), as
amended by Department ofJustice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-570, § 1 152(a)(4)(3), 100 Stat. 3207-12. The United States Customs Service is
likewise authorized to equip its vessels with the proceeds of forfeiture sales, 19 U.S.C.S.
§ 1613(a)(3)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), as amended by Department ofJustice Assets For-
feiture Fund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § I152(b)(1), 100 Stat.
3207-12.
A favorite use for Forfeiture Fund monies is the payment of informers. Department
of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§ 1152(a)(3), 100 Stat. 3207-12 ("awards for information or assistance directly relating
to violations of the criminal drug laws.. ."). Contraband under the Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1531-1543 (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1987), and instrumentalities
for violating the Act are subject to civil forfeiture. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(d)-(e) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). Since 1981, Congress has authorized the Treasury to pay rewards for
information out of the proceeds of such forfeitures. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(d)-(e)(1982 &
Supp. III 1985), as amendedby Act ofJune 25, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-327, § 4, 98 Stat. 271.
By a 1986 amendment, although forfeitures are effected by the Justice Department, the
proceeds are to be paid over to the Treasury for such purpose, 28 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(4)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), as amended by the Criminal Law and Procedure Technical
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 27(b), 100 Stat. 3597, and thus do not
count against the $5 million statutory ceiling of the Assets Forfeiture Fund. 28 U.S.C.S.
§ 524(c)(8) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
Similarly, the proceeds of Lacey Act forfeitures (illegally taken wildlife and the
means used to take it), 16 U.S.C. § 3374(a) (1982), have been applied to pay rewards
under the Act since 1983. 16 U.S.C. § 3375(d) (Supp. III 1985), as amended by Act of
June 25, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-327, § 4, 98 Stat. 271. Such proceeds are also withheld
from the Assets Forfeiture Fund. 28 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), as
amended by the Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986 Pub. L.
No. 99-646, § 27(b), 100 Stat. 3597.
164 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, supra note 5; Attorney General's Guide-
lines on Seized and Forfeited Property, IV.B.2.g., 50 Fed. Reg. 24,052, 24,054 (1985).
The enactment of both 19 U.S.C. § 1613a(h) (Supp. III 1985), Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 316, 2304, 98 Stat. 2054, 2193, and
19 U.S.C. § 1613b(f) (Supp. III 1985), Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573,
§ 213, 98 Stat. 2986, left the Customs Forfeiture Fund ceiling in confusion. According
to the former, the ceiling was supposed to increase to $20 million by fiscal year 1987;
according to the latter, the limit was $10 million. The limit has now been stricken from
19 U.S.C. § 1613a, Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1152(b)(1)( ), 100 Stat. 3207-12, and 19 U.S.C. § 1613b
has been repealed, Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1152(b)(2), 100 Stat. 3207-12.
165 AMERICA'S HABIT, supra note 72, at 464.
166 28 U.S.C.S. § 524(c)(4)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), as amended by Department ofJus-
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priated funds, not derived from general revenues, available for
criminal law enforcement.1 67 The Commission sought to have all
such funds derived from drug forfeitures devoted exclusively to
anti-drug programs;1 68 this proposal has not been implemented.
These are, on the whole, disquieting trends. There is an abid-
ing contradiction in the United States between public concern about
the inroads of crime, which ebbs and flows, and the public unwill-
ingness to finance law enforcement at appropriate levels, which is
more or less constant. Of course each wave of concern leaves a high
water mark in the United States Code in the form of new crimes,1 69
so that the gap between the tasks with which the Justice Department
is entrusted and its resources tends to widen over time. This gap
should not be filled, however, by making the Justice Department de-
pendent on forfeited assets. The prosecutor's charging decisions
may be distorted by considerations of the most profitable course.170
Even the appearance of such distortion is intolerable. 171 Similarly,
the conflict between the federal government and third party claim-
tice Assets Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§§ 1152(a)(5), 100 Stat. 3207-12.
167 AMERICA'S HABIT, supra note 72, at 445. As ofJanuary 31, 1986, the United States
Marshals Service had 3,851 properties under seizure with a total value of $327.1 million,
including $113.4 million in cash and negotiable instruments. Budget Appropriations: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations' 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 80
(1986), (available on Cong. Info. Service H-181-24 (1986) (microfiche))[hereinafter
1987 Appropriations Hearings]. Assets Forfeiture Fund income for fiscal year 1986 totalled
$93,711,430. 1986 ANN REP., SUPRA note 152, at 3. The Marshals Service expects total
receipts of $150 million to the Assets Forfeiture Fund in fiscal year 1987. 1987 Appropri-
ations Hearings at 114.
These sums must be weighed against the $6.6 billion budgeted for all federal law
enforcement efforts in fiscal year 1986, including aid to state and local governments and
the operation of federal prisons. Budget Appropriations: Hearings on H.R. 2695 Before the
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 236 (1986), (available
on Cong. Info. Service S-181-16 (1986)(microfiche)). Perhaps a more appropriate com-
parison is the $4.2 billion appropriation requested by the Justice Department for fiscal
year 1987. 1987 Appropriations Hearings at 1.
168 See supra note 154.
169 See Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 213,
263 (1984)(anti-racketeering statutes, once enacted, are never repealed).
170 "The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice...", AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3 1.1(c) (ABA 2d
Ed. 1979). "The prosecutor should not make the severity of sentences the index of his
or her effectiveness." Id. at 3 6.1(a).
171 See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Half of the fine for the unlawful
possession of intoxicating liquor went to the State of Ohio and half to the township,
municipality or county. The mayor of the town in which the defendant was convicted,
apparently acting as Justice of the Peace, was to receive his costs from the town's share.
This scheme was declared a violation of the due process rights of defendants because of
the appearance of partiality created, without evidence of actual bias. Ajudge may not be
paid only when he convicts.
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ants to forfeited assets should not be exacerbated by giving the Jus-
tice Department an institutional stake in defeating private claims.1 72
Finally, the "privatization" of the funding of law enforcement is a
retrograde step reminiscent of the payment of naval officers in the
eighteenth century largely out of the proceeds of the sale of cap-
tured ships. It is late in the day to begin issuing letters of marque to
United States Attorneys.
B. FORFEITURE AS SPECIFIC DETERRENT: THE HEROIC FALLACY
Forfeiture, like any penalty or punishment, deters criminals
from repeating their offenses and deters the law abiding from taking
up a career of crime. "Specific deterrence" is a name which has
been given to the first of these effects, the discouragement of recidi-
vism; the name "general deterrence" has been applied to the sec-
ond, the discouragement of crime in general by the exemplary effect
of punishment. 73
The courts, legislative committees and presidential commis-
sions have periodically advanced the idea that criminal forfeiture is
an effective specific deterrent-perhaps more effective than impris-
onment. 174 The notion is that there is a subset of hardened
criminals, particularly participants in organized crime, who view
crime as a business and make rational calculations of profit and loss.
Such criminals, supported by the ethos of their profession, suppos-
edly regard the threat and fact of imprisonment as a "cost of doing
business." They are willing to pay this price if, upon release, they
may freely enjoy the fruits of their crimes. Therefore, they will only
be deterred by the forfeiture of their profits.' 75 This idea was par-
172 An example is In re Metmore Financial, Inc., 819 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1987). This
case concerned a civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) of real property supposedly
used in connection with illegal drug activities. The drug dealer purchased it subject to a
mortgage. The mortgage lien therefore attached before the criminal activity. The Jus-
tice Department nonetheless contended that the mortgagee was entitled to recover its
principal only, and not interest on the lien from the time of seizure. The court held that
the government succeeded to the drug dealer's rights. Id. at 450. The lender was,
therefore, entitled to its accrued interest to the time of sale. Id. at 448, 451. The gov-
ernment's legal argument to the contrary seems frivolous.
173 H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION 39 (1968); Van den Haag, The Crim-
inal Law as a Threat System, 73J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769, 770 (1982)("specific de-
terrence" is scarcely distinguishable from rehabilitation).
174 See, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir. 1983)("a more potent
weapon than fines or prison terms .. "), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983).
175 This is the rationale behind the recommendation of the Attorney General's Com-
mission on Pornography that the "proceeds and instruments of any offense committed
under federal obscenity laws . . ." should be forfeited. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMIS-
SION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 433 (1986). The deterrent effect of forfeiture is
greater than that of a "modest period of incarceration, which the offender may see as
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ticularly popular when the fines available as punishment for hugely
profitable felonies were disproportionately small.176
The idea that criminal forfeiture is efficacious as a specific de-
terrent is probably a fallacy even when limited to the paradigmatic
"organized criminal," the Mafioso soldier or capo. It is more falla-
cious when applied to white collar criminals like corrupt public offi-
cials and those who corrupt them. Still less will it help to justify a
generalization of criminal forfeiture beyond the limits of RICO and
drug offenses. It may nonetheless serve as a starting point for an
exploration of the relationship between criminal forfeiture and the-
ories of punishment.
First, it is not true that the deterrent effect of imprisonment
upon the Mafia has been tried and failed, so that some more power-
ful deterrent is needed. Until recently, the government has made
no sustained effort at breaking up the Mob and imprisoning its lead-
ers. 177 Now that an effort has been made, it has proved remarkably
successful.' 78 Moreover, the conviction of Mob leaders in the major
merely another cost of doing business". Id. at 465. But the report supplies no evidence
to show that the pornography business is controlled by organized crime and that traffick-
ers in pornography are indifferent to imprisonment. Indeed, the report states that "our
lack of investigative resources has made it impossible to investigate these matters di-
rectly." Id. at 296. The author is not aware of any study of the activities of organized
crime which even mentions the distribution of pornography. The Commission acknowl-
edged that federal authorities in the important centers for the production and distribu-
tion of pornography do not give any priority to prosecuting the participants. Id. at 372-
73. President Reagan has stated, however, in support of legislation implementing the
Commission's recommendation, that "[o]rganized crime controls the majority of the ob-
scenity market. According to law enforcement estimates, organized crime's revenues in
these areas exceed seven to ten billion dollars per year." 23 Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents 1310, 1311 (November 10, 1987).
176 See, e.g., 1981-82 Hearings, supra note 56, at 153 (statement of Rep. William J.
Hughes: "The sad truth is that the financial penalties for drug dealing are frequently
only seen by dealers as a cost of doing business."). Maximum fines were raised substan-
tially by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see infra note 473 and accompanying text.
177 j. Edgar Hoover was notorious for his failure to use the resources of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to pursue organized criminals; he did not acknowledge the
existence of such an organization as the Mafia until 1960. R. POWERS, SECRECY AND
POWER: THE LIFE oFJ. EDGAR HOOVER 335 (1987). Commissioner Eugene H. Methvin
of the President's Commission on Organized Crime has complained about the failure of
the Justice Department to seek long jail sentences for mobsters under the Dangerous
Special Drug Offender Act, 21 U.S.C. § 849 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). THE EDGE, supra
note 55, Appendix at 10-11.
178 "In the last four years, the leadership in 17 of 24 La Cosa Nostra families has been
indicted or convicted. In 1984 organized crime indictments totalled 2,194, involving
predominantly La Cosa Nostra members and associates." THE IMPAcT, supra note 47, at
47. The FBI reported that 1601 organized criminals were convicted during 1985, in-
cluding two bosses, one underboss, one consigliere, six capodecinas, ten "soldiers," and 105
associates of "traditional organized crime" such as La Cosa Nostra. In addition, 151
members and associates of "non-traditional organized crime" groups were convicted.
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trials of the last two years, such as the heads of the five families in
New York, 179 has been possible in large measure because ranking
mobsters have informed on their fellows under the threat of long
prison terms.' 8 0 What has occurred has vindicated the conclusion
of most criminal law thinkers that our statutory punishments lack
deterrent effect primarily because of low levels of enforcement, so
that the requisite certainty of punishment is missing. 18' As law en-
1985 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 104, at 153. See also McFadden, The Mafia of the
1980s: Divided and Under Siege, N.Y. Times, March 11, 1987, at AI, col. 1.
179 La Cosa Nostra is organized in 24 "families" or borgate. The five New York fami-
lies, however, include half of all members, and their bosses dominate the "national com-
mission" which supposedly has authority over all but the New Orleans family. THE
IMPACT, supra note 47, at 36-37. Eight members of the commission were recently con-
victed of RICO offenses; seven were sentenced to 100 years imprisonment each. N.Y.
Times, January 14, 1987, at A1, col. 2.
180 The most striking example is Angelo Lonardo, the underboss who ran the Cleve-
land family in place of the imprisoned don, James Licavoli, and was supposedly instru-
mental in installing Jackie Presser as head of the Teamsters Union. Lonardo identified
all "made men" in the family to the Justice Department, including the perpetrators of
several unsolved crimes. Lonardo was "turned" after he was sentenced to life imprison-
ment plus 103 years for CCE violations. His own conviction was obtained largely
through the testimony of informers. He was 72 and did not wish to die in prison.
Sawicki, A Mafia Family Legacy, CLEVELAND MAC., December 1985, at 125.
The conviction of the Mafia National Commission, supra note 179, was made possi-
ble by the testimony of important mob turncoats, including Angelo Lonardo, Joseph
Cantalupo, Joseph lannuzzi, Aladena James Frattiano, and Fred DeChristopher. The
Mob on Trial. Raising the Cost of Organized Crime, NEWSDAY, September 7, 1986, at 4.
181 Most researchers have concluded that criminals are not deterred by the remote
chance of a severe penalty. They have therefore stressed the necessity for probable ap-
prehension and punishment. See, e.g., Williams and Hawkins, Perceptual Research on Gen-
eral Deterrence: A Critical Review, 20 L. & Soc'Y. REV. 545, 550 n.3 (1986)(there is a
threshold of certainty of punishment below which no increase in the severity of penalties
has a deterrent effect); Cook, Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the
Second Decade, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 211, 230-33
(1980). Their arguments have gained force as the savage punishments of the past have
fallen into disuse and disrepute.
A strict utilitarian model, however, tends to imply that it is more efficient to increase
the deterrent effect of the laws by increasing their severity, which costs little or nothing,
rather than by increasing our efforts at law enforcement, which produce decreasing re-
sults at the margin. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 207-08 (3d ed. 1986); Seid-
man, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94
YALE LJ. 315, 321 (1984). At present levels of enforcement, however, large numbers of
criminals think that the risk of discovery and punishment is well worth taking, despite
the fact that the United States has a rate of imprisonment per 100,000 population twice
that of the United Kingdom, which in turn is the highest in Western Europe. G. Cole,
United States of America, andJ. Freeman, England, in MAJOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE SURVEY 46, 60 (G. Cole, S. Frankowski, M. Gertz, eds. 2d ed. 1987). His-
tory and experience demonstrate, as well, that the public, in the form of judges and
juries, is reluctant to enforce severe punishments if the occasions for enforcing them are
so infrequent that it seems inequitable to single out the defendant. See Note, Daring the




forcement has dissipated the practical immunity to punishment of
high-level mobsters, the latter have begun to act from the same mo-
tives as other criminals, with fear of imprisonment high among such
motives. This point is worth emphasizing, because the view that
criminal forfeiture is a stronger deterrent than prison is probably
traceable to a romantic myth about organized crime. The public
views the Mafia with moral ambivalence and a degree of admiration.
The Mob is seen as supplying goods and services which, though ille-
gal, are much in demand. As such, it is a shadow version of big
business, and its leaders are difficult to distinguish morally from the
predatory "robber barons" who founded great American fortunes.
The Mafia is also the last repository of Old World values of family
and feudal loyalty, known as the code of omerta. 182 At the same time
the public attributes an unlikely consistency of purpose and effec-
tiveness of means to the Mob as a secret outlaw group. Thus the
public supposes that Mafia members combine a hardheaded calcula-
tion of costs and benefits with a romantic indifference to the threat
of prison. The "wise guys" know how to do time if they must, and
they would never violate their oath and betray their fellows for mere
leniency. Hence law enforcement must "hit them where they
hurt,"183 in the pocketbook.
The behavior of the mob under the pressure of sustained inves-
tigation shows up this popular view as a romantic fantasy.18 4 Inter-
estingly, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century defenders of
forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood argued that these penal-
ties were indispensably necessary deterrents to treason, probably
because they held a similarly romantic view of traitors.18 5 One
182 For an account of American attitudes toward organized crime, see Saney, In Praise of
Organized Crime, 16 RUrGERS L.J. 853, 858-59 (1985)(American respect for of material
success through hard work motivates criminals as well as honest people and accounts in
part for the moral ambiguity with which Americans regard "Godfathers.")
183 United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 957 n.17 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc rehear-
ing)(Congress intended to make proceeds of crime forfeitable by 1970 RICO).
184 It is possible that the older leaders of La Cosa Nostra conformed more closely to
the stereotype, and their death, retirement or imprisonment has brought to the fore
more Americanized and individualistic leaders, inexperienced, less steeped in the tradi-
tional culture, and less bound by group loyalties. THE IMPACT, supra note 47, at 50. In
any event, it is likely that La Cosa Nostra is in a long term decline only partly attributable
to successful prosecution, id. at 36; see also Bradley, supra note 169, at 262 n.338 ("the
traditional Mafia families ... are breaking down as the new generation becomes more
Americanized ... ").
185 See generally C. YORKE, supra note 1; W. EDEN, supra note 92.
In 1814, the famous law reformer Sir Samuel Romilly made a major effort to abolish
forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood, on the ground that their deterrent effect
was purchased by punishing the felon's innocent relations. See 28 Parl. Deb. (1st ser.)
164 (1814)("You choose for the instrument of your moral tortures the best feelings of
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might think that in an age when the penalty for treason was death by
prolonged public torture' 8 6 no additional deterrent was necessary.
However, as William Eden, the First Baron Auckland, argued in
1771, "[t]he mere execution of the criminal is a fleeting example;
but the forfeiture of lands leaves a permanent impression: It is in-
deed one of our best constitutional safeguards.. ."187 This improb-
able argument held sway for a long time. One may guess that a
realistic, rationalizing age felt a secret but powerful attraction to the
romantic conspirator and his cause.188 The notion that a man would
willingly risk his life for his political ambitions but might be deterred
by fear for his family betrays a deep admiration. It may be that our
lawmakers have similar feelings about La Cosa Nostra.
Despite these considerations, there probably are some profes-
sional criminals who are relatively undeterred by the possibility of
prison, because they have discounted the threat in advance, because
they know how to do time, and above all because they do not fear
the shame and obloquy of imprisonment as might, for example, a
corrupt public official. The criminal subculture is immune to such
sentiments. If possible, these criminals should not find their crimi-
nal gains waiting for them when they leave prison. The forfeiture of
such gains may have a marginal deterrent effect; it is an appropriate
penalty regardless of such effect.I8 9
The threat of imprisonment, however, is probably the strongest
possible deterrent to white-collar and economic crime, at which
RICO prosecutions are in practice largely aimed. In fact, the rela-
the human heart .. "). It was opposed by the government, however. See 27 PARL. DEB.
(1st ser.) 533-34 (1814)(statement of Mr. Serjeant Shepherd, the Solicitor General).
The result was a compromise in which corruption of blood was retained as a penalty for
treason and murder only. An Act to Take Away Corruption of Blood save in Certain
Cases, 1814, 54 Geo. 3, ch. 145.
186 Under the common law penalty for treason, the criminal was dragged to the place
of execution on a hurdle to be hanged by the neck until half-dead. Then the prisoner
was cut down, disembowelled and castrated. His genitals were burned before his eyes
before he was beheaded and his body quartered. I J. STEPHEN, supra note 34, at 476. The
full rigors of this sentence were more or less commuted after the punishment of the
regicides at the Restoration in 1660. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMI-
NAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, 220-27 (1948).
187 W. EDEN, supra note 92 at 49.
188 In fact, the long retention of the punishment of forfeiture and corruption of blood
as penalties for treason was motivated in part by fear of the Stuart pretenders, including
Bonnie Prince Charlie. Compare An Act for Improving the Union of the Two Kingdoms,
1708, 7 Anne, ch. 21 (abolishing corruption of blood effective three years after the death
of Queen Anne or the then Stuart pretender, whichever should later occur), with An Act
to Make it High Treason to Hold Correspondence With the Sons of the Pretender to His
Majesty's Crown, 1744, 17 Geo. 2 ch. 39 (extending the penalty indefinitely on the eve
of the '45-the failed Stuart invasion and Highland revolt).
189 See infra notes 377-82 and accompanying text.
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tionship of forfeiture and imprisonment as deterrents to white-col-
lar crime may be paradoxical. It is probably easier to trace and
locate the proceeds of crime earned by the inside trader, the price
fixer, and the corrupt public official than those earned by the tradi-
tional organized criminal, particularly if substitute assets may be for-
feited. The successful white collar criminal is likely to have
substantial assets legitimately acquired, particularly because, in our
society, the really grand prospects for theft are open only to the
already successful. Such a criminal has a house, vacation property,
stocks and bonds, bank accounts, paintings and antiques readily
available for seizure. In this he differs from the prototypical drug
smuggler, for example, who if smart travels light, keeps his assets
portable, and deals almost entirely in readily concealable cash.
However, even if the white-collar criminal has successfully laun-
dered and concealed his ill-gotten gains, they may be mostly recov-
ered if he or she cooperates. The task of collection is not
fundamentally different from that of a trustee in bankruptcy, who
also depends on the debtor's more or less willing cooperation.
As the Ivan Boesky affair suggests, such cooperation is most ef-
fectively induced by the threat of a long prison term. As part of a
plea bargain, Boesky forfeited $100 million.190 For the Boeskys of
this world, prison seems to be the truly formidable deterrent. To
avoid it, they will pay enormous sums.19' Here is the paradox of
forfeiture as a deterrent to crime: not only is it a less effective deter-
rent than the threat of prison against economic criminals whose as-
sets are most available to forfeiture, but it also is probable that the
threat of prison is the most effective way to enforce forfeitures.' 9 2
There is a more fundamental reason why forfeiture cannot be a
really significant deterrent to crime. In itself, forfeiture only re-
quires the criminal to disgorge his ill-gotten gains if caught and con-
190 Big Trader to Pay U.S. $100 Million for Insider Abuses, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1986, at
Al, col. 1.
191 See generally Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment. A Non-Chicago View of the Econom-
ics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 419, 432 (1980). Professor Coffee argues
that "the costs of imprisonment are 'front-loaded.' " A white-collar defendant who has
enjoyed a position of wealth and privilege most fears the degradation associated with
entering prison: the strip search; the head shaving; and assignment to a cell. For this
reason, among others, the marginal deterrent effect of additional time in prison de-
creases rapidly.
192 The enforcement of forfeitures through the threat of prison may create serious
due process difficulties to the extent that the proceeds of forfeiture are intended to be
restitution for victims. It is axiomatic that criminal process should not be used to en-
force civil liabilities, although criminal process is in fact constantly so used, for example,




victed, thus restoring the status quo ante. Yet no child will be
deterred from stealing cookies if the penalty is limited to putting the
cookies back in thejar. The child may reason that he or she may not
be caught. If caught he or she cannot be made to disgorge cookies
already consumed. At worst the child will be no worse off than
before the theft. 193 It may be just to require the child to restore the
cookies, but for deterrence something more is necessary. The pun-
ishment must, in order to deter, be disproportionate to the benefit
the criminal expects to get from the crime in order to compensate
for the likelihood that the crime will go undetected or
unpunished.' 94
So far the deterrent effect of forfeiture has been discussed on
the supposition that the value of the property forfeited is equal to
the criminal's ill-gotten gains. If the value of the property forfeited
exceeds the gain from the crime, the deterrent effect of forfeiture
will obviously be enhanced. That is precisely the current situation
under RICO and other federal forfeiture statutes. The difficult
question is whether these deviations from a principle of equivalence
between the value of property subject to forfeiture and the crimi-
nal's gross profits are an appropriate means of increasing the deter-
rent effect of forfeiture, or are they too illogical in principle and
unfair in result to defend?
C. DISPROPORTIONATE FORFEITURES AS A DETERRENT:
EFFICACY AND FAIRNESS
In 1986, the New York City police, concerned about the in-
creasing street trade in "crack,"' a purified form of cocaine, teamed
up with the Drug Enforcement Administration to attack it. They
chose to seize and civilly forfeit under federal law the cars of subur-
ban visitors who were caught buying five or ten dollars' worth of
drugs. 195 The purchase of so small an amount was of course a mis-
demeanor.' 96 Mayor Koch set as a goal the forfeiture of 5,000
193 In reality, the immediate restoration of goods converted and consumed over time,
for example, the forfeiture of substitute assets, may be experienced as a loss more severe
than the original gain. This may have an incidental deterrent effect.
194 R. POSNER, supra note 181, at 203-04.
195 Purdum, New York Police Now Seizing Cars In Arrests for Possession of "Crack", N.Y.
Times, August 5, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
196 The newspaper account is less than clear, but in most cases the police must have
arrested the buyers for simple possession in violation of state law, while DEA agents
seized their cars for administrative forfeiture in rem pursuant to 49 U.S.C.S. app. § 782
(Law. Co-op. 1981 & Supp. 1987), which essentially authorizes the forfeiture of any ve-
hicle in which "contraband," defined in 49 U.S.C.S. app. § 781(b) (Law. Co-op. 1981 &
Supp. 1987), to include "any narcotic drug," is found. The courts have upheld forfeit-
ures of vehicles under such statutes when minute amounts of drugs were found therein.
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automobiles. 197 Many of those arrested were teenagers driving their
parents' cars. As a special state narcotics prosecutor remarked,
"When they come home without momma's car or without daddy's
car, the criminal justice system is going to be the least of their
worries."1 98
It seems safe to assume that these forfeitures, like any publi-
cized penalty grossly disproportionate to the offense, had a strong if
temporary deterrent effect. The peculiar piquancy of the deterrent
is found in the fact that the owners of the cars, the people actually
punished, were often innocent of any crime, as were the lenders who
had a security interest in the cars seized.199 Although this Article is
only incidentally concerned with civil forfeitures, 200 the tactics
adopted by the New York police may serve to illustrate an important
point: under current federal criminal statutes, which provide forfei-
ture as a penalty for offenses against RICO with all its predicate of-
fenses, 20 ' the CCE,20 2 nearly all federal drug offenses, 20 3 and the
See, e.g., United States v. One 1976 Porsche, 670 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1979)(.226
grams of marijuana). The cars might be "conveyances ... used.., to transport...
property described in paragraph (1) .. " viz. "controlled substances... distributed...
in violation of this title," 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1) (1982), and thus subject to civil forfei-
ture. The drivers of the cars seized had not, however, violated 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(a)
(1982), or any other federal law, because no federal law then penalized the act of buying
a controlled substance or simple possession thereof without an intent to distribute. See
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1982). The news story makes it clear that they were buying small
amounts for personal use only. Guilt or innocence of the state crime was thus irrelevant
to the validity of the forfeiture. Congress has since criminalized the simple possession
of controlled substances with the Drug Possession Penalty Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
570, § 1052, 100 Stat. 3207-81(amending 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1982)).
197 In fact 211 cars were seized in ten weeks. N.Y. Times, October 14, 1986, at Bl,
col. 1.
198 Purdum, supra note 195.
199 The parents' innocence of any wrongdoing and probable ignorance of their off-
spring's activities are not a sufficient defense to a civil forfeiture. See infra notes 263-74
and accompanying text. Effective August 31, 1987, however, gratuitous bailors are for
the first time entitled to administrative remission of forfeiture if they can demonstrate
that they had no knowledge of the particular offense, no knowledge that the property
would be involved in any violation of law, and no knowledge that the user had any rec-
ord of convictions for a related crime. They also must show that they took all reasonable
steps to prevent the illegal use of the property. See Forfeiture Regulations §§ 9.5(b),
9.6(e), supra note 31.
200 See infra notes 240-74 and accompanying text.
201 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. III 1985).
202 21 U.S.C.S. § 848(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
203 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (Supp. III 1985) provides for criminal forfeitures of enumer-
ated property belonging to "any persons convicted of a violation of this subchapter or
subchapter II of this chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year..."
The reference is to titles II and III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 211 n.51, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3394
n.51. Thus the § 853 forfeiture does not apply, for example, to violations of the Mail
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sexual exploitation of minors, 20 4 the value of property forfeited as a
penalty is not necessarily equivalent to the criminal's ill-gotten
gains, and may exceed them in four respects:
(1) The "proceeds" of crime, rather than the "profits" of crime, are
forfeit. 20 5 Depending upon the definition of "proceeds," forfeitures
may exceed criminal profits many-fold;
(2) The instrumentalities of crime are forfeit, such as lab equipment,
cars, boats, planes, cameras and real estate, apart from and in addition
to criminal gains;20 6
(3) A criminal's interest in an "enterprise" acquired, maintained, or
operated by racketeering activities is forfeit, even though the value of
such interest bears no necessary relationship to the profits earned by
such racketeering activity.2
0 7
(4) The presumption that income not accounted for by legitimate
means was earned by criminal activity20 8 may result in the forfeiture of
property acquired by crimes other than the one for which the defend-
ant has been convicted.
Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1821-23, 100 Stat. 3207-
51, 52 (1986) (codifed as amended at 21 U.S.C.S. § 857 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)), even
though the offense of importing, exporting, or selling drug paraphernalia such as ciga-
rette papers, roach clips and bongs is punishable by imprisonment for a term as long as
three years, 21 U.S.C.S. § 857(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), because the Act is not an
amendment of the 1970 Act. The paraphernalia itself, however, is forfeit upon convic-
tion. 21 U.S.C.S. § 857(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). Thus a candy store owner does
not forfeit his store upon conviction for selling a "roach clip".
Nearly all federal drug offenses are punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year and thus subject the offender to forfeiture. The exceptions are the unlicensed man-
ufacture, distribution or sale of small quantities of so-called Schedule V substances,
which are cough medicine and the like, 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987), and a first offense of simple possession of small quantities of controlled sub-
stances. 21 U.S.C.S. § 844(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
Note, too, that the offense of manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent
to manufacture or distribute controlled substances on board vessels, formerly a Title III
offense codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 955a, 955c (1982), has been transferred to the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C.S. app. § 1903 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), by the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Prosecution Improvements Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-570, § 3202, 100 Stat. 3207-95 (1986). Criminal forfeitures upon conviction for such
offenses equivalent to those found in 21 U.S.C.S. § 853 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) are
now authorized by 46 U.S.C.S. app. § 1904 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
204 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (Supp. III 1985).
205 Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 853, 970
(Supp. III 1985); Child Protection Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (Supp. III
1985) ("property constituting or derived from gross profits or other proceeds obtained
from any such offense.").
206 Any property "used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or
facilitate the commission" of a drug violation is now criminally as well as civilly forfeita-
ble. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985). Similarly, "property used, or intended to
be used" for the sexual exploitation of children is forfeit. 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (Supp. III
1985). There is no parallel RICO forfeiture.
207 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. III 1985); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)-(3) (Supp. III 1985)(CCE
violations).
208 21 U.S.C. § 853(d) (Supp. III 1985).
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In practice these deviations from the forfeiture of criminal prof-
its are highly arbitrary and unsystematic. Their application raises
serious due process difficulties. The problems ultimately stem from
the application of a common penalty to very different crimes. The
result is to vitiate the added deterrent effect of disproportionate
forfeitures.
1. "Proceeds" or "Profits": May Criminals Deduct their Expenses?
The CCE originally provided for the forfeiture of the profits of
drug enterprises, whereas RICO merely required the forfeiture of
the defendant's "interest" in the criminal "enterprise." This dis-
tinction proved unsupportable, and now the statutes provide for the
forfeiture of "proceeds" in every case which they cover.20 9 "Pro-
ceeds," of course, is not a term which any accountant would use. It
has no fixed meaning. Congress probably chose it, in contrast to
"profits", to make clear that all property purchased with and tracea-
ble to criminal profits is forfeit, including appreciation in value at-
tributable to the criminal's skill or luck as an investor and not to any
criminal activity. 21 0 This result is parallel to familiar principles of
209 See supra notes 33-81 and accompanying text. Curiously, 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987), enacted by the Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a), 100 Stat. 3207-18 to 21 (1986), provides for
the civil forfeiture of "[a]ny property, real or personal, which represents the gross re-
ceipts a person obtains, directly or indirectly, as a result of a violation of section 1956 or
1957 of this title, or which is traceable to such gross receipts." The cited sections refer
to the offense of "money laundering," which is dealing in any way with the proceeds of
"specified unlawful activity," 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1), (c)(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987),
either to promote such activity, to conceal the source of the proceeds, or "to avoid a
transaction reporting requirement under state or federal law." 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
Congress apparently chose the term "gross receipts" to indicate the payment or
"commission" received by the person guilty of money laundering as distinguished from
the "proceeds" laundered, without deduction of "expenses or overhead." H.R. REP.
No. 855, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986), (available on Cong. Info. Service H-523-40
(1986)(microfiche)). In addition to the forfeiture of such payments, however, 18
U.S.C.S. § 1956 (a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) provides for a mandatory fine of
"$500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is
greater." Thus a person convicted of "laundering" $1 million for a fee of 10% would be
fined $2 million and would forfeit $100,000 in a separate civil proceeding.
210 The legislative history contains only one comment on the change: "In paragraph
(3), the term 'proceeds' has been used in lieu of the term 'profits' in order to alleviate
the unreasonable burden on the government of proving net profits. It should not be
necessary for the government to prove what the defendant's overhead expenses were."
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 199, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3182, 3382. However, this is a non sequitur, because the burden of proving ex-
penses logically rests on the defendant once the government has proven the existence
and amount of gross receipts.
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civil restitution 21 ' and is unexceptionable. A more difficult question
is whether Congress meant "proceeds" to equal gross receipts, or
every dollar received in the course of the criminal activity, without
deduction or allowance for expenses or the payment of taxes. 212
Not only is this a heavy penalty, it is doubtful whether it is the ap-
propriate measure of forfeiture for the white-collar offenses which
are the subject of at least a substantial percentage of RICO
prosecutions. 213
Let us consider in more detail the application of the "proceeds"
measure to different categories of crime. The drug business is very
profitable, and apparently the more dangerous the drug the more
profitable it is.214 How the net income of a typical drug kingpin
compares with his gross receipts is unknown,215 but it appears that
the rate of return is very high. There is no room to argue that the
forfeiture of a drug trafficker's gross receipts is an "unfair" penalty
211 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.12 (1978) ("general considerations of
fairness" must control in deciding to what extent a profit is attributable to wrongdoing
and to what extent to contributions made by the defendant).
212 For the statutory use of "gross receipts" in 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956, 1957 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1987), see supra note 209.
213 One study of all reported RICO cases as of 1985 found that 16% involved "fairly
ordinary business frauds." Lynch, Parts I & II, supra note 28, at 748. It found that 94
involved "concerted criminal activity"; seventy-one involved "government corruption";
forty-two involved "business crime", which were mostly frauds; and twenty-nine in-
volved labor corruption. Id. at 735. The study noted that very few of the government
corruption cases involved "penetration of law enforcement by organized criminal
groups." Id. at 736. Rather, they were mostly cases involving bribes and kickbacks paid
by businesses in exchange for special treatment, and are thus little different in kind from
such white-collar crimes as bid rigging among competitors.
214 This is assuming that heroin is more dangerous than cocaine and cocaine is more
dangerous than marijuana and hashish. The federal government concentrates its en-
forcement efforts on heroin and cocaine. These drugs may be purchased cheaply
abroad; their price is driven up by law enforcement, which is really quite successful,
especially in the case of heroin. See Reuter & Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An Economic
Analysis of Drug Enforcement, 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 289
(1986). Because the demand for addictive drugs is relatively inelastic, the paradoxical
result of successful enforcement is to increase the income of successful drug dealers. Id.
at 335-37.
215 The ABT REPORT, supra note 146, at 34-35, provides an estimate of the difference
between the retail value of heroin consumed in the United States in 1982, totalling
$7.88 billion, and the resulting unreported illegal income to traffickers totalling $6.12
billion. This differential, however, is based on the assumption that some of the income
is reported but attributed to other sources. Id. at 36. The adjustments for consumption
at wholesale prices, foreign payments and legitimate business deductions total only
15%. The Internal Revenue Service, which commissioned the report, was interested in
the total unreported income of all those engaged in the drug business, at every level.
The ABT Report therefore provides no facts from which to arrive at an estimate for the
ratio of sales to expenses for any given trafficker, since his expenditure for wages and
commissions, probably his major expense, is illegal taxable income to some other per-
son engaged in the business.
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in the absence of evidence that it is grossly disproportionate to the
offense. The task of fixing a punishment is not the same as precisely
calculating civil restitution. Such forfeitures may be unfair to third
persons, creditors and dependents of the defendant, whose claims
are more likely to go unsatisfied if more of the defendant's re-
sources are taken by the federal government.2 16 This problem does
not arise from the forfeiture of proceeds, however. It is intrinsic in a
system of forfeitures which makes inadequate provision for third
party claims through the workings of the "relation back" doc-
trine.2 17 The solution is to provide better for such claims. 218
On the other hand, there would be no harm in limiting forfeit-
ures in drug cases to net profits. It might appear unseemly to give a
drug trafficker a chance to prove his ordinary business expenses, 219
but criminals may deduct their "legal" business expenses in com-
puting their net income for tax purposes, 220 and a British law re-
form commission did not shrink from just such a proposal.22' The
chief difficulty with the offer of such proof is that it is fundamentally
incompatible with the defense of innocence. Of course, contesting
the government's evidence as to the amount of one's gross receipts
from crime is almost equally incompatible with a vigorous defense.
216 Some courts have adopted the principle, in cases with multiple defendants, that
each is jointly and severally liable for the proceeds of the whole enterprise. United
States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d
1487, 1506-08 (lth Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3265 (1987)(defendants' eighth
amendment claims, raised for the first time on appeal, not considered). This only makes
matters worse. Presumably each defendant only received a share of the proceeds. Joint
and several liability will cause the disproportionate forfeiture of substitute assets belong-
ing to the more solvent defendants or those whose assets are more readily accessible, to
the detriment of their legitimate creditors.
217 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
218 See infra notes 447-69 and accompanying text.
219 The trafficker would certainly have the burden of proof on such an issue.
220 See generally Bittker, Taxing Income from Unlawful Activities, 25 CASE W. REs. 130
(1974). In 1982, Congress provided that none of the ordinary business expenses in-
curred by drug dealers, except for the cost of the drugs themselves, could be deducted
from their gross income for tax purposes, in contradistinction to the ordinary rule that
such expenses of an illegal business as salaries and rent are deductible from gross in-
come for tax purposes. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, § 351, 96 Stat. 640 (1982) (codified at I.R.C. § 280E (1987)).
There is a sharply defined public policy against drug dealing. To allow drug dealers
the benefit of business expense deductions at the same time that the U.S. and its
citizens are losing billions of dollars per year to such persons is not compelled by
the fact that such deductions are allowed to other, legal enterprises. Such deduc-
tions must be disallowed on public policy grounds.
S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 309, reprinted in 1982 CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
781, 1050. This hardly furnishes a reason for treating drug dealers differently from
other criminals.
Illegal bribes and kickbacks are not deductible. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21 (1987).
221 D. Hodgson, supra note 136, at 74.
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These difficulties are again essentially procedural. RICO and CCE
forfeitures are an automatic incident of conviction, and the jury is
required to give a special verdict as to the amount.222 The solution
is at least a bifurcation of the issues at trial, 223 and possibly the post-
ponement of the forfeiture issue until sentencing.
Illegal gambling is also a prototypical activity of traditional or-
ganized crime. Here, however, there is a large and well-defined gap
between gross receipts, equal to total bets placed (the "handle")
and net receipts, equal to the handle less payoff of winning bets. In
the numbers, net receipts are forty percent of gross wagers; in ille-
gal betting on horseracing, the "takeout" is about sixteen percent;
in betting on a single football game, net receipts are only 4.55% of
the handle.224 Whether or not bookies should forfeit their relatively
minimal expenses of operation, it seems curious to adopt a defini-
tion of proceeds under which the bookie ostensibly forfeits the total
value of all wagers ever to pass through his hands, with the peculiar
result that forfeitures are higher when the odds most favor the bet-
tor. No reported decision has yet dealt with this issue.
The forfeiture of gross receipts as a punishment for white collar
crime is a different matter. These crimes are characteristically the
use of illegal means, such as insider trading, rigged bidding, and the
payment of bribes, in the operation of legitimate business. If an ille-
gally obtained contract has been performed in full, it may not be
appropriate to make the return of the contract price in full a
mandatory part of the criminal sentence, in addition to all other
punishments, and without regard for the expense of
performance. 225
222 FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(e). See supra note 34.
223 See Markus, Procedural Implications of Forfeiture under RICO, the CCE, and the Compre-
hensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Reforming the Trial Structure, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1097 (1986)(con-
stitutional necessity of "pure" bifurcation).
In several reported cases defendants have waived jury determination of forfeitures.
See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1986)(rejected claim
that defendants had been misled into waving jury); United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d
1003, 1012-13 (11 th Cir. 1984)(waiver must be in writing); United States v Schmalfeldt,
657 F. Supp. 385, 396 (W.D. Mich. 1987)(waiver precluded argument that acquittal by
jury on certain counts was an implicit finding of fact on forfeiture issues); United States
v. Horak, 633 F. Supp. 190, 197 (N.D. Ill. 1986)(defendant waived jury and stipulated to
facts concerning forfeitable assets). They were probably impelled by the desire to avoid
prejudice arising in the jury's mind by the proof of unexplained income in large
amounts. See infra notes 371-73 and accompanying text.
224 The ABT REPORT, supra note 146, at 78, 98-99.
225 Under RICO as it now stands, this question tends not to arise. RICO provides the
more draconian penalty of forfeiture of the defendant's interest in the business itself.
See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text. Forfeiture of the proceeds and of the
enterprise are not mutually exclusive, although there is no reported case in which both
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Only one case has explicitly considered this issue, and it is of
limited interpretive value because the offense occurred before the
adoption of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984. In United
States v. Lizza Industries, Inc. ,226 the defendants were charged with
thirty-two counts of mail fraud, a predicate RICO offense, for ob-
taining contracts for the building and repair of public roads through
collusive bidding. Applying Rssello v. United States,227 which held
that criminal proceeds can constitute an interest in a RICO enter-
prise and are therefore subject to forfeiture, the Second Circuit or-
dered the forfeiture of the gross receipts from the contracts less the
direct costs of performance, but the court refused to permit the de-
fendants to allocate a share of the receipts to the overhead of the
business and deduct them. 228 The majority similarly refused to per-
mit the deduction of taxes already paid. 229 This mode of calculating
forfeiture clearly preserves a rough proportionality between the of-
fense and the punishment, and due process requires nothing
more.230 "RICO does not require the prosecution to prove or the
trial court to resolve complex computations, so as to ensure that a
convicted racketeer is not deprived of a single farthing more than
his criminal acts produced. 23 1 The court, however, went on to say
that forfeiture of profits net of allocated overhead and taxes would
have an insufficient deterrent effect. "Using net profits as the mea-
sure for forfeiture could tip such business decisions in favor of ille-
gal conduct." 232 This is difficult to credit. The court apparently
imagined that a businessperson undeterred from bid rigging by the
prospect of disgrace, high fines, legal expense and the threat of
prison will refrain when he realizes that upon conviction he will have
to surrender the allocated overhead from the illegal contract.
Furthermore, the court overlooked the perverse effect of
forfeiting proceeds already paid to the federal government as taxes,
have been sought. See, e.g., United States v. Horak, 633 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill.
1986)(government sought forfeiture of defendant's stock interest, salary, bonuses and
pension rights, but not the proceeds of contracts obtained by bribery). In United States
v. Brennan, 629 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), the prosecution of a corrupt judge under
RICO, the government voluntarily excluded from its request for forfeiture sums which
the judge paid to a go-between.
226 775 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082, (1986).
227 464 U.S. 16 (1983). See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
228 Lizza Inds., 775 F.2d at 498.
229 In a concurring opinion, Judge Van Graafeiland objected that to the extent the
criminal has paid taxes he has already been separated from his dishonest profit, which is
the chief purpose of RICO forfeiture. Id. at 499.
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thus penalizing the criminal who pays his taxes more severely than
the criminal who does not.23 3 This could be dismissed as trivial, but
one must consider which criminals ordinarily pay their taxes and
which do not. Offenders whose criminal violations are incidental to
the management of a legitimate enterprise usually pay taxes on their
earnings. Such offenders are the quintessential white-collar
criminals, and their offenses, including bribery, insider trading, and
SEC violations, all involve bending the rules of the free market.
Professional criminals, on the other hand, whose enterprises are in-
trinsically illegitimate, declare as little income as they can. 234
Therefore the measure of profits adopted in Lizza Industries seems to
punish the white-collar and occasional lawbreaker more severely
than the professional criminal. 235
2. The Forfeiture of the "Instrumentalities" of Crime as a Punishment
Congress has recently expanded existing criminal forfeitures in
nearly all drug cases236 to include property of the defendant "used,
or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, such violation. .. 237 the so-called "in-
strumentalities of crime." Real as well as personal property may be
forfeited. 238 In addition to the proceeds of the crime, houses,
stores, planes, ships and trucks, if used in committing the offense,
are thus all automatically forfeited upon conviction. It is possible,
indeed likely, that in many cases the value of the property forfeited
233 Judge Van Graafeiland's concurrence at least implied that this disparity is a depri-
vation of equal protection. Id. at 499. The criminal who forfeits proceeds already paid
in taxes cannot deduct the amount thus forfeited as a business expense. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-21 (1987).
234 Professional gamblers, however, are supposedly careful to declare substantial in-
come, on the theory that the IRS is more likely to prosecute them for tax evasion than
their local police for gambling. Bittker, supra note 220, at 141.
235 The fault of failing to distinguish properly between traditional organized crime
and traditional white-collar crime is intrinsic to RICO. The essence of RICO is that, by
its hugger-mugger definition of"racketeering activity," 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(1) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987), it makes one federal offense of such disparate offenses as arson, kid-
napping, murder, hijacking, bid rigging, welfare cheating, currency smuggling, counter-
feiting, bribing public officials and accepting bribes, and the breach of all manner of
private fiduciary duties through the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343 (1982). RICO thus carries out the essential program of Edwin Sutherland, who
coined the term "white-collar crime," and the other Progressive reformers: the treat-
ment of all deviations from social and economic responsibility as crimes. Geis & Goff,
Introduction, E. H. SuTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME at ix-x (1983).
236 See supra note 203.
237 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 303, 98 Stat. 2044
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985)).
238 21 U.S.C. § 853(b)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
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because of its involvement in the offense, may vastly exceed the pro-
ceeds thereof or any fine the court may choose to impose.
This new mandatory penalty may have a deterrent effect on
those contemplating offenses against the federal drug laws. Its ori-
gin, however, casts considerable doubt on its fairness and workabil-
ity. Congress borrowed the remedy from traditional in rem civil
forfeitures, apparently with no consideration of its appropriateness
as a criminal penalty.23 9 Rather the forfeiture of instrumentalities
was made a criminal penalty for the convenience of avoiding two
separate actions, a criminal trial and a civil forfeiture.2 40 The very
same property may be forfeited civilly, without evidence of criminal
guilt on the part of the user or owner, or criminally, as a mandatory
penalty upon conviction. A closer look at the history and policy of
in rem forfeiture is therefore necessary.
The customs and impost laws of the United States, like the Brit-
ish Navigation Acts which served as their model,24 1 have always
been enforced by summary forfeitures of contraband 242 and of the
vehicles in which such contraband was transported. Congress has
extended such forfeitures in recent times to such "contraband" as
adulterated and misbranded products, 243 cars whose vehicle identi-
fication numbers have been tampered with,244 and controlled sub-
stances. 245 In fact such forfeitures are a pervasive mode of
regulatory enforcement, as is perhaps best illustrated by the provi-
sions for the forfeiture of "any property intended for use in violat-
ing the provisions of the internal revenue law. .. "246 The same
239 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 209-14, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3392-97.
240 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 196, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3379; S. REP. No. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982), (available on
Cong. Info. Service S-523-16 (1982)(microfiche))(precursor bill); United States v.
Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987).
241 Reed and Gill, RICO Foreitures, Forfeitable "Interests, " and Procedural Due Process, 62
N.C.L. REv. 57, 66 (1983); Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 769, 774 (1977). See also United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 209, 235 (1844)(Story, J.)(seizure of brig used for acts of piracy by mentally un-
balanced captain, despite innocence of owner, in accordance with "the maritime law and
the law of nations").
242 See supra note 36.
243 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1982).
244 18 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. III 1985). The owner of the car has the burden of show-
ing that he did not know that the number had been altered. Id. at § 512(a)(1).
245 49 U.S.C.S. app. §§ 781, 782 (Law. Co-op. 1982 & Supp. 1987)(transportation,
concealment or possession of any "contraband" article, including narcotic drugs, coun-
terfeit money and illegal firearms in any vessel, vehicle or aircraft, subjects such vessels
to civil forfeiture).
246 I.R.C. § 7302 (1986). The seizure and civil forfeiture of such property is man-
dated by I.R.C. §§ 7321 and 7323.
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statutes ordinarily mandate the forfeiture of property used to pro-
duce contraband. 247 Such property, together with the means of
transporting contraband, has often been called "instrumentalities"
of crime.248
Contraband and instrumentalities have always been forfeit re-
gardless of the criminal guilt of their users or owners, and have been
condemned without any of the protections of criminal due pro-
cess.249 The traditional justification for this mode of proceeding has
been that the property is "guilty," or, less metaphorically, that the
property itself or the circumstances in which it was seized furnished
all the evidence necessary for its condemnation. 250 Such justifica-
tion has no real application to many of the in ren forfeitures enacted
in recent years. A common feature of such forfeitures is that they
depend upon proof that a crime has been committed and the prop-
erty to be forfeited is traceable to or was used in the commission of
such crime. An example is the 1986 provision for the civil forfeiture
of the proceeds of drug offenses, including offenses committed in
foreign countries against foreign law.25' Similarly, Congress re-
247 See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (Supp. III 1985)(property used or intended to be used
to produce depictions of minors engaged in sexual conduct).
248 The term "instrumentalities" is traditional but misleading, since under both 21
U.S.C.S. § 881 (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1987), and 49 U.S.C.S. app. § 782 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987), the mere presence of contraband in a vehicle justifies the forfeiture of
such vehicle, regardless of any evidence that the vehicle was used to transport the con-
traband. United States v. M/V Christy Lee, 640 F. Supp. 667, 672 (S.D. Fla. 1986)(21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1982)); United States v. One 1971 Porsche Coupe Automobile, 364
F. Supp. 745, 749 (E.D. Pa. 1973)(former 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1982)). For this reason the
term "derivative contraband" has been suggested. It is, of course, possible to forfeit a
vehicle as an instrumentality of crime even if it has not been used to transport contra-
band. United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1221 n.10 (10th
Cir. 1986).
249 United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 2-Door Hardtop, 529 F.2d 65, 66 (9th
Cir. 1976).
250 Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
784 (1977).
Another justification commonly advanced is essentially one of exigent circum-
stances: seizure and forfeiture are necessary, as in the case of piracy on the high seas,
because the United States has no jurisdiction over the offender or the locus of the of-
fense. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) I (1827)(dictum). The Supreme Court in
1974 apparently endorsed this principle when it upheld the seizure of a leased yacht
without warrant, notice or hearing under a Puerto Rican statute; a single marijuana ciga-
rette had been discovered on board. "[Such] [s]eizure permits Puerto Rico to assert in
rem jurisdiction over the property in order to conduct forfeiture hearings . .. " Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 670 (1974).
251 Any property ... which represents the proceeds of an offense against a foreign
nation involving the manufacture, importation, sale or distribution of a controlled
substance... within whose jurisdiction such offense ... would be punishable by...
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and which would be punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year if such act or activity had occurred
within . . . the United States [is subject to civil forfeiture].
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cently provided for the civil forfeiture of a vehicle in which an illegal
alien has been knowingly transported, including travels entirely
within the United States such as a lift to work, 252 in violation of a
criminal statute.253 A third example is the civil forfeiture of "mone-
tary instruments," including cash, in excess of $10,000, knowingly
imported or exported without declaring the same to Customs. 254
It seems difficult to maintain that such forfeitures are anything
other than a punishment for crime. The constitutionality of these
forfeitures from a due process standpoint seems suspect, insofar as
they impose a penalty for criminal conduct without a criminal con-
viction and indeed without a jury trial.255
These penalties bear an added sting in the form of a statutory
novelty: real property used in any way to facilitate the commission
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1351, 100 Stat. 3207-18
(codified at 18 U.S.C.S. § 981(a)(1)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)). The statute does not
require that the offender be convicted or even charged in a foreign country. The effect
is to give American courts jurisdiction to determine whether American citizens and resi-
dent aliens have committed crimes in foreign countries, without benefit of trial by jury,
in a proceeding in which the owner of the property has the burden of proof but does not
have the benefit of process to compel the testimony of foreign witnesses.
252 See, e.g., United States v. One 1982 Chevrolet Crew-Cab Truck, 810 F.2d 178 (8th
Cir. 1987)(owner loaned truck to illegal alien who was driving it when arrested); but cf.
United States v. One 1984 Ford Van, 826 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1987)(contractor's trans-
portation of workers to and from job site in Washington State did not further their ille-
gal presence in the United States.).
253 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 12,
95 Stat. 1617. It is a predicate to civil forfeiture that the vehicle have been used in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982), making such knowing transportation of an illegal
alien within the country a felony. It is, of course, not a precondition to the civil forfei-
ture that the owner of the vehicle be convicted or even indicted for the criminal offense.
254 31 U.S.C.S. 88 5316, 5317(c) (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1987). Most courts
agree that the money is subject to forfeiture if the traveler knew that he was transporting
monetary instruments with a value in excess of $10,000, whether or not he knew of the
reporting requirement. United States v. $47,980 in Canadian Currency, 804 F.2d 1085,
1090 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2469 (1987). Contra United States v. One (1)
Lot of $24,900 in United States Currency, 770 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir. 1985).
255 The Warren Court seems to have recognized the force of this argument in One
1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), in which it invalidated the
forfeiture of untaxed liquor and the vehicle in which it was being transported on the
grounds that the search and seizure were invalid without a warrant. The exclusionary
rule applied because the forfeiture of the car necessarily depended upon a finding that
the owner had committed the crime of illegally transporting untaxed liquor. Id. at 701
(citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)(compulsory production of the
owner's private papers in a civil forfeiture action violates the fourth and fifth amend-
ments)). The court noted that the value of the car exceeded the fine that could be im-
posed for the same offense. It is doubtful that anything remains of One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan after Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See infra
notes 266-76 and accompanying text. See generally Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 493 (1976).
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of a drug offense is now also subject to forfeiture. 256 Such forfeit-
ures are a nearly unprecedented extension of the forfeiture of the
"instrumentalities" of crime, hitherto limited to personalty such as
tools, equipment and vehicles. 257 Congress specifically authorized
the forfeiture of real property, because, until recently, it has been
considered too daringly metaphorical to call the premises where a
crime was planned or contraband stored an "instrumentality" of
such crime.258 All drug offenses must be planned and carried out
somewhere; if the house, office or store of the defendant, as well as
a vehicle, when so used, is forfeit, the potential for grossly excessive
penalties is multiplied.259 Such penalties may be "disproportion-
ate" in the sense that they are out of proportion to commonly ac-
cepted opinions about the gravity of the offense. 260 In addition, if
the property is leased, every such forfeiture will implicate the inter-
ests of a putatively innocent owner. 26 1 Finally, such forfeitures pres-
256 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. III 1985).
257 There are two statutes which provide for the civil forfeiture of land: land upon
which an illegal still is found, 26 U.S.C. § 5615(3) (1982); and land of a brewery from
which taxable beer has been removed for consumption or sale "with intent to defraud
the United States of the tax thereon." 26 U.S.C. § 5673 (1982). There is no reported
case of in rem forfeiture of real property under either of these statutes more recent than
United States v. About 151.682 Acres of Land, 99 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1938).
258 [I]f [a drug dealer] uses a secluded barn to store tons of marijuana or uses his
house as a manufacturing laboratory for amphetamines, there is no provision [in
current law] to subject his real property to civil forfeiture, even though its use [was]
indispensable to the commission of a major drug offense and the prospect of the
forfeiture of the property would have been a powerful deterrent.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 195, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3378.
In fact, there are cases in which real property used by drug dealers was forfeit, not
as an instrumentality of crime, but as property which afforded its owner a source of
influence over a RICO enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (Supp. III 1983),
see United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1459 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1189 (1985), or over a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(a)(2)(B) (1982), United States v. McKeithen, 822 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1987).
259 It must be remembered that a potential penalty of imprisonment for more than
one year is prescribed for nearly all federal drug offenses. See supra note 203.
260 This is one element of the test for disproportionality adopted by the Supreme
Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294 (1983)("[Tlhere are generally accepted crite-
ria for comparing the severity of crimes on a broad scale . . ."). In Solem, the Supreme
Court invalidated the defendant's sentence of life without parole under a recidivist stat-
ute for uttering a "no account" check for $100 after six earlier convictions for minor
non-violent crimes. The court held that the sentence violated the eighth amendment
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments." In rem forfeitures are not constitution-
ally "punishments;" therefore, they cannot be disproportionate within the Solem defini-
tion, however severe. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
261 There is no reported case concerning the criminal forfeiture of a leasehold.
United States v. Various Parcels of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1986),
concerned the civil forfeiture of a leased house because of its supposed use by the tenant
in narcotics violations, but the true owner did not appear and the court denied the gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment for lack of probable cause. It would appear
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ent unresolved problems about the degree of involvement in the
criminal business necessary before the property is forfeit. 262
It has already been noted that civil forfeitures imposed for the
knowing use of property in violation of criminal statutes have the
effect of punishing crime without criminal process. 263 Such forfeit-
ures may also punish the innocent, because the user and the owner
may be different persons. Until 1974 it was clear that the owner's
innocence of crime, ignorance of the user's activities, and inability
to control such activities were legally irrelevant.264 At least one
commentator has decried the unfairness of this result.265
that the fee is not forfeit if a lessee commits a crime, like the sale of drug paraphernalia,
upon leased premises, without the knowledge or conent of the owner; the innocent
owner is at least entitled to remission underJustice Department regulations, Forfeiture
Regulations § 9.5(c)(2) supra note 31 (claimant "at no time had any knowledge or reason
to believe that the property in which he claims an interest was being or would be used in
a violation of the law . . ."). However, "[a] lessor who leases property on a long term
basis with the right to sublease shall not be entitled to remission or mitigation of such
forfeiture unless his lessee would be entitled to such relief." Id. at § 9.6(c)(2).
Presumably once a leasehold has been forfeited to the government it is held subject
to an obligation to pay rent. An interesting question is whether the lessor would have
the right to terminate the leasehold if the lessee performs an act subjecting the leasehold
to forfeiture, perhaps on the ground that such forfeiture was equivalent to an assign-
ment contrary to the terms of the lease. Perhaps lessors will begin to include boilerplate
in their leases providing that the lease shall terminate automatically if the lessee does
anything upon the premises which gives rise to a civil or criminal forfeiture under state
or federal law.
262 In United States v. Various Parcels of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind.
1986), the government sought the civil forfeiture of a leased house on the grounds that
it had been used to facilitate illegal exchanges of money for controlled substances. The
sole evidence offered, by affidavit, was that the tenant had made eight telephone calls to
and from the house allegedly in furtherance of such exchanges. Id. at 65. The court
rejected this evidence as insufficient to show probable cause for forfeiture. Id.
The Drug Enforcement Agency attorney in charge of forfeiture matters has testi-
fied: "We can seize a house for almost any use, but we are trying, for instance, to avoid a
deal done in a hallway you could forfeit the house technically. .." 1985 Forfeiture Hear-
ings, supra note 104, at 47 (testimony of William M. Lenck).
263 See supra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
264 See, e.g.,J. W. Goldsmith. Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921)(up-
holding forfeiture of a taxicab used in transporting untaxed spirits against conditional
vendor); United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Automobile, 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.
1958) (forfeiture of car owned jointly by driver and his mother, in which lender had sig-
nificant security interest, when passenger was found to have a few grams of marijuana on
his person, unknown to driver).
265 [IThe doctrine that the sovereign is authorized to impose forfeitures and confis-
cations of "guilty things" without regard to the interests of the innocent owners of
those things is about as irrational and unjust a proposition as a sober mind can
concoct, for all that it has a history of thousands of years behind it, and has been
solemnized by the United States Supreme Court.
Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful
Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 257-58 (1973). See also
Clark, supra note 255, at 481 (lessor or installment seller made a guarantor or surety for
the good behavior of the lessee or buyer).
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In 1974, however, the Supreme Court upheld the civil forfei-
ture under a Puerto Rican statute of a yacht on a long-term lease
because a single marijuana cigarette was found on board, despite
the innocence of the owner/lessor and its inability to control the
lessee's activities. 266 Although the Court insisted that such forfeit-
ures are justified from a due process standpoint by their sheer antiq-
uity, 2 6 7 it in fact abandoned the "guilty property" fiction. Instead, it
characterized the forfeiture of property belonging to innocents as
having "punitive and deterrent purposes. ' 268 The Court did not
explain how innocent persons can constitutionally be punished nor
why the state would wish to do so. 269 As for deterrence, the court
said that "confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing [les-
sors, bailors, or secured creditors] to exercise greater care in trans-
ferring possession of their property." 270  The claimant in Calero-
Toledo, although undoubtedly guiltless of any offense, had offered
no evidence as to its degree of care in leasing the yacht. 27 1 In dic-
tum, the Court stated that
266 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
267 Id. at 680-81. The Court traced such civil forfeitures to the Anglo-Saxon institu-
tion of deodand, under which an inanimate object such as a falling tree which acciden-
tally killed a person was forfeit to the Crown, and even to the Biblical law concerning an
ox that killed a person by goring. The ox was to be stoned to death but no one might
partake of its flesh or otherwise use the carcass. Exodus 21:28. The connection is sup-
posed to be the metaphorical guilt and punishment of the offending property in each
case, but there is no historical link among the institutions. The underlying concepts are
also very different. Finkelstein, supra note 246, at 229-30 (stoning of the goring ox is not
a forfeiture; the Old Testament is devoid of any concept of the guilt of inanimate ob-
jects); Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
770-71 (1977).
268 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686.
269 From a utilitarian point of view, punishment of innocent persons is perfectly justi-
fied for its deterrent effect, at least if the suffering prevented by the deterrence of future
crime outweighs the suffering inflicted by present punishment. The merely negligent
may be punished to deter negligence; the insane may be punished to deter others from
falsely claiming insanity; even the innocent relatives of a convicted criminal may usefully
be punished if more crime may be deterred thereby. H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RE-
SPONSIBiLrry: EssAYs IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 6 (2d Ed. 1970)(deterrent effect of
punishing an entire family).
However, it is likely that the Supreme Court characterized such civil forfeitures as
"punitive" merely to avoid the fifth amendment claim that they constitute a "taking" for
which compensation is due. Clark, supra note 255, at 427.
270 416 U.S. at 688.
271 Id. at 690. Presumably it failed to do so because the settled law until Calero-Toledo
was that such evidence was irrelevant and would be unavailing. In fact the lease specifi-
cally forbade any illegal use. Note, Forfeiture-Due Process-Supreme Court Upholds Forfeiture
of Innocent Owner's Property Without Prior Notice and Hearing, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 467, 476
n.54 (1976). The claimant's main line of attack was against the state seizure without
notice, hearing, or independent judicial determination of probable cause. This attack
was upheld by a three judge district court. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 669.
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It would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner...
who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could
be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for in that
circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served
legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.272
Although later courts took up this dictum, they generally have
judged the behavior of innocent owners with invidious strictness,
suggesting, for example, that it is a breach of one's duty of reason-
able care to allow one's son to use one's car if he has a minor crimi-
nal record. If he misuses it to transport any quantity of drugs, it is
forfeit. 273 Thus, the peculiar tendency of the Calero-Toledo rule is to
make both commercial dealings, such as the installment sale of an
automobile, and relations of friendship with ex-convicts, extremely
risky, thereby validating discrimination against them.274
If in rem forfeitures after Calero-Toledo can no longer be justified
by the "guilty property" fiction, but by their punitive and deterrent
effects, then the extreme and arbitrary disproportion between of-
fense and remedy in many cases seems to violate both fundamental
fairness 275 and the eighth amendment requirement that punishment
be in proportion to the crime. 276 The Court, however, rejected this
apparent consequence of the change in rationale, and no court has
refused to order an in rem forfeiture on the grounds of
disproportionality.
Apart from this objection, it seems that criminal punishments
should not depend upon accidental and irrelevant details in the
manner in which the crime was carried out. For example, one might
imagine six participants in a continuing criminal enterprise who
meet in the house of one participant and store drugs in the base-
272 416 U.S. at 689-90.
273 United States v. One 1978 Chrysler Le Baron Station Wagon, 648 F. Supp. 1048,
1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). A similar father and son case with the same result is United
States v. One 1976 Lincoln Continental Mark IV, 578 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. W. Va. 1984).
See generally United States v. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. 783, 786, (S.D.
Fla. 1988)(dictum)(courts routinely uphold the civil forfeiture of a loaned vehicle used
to facilitate a drug transaction against the innocent owner exemption); United States v.
One Rockwell Int'l Commander 690 C/840, 594 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.D. 1984)(civil
forfeiture proper when innocent owner of airplane leased it without any "plan or proce-
dures for detecting smuggling.").
274 The Justice Department has explicitly adopted a requirement that all petitioners
for remission show their ignorance of the criminal record of their vendees as a precondi-
tion for administrative remission of forfeiture. Forfeiture Regulations, supra, note 31, at
§ 9.5(b)(4).
275 Justice Douglas based his dissent on this point. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 695
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
276 See supra note 260.
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ment of another. These two participants would be subject to the
mandatory forfeiture of their houses in addition to all other penal-
ties prescribed by law; their co-conspirators would suffer no such
penalty.
Another objection is procedural. The forfeiture of instrumen-
talities is more likely than any other forfeiture to involve the inter-
ests of innocent third parties, especially when the government seeks
to forfeit real property. Such third parties have standing to inter-
vene in civil in rem forfeitures, in which they may litigate all issues,
including whether their property was in fact used to facilitate a
crime. After their property is identified as subject to forfeiture in a
criminal indictment, however, they have no right to intervene 277 and
have, in fact, no legal remedy until the conclusion of criminal pro-
ceedings. They are then relegated to an independent action, with-
out the right to a jury trial,278 in which the fundamental issue of
whether their property has been used to facilitate crime may be
barred by resjudicata.279
Finally, there is simply no principled justification for making the
forfeiture of the instrumentalities of crime into a mandatory crimi-
nal punishment. The forfeiture of proceeds is precisely retributive,
effectuating the principle that the criminal shall not profit by his
crime. The added penalties of fine and imprisonment are defined
by the legislature in rough proportion to society's view of the seri-
ousness of the offense in the abstract. The judge fixes them after
considering the character of the criminal and the circumstances at-
tending his particular offense. But the forfeiture of instrumentali-
ties of crime in general and of real property in particular, as an
automatic consequence of conviction, is perfectly arbitrary and even
smacks of superstition. In effect, the injustice of massive civil for-
feitures for often trivial offenses has been grafted onto the criminal
statutes.
3. The Forfeiture of Interests in an Enterprise as a Punishment
The great originality of RICO as an anti-racketeering statute
lies in its concept of enterprise forfeiture. La Cosa Nostra and newer
branches of organized crime have gained a footholds in a few indus-
tries and especially in a number of important trade unions. They
277 21 U.S.C.S. § 853(k)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
278 See Schwarz v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Md. 1984).
279 There are no reported decisions on this point. But see United States v. Raimondo,
721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984)(dic-
tum) (determination at criminal trial that certain property constituted profits of CCE vio-
lations not binding upon defendants' attorneys, as they were not parties.).
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have purchased such foothold with the proceeds of wholly illegal
businesses like drug dealing, gambling and loansharking, perhaps
originally to provide a cover for the continuation of such businesses,
to "launder" such proceeds, and to provide an apparent source for
declared income. From the first, however, mobsters conducted
their legitimate businesses with the same methods of violence
smoothed over by political corruption that have served them in their
rackets.28 0
The insight of the RICO draftsmen was that the Mob's hold on
legitimate businesses would be substantially unaffected by targeting
individuals, even those at the head of their enterprises, and convict-
ing them for particular crimes. The problem was the conduct of
legitimate businesses by a pattern of criminal means. The chosen
remedy was to criminalize both the acquisition 28' and manage-
ment28 2 of the businesses through racketeering activity. The ulti-
mate aim was the liberation of such businesses and their honest
competitors from predatory control. 28 3 With this in mind, the crim-
inal penalty for racketeering should be forfeiture of the defendant's
interest in the business to the federal government, preventing the
succession of new mobsters to replace those convicted.284
This was a worthy, and remains an essentially workable, idea. It
has been tainted, however, by the fact that RICO has not been di-
rected primarily against organized crime activity of the sort de-
scribed above, but against political corruption, ordinary fraud, bid-
rigging, fraud in the sale of securities, and breaches of private fidu-
ciary duty. Such prosecutions flow naturally from the broad variety
of predicate offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) and particularly
from the inclusion of mail and wire fraud. 28 5 These latter statutes
280 The infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime has been a common
theme of Congressional hearings and legislative reports over the years. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 2370, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1950); S. REP. No. 307, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 170
(1951)(Kefauver Committee); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 76-78 (1969).
281 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982).
282 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
283 "If we take back the labor unions, the legitimate businesses, eventually they [the
Mafia] become just another street gang." McFadden, The Mafia of the 1980's: Divided and
Under Siege, N.Y. Times, March 11, 1987, at Al, col. 1 (quoting United States Attorney
Rudolph Giuliani).
284 See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 245 n.25 (1982) (Professor Blakey was a principal draftsman of
RICO).
285 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). The statutes make it a felony to use the mails,
wire, radio, or television communications in interstate commerce for the purpose of exe-
cuting a scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or property by false pre-
tenses. Such use is a prerequisite for federal criminal jurisdiction under the commerce
clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, but any use of the telephone or of the mails inciden-
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have been described by one court as "seemingly limitless" in their
reach.28 6 They make federal crimes of such local concerns as filing
false state income tax returns. 28 7 They have been used to criminal-
ize torts288 and offenses against professional ethics, 2 9 a result which
has roused the passionate opposition of critics. 290 They have also
provided federal prosecutors with a roving commission against local
political corruption which they have not hesitated to employ.29 1
tal to an essential part of the scheme is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. See, e.g., United
States v. Vardell, 760 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir. 1985)(mail fraud); United States v. Curry,
681 F.2d 406, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1982)(mail fraud); United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d
633, 644-45 (11th Cir. 1983)(wire fraud), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 (1984); United
States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1010, rehearing denied 605 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.
1979)(wire fraud)(sufficient that the defendant intended the communication to further
the scheme or fraud; no proof of actual furtherance required).
286 United States v. Standard Drywall Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (mail fraud statute "applies to an employer's scheme to defraud employee benefit
funds of workers with whom he has a collective bargaining agreement of contractually
mandated benefit contributions.").
287 United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204, 1216 n.17 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 930 (1977).
288 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987)(reporter's use of
advance knowledge of contents of Wall Street Journal column for personal profit by
trading on his own account was mail fraud); United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566 (11th
Cir. 1985)(self-dealing by officer of agricultural co-operative in phosphate holdings),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983)(breach of duty to disclose material information to an
employer).
289 See, e.g., United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981)(despite absence of
any evidence that client was harmed, attorney was convicted for personally representing
a client in a known conflict of interest with another client of his firm, without disclosing
such conflict), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
290 See Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the "Evolution" of a
White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983); Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflec-
tions on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line between Law and Ethics,
19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117 (1981); Comment, The Intangible Rights Doctrine and Political
Corruption Prosecutions under the Federal Mail-Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 562
(1980) (legislative history of mail-fraud statute reveals that it was intended to proscribe
only the use of the mail to obtain property by false pretenses).
291 See McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2883 n.1 (1987). McNally has called
into question the continued use of the mail and wire fraud acts in the prosecution of
public officials by striking down the "intangible rights" doctrine. Under this interpreta-
tion, the statutes criminalized the deprivation of the citizens of a state or local govern-
ment of their "right to have the affairs of [the defendant's office] conducted honestly,
fairly, and free from corruption, dishonesty, fraud, and conflicts of interest." United
States v. Best, 657 F. Supp. 1179, 1181 (N.D. Ill. 1987)(quoting from the indictment).
The prosecution was thus relieved of the necessity of proving any financial benefit to the
defendant or injury to the state. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982), whose viola-
tion is also a predicate offense under RICO, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987), has been expansively interpreted in just the same way. The Act prohibits the
extortion of property, but "property" has been extended to include, for example, the
right of union members to have the affairs of their union conducted democratically in
accordance with the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.
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Mail and wire fraud have become so elastic that they are the
most common predicate offenses under RICO,29 2 while the addition
of RICO counts has made enterprise forfeiture a common penalty in
mail fraud cases. 29 3 Such forfeiture, however, is nearly always an
excessive and inappropriate punishment. An example is United
States v. Horak.29 4 Horak owned a garbage disposal business, which
he sold to a large corporation in exchange for valuable stock and a
contract retaining his services as manager. Without the knowledge
or participation of anyone in the parent company, he bribed the
mayor of a village to award his division a contract even though it was
not the low bidder. Horak was indicted for mail fraud; the jurisdic-
tional predicate was the fact that contract payments were mailed.
Apparently his payment of the bribe in successive installments fur-
nished the pattern of racketeering necessary to support a RICO
indictment.
The bribe paid was $12,000.295 The gross revenues under the
contract totalled $483,000.296 The reported facts unfortunately do
not include the division's net profits from performing the contract
or the loss suffered by the village from its failure to accept the low-
est bid. The government did not seek to forfeit gross receipts or net
profits; rather, it demanded Horak's stock in the parent company,
purchased 10 years before, and valued at $8.5 million, as well as the
forfeiture of his employment contract, his vested pension and profit
sharing rights, and his entire salary and bonuses totalling $305,000
over five years.29 7 Horak had not acquired the stock with the pro-
ceeds of his wrongdoing. Rather, the government claimed that the
stock was an "interest" in an "enterprise which [the defendant has]
§ 411 (a) (1982). See United States v. Local 560 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267,
281 (3d. Cir. 1985).
In McNally, however, the Supreme Court invalidated the mail fraud convictions of a
Kentucky state official and the chairman of the state Democratic party who conspired "to
place the State's workmen's compensation insurance with a particular agency in ex-
change for that company's agreement to share a major portion of its commissions with a
list of agents provided by the officials, including sham agencies under the control of the
officials themselves." 107 S. Ct. at 2882 (Stevens,J, dissenting). The gravamen of their
offense was the concealment of this arrangement from "other persons in the state gov-
ernment whose actions could have been affected by the disclosure," 107 S. Ct. at 2882
n.9, and not any financial loss to the state.
A bill reversing the result in McNally is presently before the Congress. H.R. 3089,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
292 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CIVIL RICO 1986, at 52 (1986).
293 See Lynch, (Parts I & II), supra note 28, at 750-55.
294 833 F.2d. 1235 (7th Cir. 1987).
295 Id. at 1238.
296 633 F. Supp. at 201 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
297 Id. at 200.
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S.. participated in the conduct of, in violation of § 1962(c).- 2 98
If one assumes that the parent company was the RICO enter-
prise, the government was undoubtedly right as a matter of statu-
tory construction.299 But the district court refused to forfeit Horak's
shares in the parent company, while forfeiting the other listed prop-
erty.300 The district court held that an "interest" must "afford... a
source of influence over" an enterprise for it to be forfeit, whereas
Horak's shares, fewer than one percent of those outstanding, af-
forded him no such influence. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the
government that this result was "probably incorrect," 30' and that
the statute does not require such influence,30 2 but declined to vacate
the district court's sentence on the grounds that it was not appeala-
ble under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 303 The court acknowledged that it had
the power to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus ordering cor-
rection of the sentence 304 but declined to do so because the govern-
ment's argument was not "indisputable. ' 30 5
Thus both the district court, by a strained construction of the
statute, and the appeals court, by refusing to exercise its authority,
avoided ordering the forfeiture of Horak's stock. In this way they
both avoided dealing with the constitutional questions posed by in-
terest forfeiture. The district court questioned whether Congress
could constitutionally require the forfeiture of assets which have no
298 Id. at 190, 198 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1982)).
299 See infra note 302.
300 633 F. Supp. at 199-200. The district court held that an "interest" must "afford...
a source of influence over" an enterprise for it to be forfeit, id. at 197, whereas Horak's
shares, less than one percent of those outstanding, afforded him no such influence, id. at
200. The court characterized Horak's investment in the parent as a "fortuity" essen-
tially unconnected with his wrongdoing, id. at 199.
301 833 F.2d at 1250.
302 The statute provides in the alternative for the forfeiture of "any interest in ... any
enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or partici-
pated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1968" or, inter alia, "any property or
contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over.., any enterprise...,"
18 U.S.C. § 963(a)(2)(A), (D) (Supp. III 1985). The implication is that all ownership
interests are forfeit, but a contractual right is only forfeit if it is a source of influence
over the enterprise-a contract for employment as vice-president, for example, as op-
posed to a vested interest in a pension fund.
The district court's principal argument was that unless an interest, to be forfeitable,
must afford a source of influence over the enterprise, it is impossible to distinguish the
property described in § 1963(a)(2) from that described in § 1963(a)(1). The latter sub-
section makes forfeitable an interest "acquired or maintained in violation of section
1962," 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). But § 1963(a)(1) refers to the mode of
acquisition of the interest, whereas § 1963(a)(2) refers to the mode of operation of the
enterprise-a perfectly intelligible distinction.
303 Horak, 833 F.2d at 1246-48.
304 Id. at 1248.
305 Id. at 1250.
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connection to the underlying racketeering activity and, if it could,
whether such forfeiture might not raise a serious danger of dispro-
portionate punishment. 306 The appeals court said that a construc-
tion of the statute which makes mandatory the forfeiture of a
defendant's entire interest in the enterprise for any RICO offense,
constrained only by the eighth amendment, "gives us pause."307
The appeals court was also troubled by the element of
"prosecutorial caprice" 308 involved in defining the parent company
as the "RICO enterprise."
Other courts have been troubled by the risk of disproportionate
punishment posed by enterprise forfeiture.309 But apart from the
limits imposed by the eighth amendment, there is simply no argu-
ment, on policy grounds, for providing that any corporate officer
who wrongfully diverts a corporate opportunity, takes improper ad-
vantage of inside knowledge, rigs a bid or pays a bribe should be
punished by forfeiture of his entire business or interest therein,
built up over many years of hard and presumably honest labor. En-
terprise forfeiture seems even more inappropriate for the violation
of an administrative regulation such as disposing of hazardous
wastes without a permit, but the government is now seeking such a
forfeiture.310 The statute already provides that a defendant entre-
preneur shall forfeit the profit derived from his or her wrongdoing;
enterprise forfeiture is by statute an additional penalty, only acci-
dentally correlated to the seriousness of the offense and the magni-
tude of the profits.311 In fact, enterprise forfeiture for ordinary
306 Horak, 633 F. Supp. at 199.
307 833 F.2d at 1251.
308 Id.
309 Similar doubts were expressed in United States v. Marubeni America Corp., 611
F.2d 763, 769 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980), and in United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.
1979) (forfeiture of defendant's interest in medical supply business for inflated bills), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980):
We further note that where the forfeiture threatens disproportionately to reach un-
tainted property of a defendant, for example, if the criminal and legitimate aspects
of the "enterprise" have been commingled over time, section 1963 permits the dis-
trict court a certain amount of discretion in avoiding draconian (and perhaps poten-
tially unconstitutional) applications of the forfeiture provision.
Huber, 603 F.2d at 397. Unfortunately, nothing in the text of the statute suggests the
existence of any such discretion.
310 Shabecoff, U.S. Brings Racketeering Charge in a Waste Case, N.Y. Times, April 29,
1988, at Al1. Of course, disposing of hazardous waste without a permit is not a predi-
cate offense under RICO. The defendant, president of a waste disposal company, was
charged with mail fraud-assuring a customer that it could dispose of contaminated soils
legally without a permit and then advising an employee to give false testimony before
the grandjury. The indictment sought forfeiture of the defendant's entire interest in the
company and all sums he had received from the company from 1983-86.
311 This objection is directed to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (Supp. III
1988] 393
DAVID J. FRIED
white-collar crime will necessarily fall most heavily upon one who
has been scrupulously honest in building up his business until the
time of his lapse 31 2 and upon the corporate officer who has been
well rewarded with stock options for his faithful services. This ob-
jection is in principle no different from the one already advanced
against the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime as a criminal pun-
ishment. 313 This is not surprising, because a common feeling (one
hesitates to call it an idea) underlies both punishments. The criminal
used his car when he went to buy drugs; he deserves to lose his car.
The businessman committed a crime in the management of his busi-
ness; he deserves to lose his business. This is retribution of a partic-
ularly crass and irrational kind. It is justifiable, if at all, only if the
apparently legitimate business is a mere facade for a criminal enter-
prise, as in the case of a motel which is really a brothel.314
One class of enterprise forfeitures authorized by RICO-the
potential forfeiture of such businesses as publishing houses, movie
studios, radio or television stations, or chains of bookstores or con-
venience stores, for the violation of state or federal obscenity
laws. 3 15-is objectionable for additional reasons. The prospect of
enterprise forfeiture may chill the assertion of first amendment
1985), of property in or rights against any enterprise operated or managed in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). The forfeiture of an interest "maintained in violation of
section 1962," 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985), is similarly objectionable. Many
white-collar crimes are for the benefit of an enterprise, and thus serve indirectly to
"maintain" the perpetrator's interest in the enterprise by enhancing its value.
On the other hand, forfeitures of interests in an enterprise acquired in violation of
§ 1962, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985) are appropriate. Section 1963(a)(1)
makes criminal the acquisition of a business interest "through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt." The drafters had in mind such tradi-
tional practices as taking title to a business in payment for a grossly usurious loan or
gambling debt. The wrongdoer should forfeit such illegal acquisitions, which are, in
fact, proceeds of crime.
312 United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978), illustrates this type
of forfeiture. The government originally sought forfeiture of all assets of a beauty col-
lege whose proprietor falsely certified to the Veterans Administration the hours of at-
tendance of the students and enrolled numbers of students in excess of the authorized
limit. Clearly the proprietor should restore all funds gained by her misrepresentations
to the government in addition to other statutory penalties, but loss of the business is an
arbitrary and draconian punishment.
313 See supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
314 United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982)(forfeiture of motel upheld
when defendant corrupted public officials over several years to purchase immunity from
prosecution for his prostitution business).
315 RICO defines "racketeering activity" to include acts chargeable under state crimi-
nal statutes concerning "dealing in obscene matter and punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year," 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(A) (West Supp. 1987), as well as acts indict-
able under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-65, concerning the mailing and transporting of obscene
matter and the broadcasting of obscene or profane language, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(B)
(West Supp. 1987). As always, the government would be required to show that the af-
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rights. A businessperson might run the risk of a fine as the price of
obtaining a judicial determination whether certain material was le-
gally obscene. He or she will hesitate to run the risk of forfeiture of
the business, or even of the premises where the sale took place. The
result will certainly be self-censorship. What is more, such enter-
prise forfeitures will result in the confiscation of, for example, a
bookstore's entire stock in trade, much of which may not be legally
obscene, without any determination of obscenity for each individual
item. However persuasive these arguments may seem, they have
been emphatically rejected by several courts.316
Thus RICO enterprise forfeiture is an often disproportionate
fairs of the enterprise were conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity, in this
case two or more obscenity offenses. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1963(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
The Reagan administration has proposed the inclusion of child pornography of-
fenses, 18 U.S.C. § 2251-52 (Supp. III 1985), in the definition of racketeering activity,
President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Protection and Obscenity Enforce-
ment Act of 1987, 133 CONG. REC. S16093 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1987).
316 See generally United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D.,Va. 1987). The de-
fendants owned and operated several video stores that allegedly sold obscene materials.
They were indicted under RICO for conducting an enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity, viz. dealing in obscene matter, but the government apparently sought
to forfeit, not the enterprise itself, but assets (including a business) allegedly acquired
with the proceeds of the sale of obscene material. On the day the indictment was
handed down, the government obtained an ex parte restraining order, later modified,
prohibiting the defendants from selling all "video tapes, magazines, and other printed
material." Id. at 1508.
The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the prospect
of draconian punishment by RICO forfeitures will have a chilling effect on the willing-
ness of persons desiring to engage in questionable but protected speech to do so, and
thus functions as a constitutionally impermissible prior restraint. Id. at 1512. The court
gave this argument short shrift, holding that the "chilling effect" doctrine refers only to
obscenity statutes which give insufficient notice of what speech is prohibited, unlike the
Virginia statute whose violation was the predicate RICO offense. Id. at 1511. Nor can
the threat of a subsequent punishment, however severe, be a prior restraint. Id. at 1513.
The court distinguished the case before it from Arizona v. Feld, No. 148389 (Ariz. App.
1987), which involved the forfeiture of a business conducted in violation of state RICO,
and thus of much property "essentially unconnected with the racketeering activity." Id.
at 1514. The thrust of the opinion, however, is that RICO enterprise forfeiture is consti-
tutional as a punishment for the sale of obscene material, limited only by the general
proportionality requirements of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1516-17.
The Indiana Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of a similar forfeiture
in 4447 Corporation v. Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d 559, rehearing denied, 509 N.E.2d 174
(Ind. 1987), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988), concerning two civil forfeiture actions
brought by local prosecutors under the Civil Remedies for Racketeering Activity Statute,
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-30.5-1 to 35-45-6-2 (West 1987), each alleging that several
bookstores owned by a corporation constituted an enterprise intentionally conducted
through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of Indiana RICO, IND. CODE
ANN.§ 35-45-6-2(a)(3) (West 1987). The predicate offense was the distribution of ob-
scene matter in violation of Indiana law. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West 1987). The
prosecutors sought to enjoin the RICO violations and to seize assets of the corporations
allegedly subject to forfeiture as "property used in the course of, intended for use in the
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punishment which may in some circumstances threaten first amend-
ment rights. However, such forfeitures were not conceived of as ret-
ribution or even as punishment, except incidentally. They were
intended as a weapon against the corruption of legitimate business
by criminal methods. As such they are potentially very useful. At
first glance, the problem with RICO seems to be that the predicate
offenses listed are too extensive; perhaps mail and wire fraud in par-
ticular should be deleted. Yet the breadth of the list of predicate
offenses was deliberate, and is based upon the sound insight that the
categories of the criminal statutes do not correspond, and cannot be
made to correspond to the distinction between the activities of or-
ganized crime when it goes into business and white-collar crime.3 17
It is more useful to ask whether organized crime has an identifi-
able "fingerprint" the presence of which might trigger the remedy
of enterprise forfeiture. Coercion, usually involving at least an im-
plied threat of violence, is the hallmark of the mobster in legitimate
business or in control of a trade union and might serve as such a
"fingerprint." A thumbnail sketch of the aims and methods of or-
ganized crime involvement in commerce will serve to demonstrate
this fact. A major aim of racketeers, as well as their most consistent
source of profit, is the organization of some target industry, whether
vending machines, laundry services, beer distribution, or the supply
course of, derived from, or realized through, conduct in violation of [state RICO]."
Goldsmith, 504 N.E.2d at 561 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30.5-3(a) (West 1987)).
In one case, the trial court issued an injunction ex parte ordering the Indianapolis
Police Department to seal the premises where a third bookstore operated by the same
company was due to open, on the strength of an affidavit that a police officer had
purchased sexually explicit movies in the two other stores and saw similar materials ex-
hibited for sale. Id. at 562. In the other case, persons involved with the enterprise,
which also operated three bookstores, had been convicted 39 times of obscenity offenses
in less than three years. The police seized the contents of the three bookstores under an
ex parte order. Id.
The Indiana Court of Appeals held that this mode of proceeding violated the first
amendment prohibition on prior restraint of speech and the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. Id. at 560. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, held that the suppres-
sion of obscene materials was neither the purpose nor effect of the forfeiture. The trial
court was not judging the content of any books seized, but the activities of the enter-
prises. All the assets of the enterprises, whether obscene or not, were seized because
they were "the proceeds of racketeering activity." Id. at 566-67.
No evidence was introduced before the trial court, however, that any of the assets of
the corporations were the proceeds of the sale of obscene matter. Arguably the prop-
erty seized was "used in the course of, [or] intended for use in the course of... [RICO
violations]." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30.5-3(a) (West 1987). But it is difficult to see how
the non-obscene materials seized fit into this category. The Indiana Supreme Court, in
effect, upheld an enterprise forfeiture not expressly authorized by the state statute.
317 It may be that offenses against the mail and wire fraud statutes have been too
broadly defined, but that is an independent policy problem.
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of concrete, into a cartel.318 The market is then divided among car-
tel members through collusive bidding or more directly, for exam-
ple, by enforcing the use of members' services as subcontractors.
Apart from the prospect of oligopoly profits there are other avenues
of profit such as hijacking, pilferage, and insurance fraud, all of
which members may be compelled to tolerate.
Not every industry is susceptible to mob domination, however.
Ideal candidates are usually untechnological, labor-intensive, inher-
ently local, and often, but not always, service-oriented businesses.
These characteristics make them particularly subject to coercion.
The small firms in the industry, often operating close to the margin,
are easily threatened and easily bought. Sometimes an ethnic tradi-
tion in an industry can be exploited. Businesspersons already in the
industry do not necessarily find it objectionable to be organized into
cartels, as they see a prospect of security and certain profits. This
fact does not negate the importance of coercion in policing the
ranks and excluding new entrants. 31 9
This coercion takes many forms. It can, of course, be crude and
direct, such as arson, attacks on workers, and the like. However, the
most sophisticated and successful coercion lies in the manipulation
of the labor force, both the employees of the business and those of
crucial outside suppliers. In easily dominated industries, the work
force is relatively low-paid, ill-educated, and often drawn from vul-
nerable fringe groups like illegal aliens. Such an industry, in fact, is
best organized and dominated through control of its major union,
because labor laws actually create and enforce a quasi-monopoly of
the most significant productive input.3 20 Strikes, slow-downs, and
picket lines, or the threat thereof, may easily induce the recalcitrant
to pay "strike insurance," while their mob owned or mob dominated
318 p. REUTER, DISORGANIZED CRIME: THE ECONOMICS OF THE VISIBLE HAND 114-31
(1983). Reuter applied industrial organization analysis to demonstrate why illegal rack-
ets such as sports gambling, numbers, and loansharking are necessarily small and ill-
organized, and drew upon sociological, rather than anecdotal, research to show that
nationwide or even local domination of such rackets by the Mafia is a myth. Reuter's
analysis at least demonstrates the decisive advantages that organized crime enjoys in
penetrating and dominating legitimate commerce.
319 This description of the conditions of organized crime penetration of legitimate
business is drawn from a variety of sources, including A. ANDERSON, THE BUSINESS OF
ORGANIZED CRIME (1979); D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION (1969); and Reuter, Racke-
teers as Cartel Organizers, reprinted in THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIME
49 (H. Alexander & G. Caiden, eds. 1985).
320 The FBI has determined that the International Longshoremen's Association, the
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union, the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Laborers International Union of North America are
dominated by organized crime. THE EDGE, supra note 55, at xvi.
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competitors enjoy labor peace in the form of "sweetheart" con-
tracts. Mob owned businesses may also benefit from cheap capital
either borrowed directly from union benefit funds or from the banks
in which such funds are deposited.3 21 Of course control of such a
union provides significant independent opportunities for profit
through pension fund manipulations, no-show jobs,322 exorbitantly
expensive or phony contracts with service providers,3 23 and kick-
backs of all sorts. 324 Inside the union the simplest method of coer-
cion is exclusion from work, but violence against troublemakers and
dissidents is an old tradition.325
Such cartel organized industries in the New York area are re-
ported to include private garbage disposal, concrete and cement
supply, and fish and meat distribution. 326 Corrupt national unions
like the Teamsters and Laborers, through their control of produc-
tion "chokepoints" like the delivery of materials, assist organized
crime in its domination of these industries.327 Organized crime
domination of such industries injures the economy because it stifles
competition and raises prices, and it demoralizes owners and work-
ers alike who find themselves living perforce within a criminal
subculture. 328
Enterprise forfeiture or forced divestiture may well be the most
effective weapon against such organized crime activities, which have
321 Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront " RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 341-46 (1980). Blakey and Goldstock provide an excellent overview of the meth-
ods of labor racketeering.
322 Organized crime members find highly-paid union sinecures very useful in provid-
ing a reportable source of income, making prosecution for tax evasion more difficult. R.
RHODES, ORGANIZED CRIME: CRIME CONTROL VS. CIVIL LIBERTIES 231 (1984).
323 See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986)(health care prov-
iders to the Laborers International Union of North America paid kickbacks to union
officers disguised as payments for clerical and other services to straw corporations), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3265 (1987).
324 R. RHODES, supra note 322, at 209-231.
325 The memory of the murders of two dissidents in Local 560, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters in 1961 and 1963 was still a powerful check on dissent in 1985.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, HEARING VI: ORGANIZED CRIME AND
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RACKETEERING IN THE UNITED STATES 733, 740-44 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter HEARING VI](statement of Robert C. Stewart, Newark Strike Force).
326 Id. at 745. For organized crime domination of fish distribution, see Lubasch, Mafia
Runs Fulton Fish Market, U.S. Says in Suit to Take Control, N.Y. Times, October 16, 1987, at
Al, col. 3.
327 Hearing VI, supra note 325 at 21, 23. See, e.g., United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d
940 (2d Cir. 1987)(teamsters local compelled movie studio through strike threats to hire
"cover drivers who did not work.").
328 "The persistence of racketeering in certain segments of the economy ... adver-
tises an apparent structural flaw in our political institutions .... " Blakey & Goldstock,
supra note 321, at 342.
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remarkable powers of self-perpetuation.3 29 However, enterprise
forfeiture as a criminal punishment under RICO, if it is retained at
all, might be limited to cases in which the defendant is charged with
the commission of at least one predicate offense which necessarily
involves violence or the threat of violence.330 Enterprise forfeiture
might also be permitted if the prosecution proved that the defend-
ant used violence or intimidation in connection with any one predi-
cate offense, because a number of offenses, like tampering with
witnesses or obstruction ofjustice, may or may not involve violence
in any given case. In this way a demonstration of the "fingerprints"
of organized crime becomes, not an element of the offense, but a
precondition for the application of one out of a several remedies.33'
It should be noted that the prosecution may prove intimidation by
indirect means, for example, by showing that the defendant had a
reputation for violence and exploited such reputation, thereby put-
ting the victim in fear without saying a word.33 2 Courts could add a
question about the occurrence of such intimidation to the special
verdict form already used by the jury in RICO forfeiture cases. 333
Another possibility would be to abolish enterprise forfeiture as
a criminal punishment. There is no evidence that the government
has made any progress toward the goal of expelling organized crime
from legitimate business through criminal forfeiture. 33 4 Making any
one person, no matter how powerful, forfeit his interest in a crimi-
329 The most notorious example is probably the 30-year reign of elements of the
Provenzano organized crime family over Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters in New Jersey. HEARING VI, supra note 325, at 739.
330 Such offenses include murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, and extortionate credit
transactions, 18 U.S.C. § 891(b) (1982)(loans wherein "it is the understanding of the
creditor and the debtor" that delay or failure in repayment "could result in the use of
violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property of
any person."), retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant, 18 U.S.C. § 1513
(1982), and possibly theft from interstate shipment, 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1982). Because an
important purpose of RICO is to stop the Mob's infiltration and control of unions, it is
perhaps surprising that violation of 29 U.S.C. § 530 (1982) is not a predicate offense.
Section 530 criminalizes the coercion or intimidation of a union member through force
and violence or the threat of violence, depriving him of his statutory rights. Apparently,
it has mostly been invoked to punish simple battery. See United States v. Local 560 of
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 282 (3d Cir. 1986).
331 It is of course true that this test may result in enterprise forfeiture against defend-
ants who have no connection with traditional organized crime. Enterprise forfeiture
seems an appropriate penalty when a defendant firebombs the competing nightclub of a
former partner, as in United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 917-18 (11th Cir. 1986).
332 United States v. Local 560 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 275-77 (3d
Cir. 1986).
333 FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e).
334 See Lynch, (Parts I & II), supra note 28, at 724-29 (survey of all reported RICO
prosecutions reveals only a "handful" of cases concerning infiltration or acquisition of
legitimate businesses by organized crime, and those were trivial).
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nally managed enterprise does not disturb the continuity of mob
control any more than does his imprisonment. What is needed is a
means of taking the enterprise as a whole away from the racketeer-
ing group without the necessity of identifying and convicting each
member of the group of specific RICO offenses. Curiously, the
means are at hand, though scarcely ever used, in the form of civil
proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 1964,3 35 perhaps amended to in-
clude a "violent means" test as outlined above. This statute confers
power upon the Justice Department to seek to divest RICO offend-
ers of their interest in an enterprise, to bar them from further activi-
ties in the same field, and to reorganize or dissolve the enterprise if
necessary.
The best feature of this approach is that divestiture is not forfei-
ture, for presumably the defendant may sell his interest to approved
buyers. The racketeer will lose his opportunity for future profits
from that particular investment, but a prohibition on future activi-
ties in the same field is not a criminal punishment and requires no
higher standard of due process than any form of delicensing.33 6
Furthermore, the government may target the entire controlling
group through a civil divestiture action without the necessity of
proving that each member is personally guilty of RICO offenses be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Finally, it seems likely that injunctive re-
lief, divestiture, or dissolution will rarely be sought except after one
or more participants in the enterprise have been criminally con-
victed of RICO offenses, because such a conviction works an estop-
pel, making the government's task far easier.33 7
The government did not bring a civil RICO action seeking di-
vestiture until 1982,338 and has rarely sought to enjoin the contin-
ued participation of a violator in a business or industry.33 9 The
Newark Organized Crime Strike Force has now successfully peti-
335 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
336 See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) (RICO civil divestiture
is not punishment), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(6) (Supp. III
1986) (discretionary conditions of probation may include a requirement that the defend-
ant refrain from engaging in certain occupations, businesses or professions "bearing a
reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense... .
337 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982).
338 HEARING VI, supra note 325, at 734 (statement of Robert C. Stewart, Newark Strike
Force).
339 The only successful example known to the author is United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974)(injunction against continued participation in gambling
enterprise and divestiture of building in which business was operated), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975). Cf. United States v. Winstead, 421 F. Supp. 295, 296 (N.D. Ill.
1976)(crime may not be enjoined under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) with-
out a showing that the defendants are likely to commit wrongful acts in the future).
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tioned to place Teamsters Local 560 under a civil trusteeship,340
and it is reported that the Justice Department is considering the
same sort of action against the national union.341
Thus the forfeiture of an interest in a business as a punishment
for criminal offenses in the conduct of such business is an arbitrary
and disproportionate punishment in the great majority of cases of
ordinary white-collar crime, especially in view of the broad scope of
such predicate offenses as mail and wire frauds. On the other hand,
criminal forfeiture is certainly appropriate where the business inter-
est was acquired with the proceeds of crime,3 42 and is probably ap-
propriate when the interest was acquired illegally and coercively.
To be fair, enterprise forfeiture must be confined to businesses and
unions run by racketeering methods strictly understood. The goal
is to stop and prevent the corruption of entire markets by violence
and coercion, whether express or implied. This is best done civilly,
making divestiture the objective of the action rather than the inci-
dental by-product of a criminal conviction.
4. The Presumption of Forfeitability of Income from an Unknown Source
One of the innovations of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984 is the rebuttable presumption that property acquired at the
time of a drug violation is subject to forfeiture if the government
establishes that there was no likely source for the property other
than through the violation.3 43 This presumption is modeled after
the "net worth" method of proving income often used by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service in both civil and criminal cases in the absence
of accurate records.3 44 The purposes of the presumption are to es-
340 See United States v. Local 560 of Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1986).
341 Prial, U.S. Court Runs a jersey Union in Test, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1987, at A29, col.
2. The New York District Council of Cement and Concrete Workers consented to the
court appointment of a trustee.
342 Only one such case has actually been reported. United States v. Williams, 809
F.2d 1072, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1987)(proceeds of drug sales used to purchase a printing
company facing bankruptcy, which employed certain drug smugglers).
343 21 U.S.C.S. § 853(d) (Law Co-op Supp. 1987).
There is a rebuttable presumption at trial that any property of a person convicted of
a felony under this title or title III is subject to forfeiture under this section if the
United States establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that-
(1) Such property was acquired by such person during the period of the violation
of this title or title III or within a reasonable time after such period; and
(2) there was no likely source for such property other than the violation of this
title or title III.
Id. See supra note 203 for an explanation of what offenses are covered "under this title or
title III."
344 I.R.C. § 446(b) (1986) authorizes the secretary to compute taxable income accord-
ing to any appropriate method, if the taxpayer has kept no records or false ones or has
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tablish the amount of proceeds of a drug offense and to assist in
tracing them to particular property. These aims seem unexception-
able and the inference commonsensical. However, it is easy to im-
agine circumstances in which the use of the presumption will result
in the forfeiture, not of the proceeds of the offense charged and
proven, but of the proceeds of all crimes committed by the defend-
ant around that time, including crimes for which the defendant was
never indicted and which do not carry the penalty of criminal forfei-
ture. The statute does not authorize such forfeitures and probably
could not constitutionally authorize them,3 45 even if their applica-
tion did not result in the imposition of a disproportionate forfei-
ture.346 Moreover, in some cases the evidence required to invoke
the presumption tends to prejudice the jury, and the defendant will
be unable to rebut it without incriminating himself as to other
offenses.
First consider the presumption as a rule of tracing. Suppose
that the state has charged the defendant with the importation of a
stated quantity of heroin with a wholesale value of $50,000. Shortly
after the commission of the offense, the defendant bought a house,
paying $50,000 down. If the government can show that there is no
other likely source for the down payment, the defendant's interest in
the house is forfeit. However, if the government cannot show this,
or if the defendant rebuts the presumption by demonstrating an-
other source for the down payment, even though the proceeds of
used inaccurate accounting methods. "Net worth" reconstruction is only one such
method approved by the courts. See Fed. Tax Guide Rep. (CCH) para. 2767.01 (Apr. 1,
1987).
345 Congress probably could, despite long tradition, constitutionally revive forfeiture
of estate, which amounts to the loss of all property, as a punishment for crime within the
limits of the eighth amendment, see supra note 260, and certainly can and does impose
fines many times in excess of the value of criminal gains. Congress has seen fit to make
criminal forfeiture a penalty imposed only upon criminal conviction of specific offenses.
It would, therefore, violate due process to forfeit the proceeds of other offenses, of
which the defendant has not been convicted, as a punishment for such specific offenses.
Only a few cases have limited forfeitures to satisfy the requirement of a nexus be-
tween the crime and the forfeit property. In United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th
Cir. 1987), discussed supra at notes 294-308, the required nexus was causal. The district
court had sentenced Horak to forfeit his "gross income and bonuses fromJanuary, 1981
until his conviction, and all corporate contributions to his pension and profit-sharing
plans for the same time period," id. at 1241. The appellate court reversed and re-
manded for a factual determination of what portion of these benefits Horak would not
have received "but for" his racketeering activities. Id. at 1243. In United States v. McK-
eithen, 822 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1987), a duplex used in the drug business was forfeit. A
six-unit apartment building not so used was not, even though it stood on the same lot.
Since the lot could not be legally subdivided, the court ordered it to be sold and the
proceeds apportioned between the defendant and the government.
346 See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
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the drug sale remain untraceable, the house is still forfeit as a substi-
tute asset. The 1986 amendments to the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act, which introduced the forfeiture of substitute assets have ren-
dered the presumption nugatory as a mode of tracing.3 47
The more important purpose of the presumption is to justify an
inference of the value of criminal proceeds when such value is un-
known. The government is not required to introduce any direct evi-
dence of the earnings of a major drug dealer with no visible means
of support. His or her property is presumed to come from drug
dealings unless he or she shows otherwise.
Such a presumption would be highly useful, but the statutory
language literally understood promulgates a much narrower pre-
sumption, and for good reason. The statute says that the govern-
ment must show that the property at issue has no source other than
"the violation" with which the defendant is charged. So stated, the
inference dictated by the presumption is a tautology. If the govern-
ment can establish that the defendant has property, acquired after
the offense charged, with no other likely source, the property must
have proceeded from the offense and is therefore subject to forfei-
ture. The judge could probably so charge the jury in the absence of
a statute.3 48 So interpreted, however, the presumption is of little
practical use. To prove that "there was no. likely source for such
property other than the violation of this title," the government must
demonstrate that ,the property did not originate from some other
crime.3 49 It is impossible to prove such a negative, no matter how
inclusively the indictment is drawn. Even if the defendant is
347 Sie supra note 78. One might imagine that the "tracing presumption" remains use-
ful as a basis for seizing or enjoining the transfer of property before trial pursuant to 21
U.S.C.S. § 853(e)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). HoWvever, the § 853(d) presumption
may only be invoked "at trial," and for good reason. First, it is obviously inappropriate
to defeat the interests of third party claimants and the defendant's other creditors by
thus piling an inference which amounts to a tracing fiction upon the fiction of "relation-
back." Second, the defendant should not be required to rebut the presumption at a pre-
trial hearing by showing himself guilty of other crimes or by giving a full accounting of
the sources of his property before the government has introduced any evidence at trial.
See infra notes 365-73 and accompanying text.
In at least one CCE case tried before the passage of the CFA, however, the "net
worth" method was used to identify assets potentially subject to forfeiture whose trans-
fer was then enjoined pendente lite. United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040, 1089-
90 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
348 See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973)(judge may validly charge a
jury, without specific statutory warrant, that the unexplained possession of recently sto-
len property authorizes an inference that the possessor knew it was stolen).
349 This assumes that "the violation of this title" means the same violation with which
the defendant is charged. The defendant may not constitutionally be punished by the




charged with operating a continuing criminal enterprise,3 5 0 thus
sweeping in all his drug offenses for a stated period, there is no way
to demonstrate that he was not carrying on other unrelated criminal
activities at the same time.
Congress, however, may have intended a broader inference: all
property not traceable to legitimate earnings is forfeitable proceeds
of the very offense charged, without the necessity of demonstrating
that it has no likely source other than the offense charged. 35 1 Set-
ting aside the fact that this interpretation is directly counter to the
statutory language, as a general inference it is insupportable. For
one thing, the property may be the proceeds of some other crime.3 52
A related reason is that the inference is unjustified if the value of the
criminal proceeds is provably incommensurate with the value of
later acquired property. If the defendant imported heroin with a
retail value of $50,000, obviously a house he purchased afterwards
for $500,000 in cash is not attributable solely to the crime charged.
On such facts either the presumption does not apply. 353 or the de-
fendant may rebut its application. The difficult question, assuming
arguendo that the presumption has the broader meaning described, is
whether the government may employ the presumption if it has no
350 21 U.S.C.S. § 848 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
351 This is unquestionably the meaning of the presumption adopted by the House and
Senate in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1982, H.R. 3963, which was never signed
into law:
Any property of the defendant may be presumed to be property subject to forfeiture
under subsection (a) [of 21 U.S.C. § 8531 if the trier of fact finds that-
(1) the defendant acquired the property during, or within a reasonable time after,
the period during which he committed the violation for which he was convicted; and
(2) the defendant's apparent sources of legal income during such period were sub-
stantially insufficient to account for his acquisition of the property.
SEN. REP. No. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982)(available on Cong. Info. Service S-
523-16 (1982)(text ofS. 2320, § 201)). The 1984 Senate Report, which is largely identi-
cal to SEN. REP. No. 520, describes the 1984 provision, now law, as essentially the same.
SEN. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 3182, 3395. However, the current § 853(d) is not at all the same, and the
change strongly supports the idea that Congress intended the narrower inference, which
also follows more naturally from the literal language of § 853(d). Thus it is probable
that some draftsman recognized the logical non sequiturs in the original language and
corrected it, making the presumption more reasonable but less useful.
352 In fact, once Congress has eliminated the tracing function, it is difficult to see why
the statutory presumption should include all serious drug offenses. There seems to be
no reason to invoke the presumption if the defendant is charged with specific and identi-
fiable drug transactions as opposed to a course of dealing. The facts of such transac-
tions-the amount of dope imported or the price for which it was purchased or sold-
are better and more direct evidence of the amount of the defendant's gain than his sub-
sequent acquisitions of property.
353 There must be another source for the property other than the crime charged. 21
U.S.C. § 853(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
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direct evidence as to the amount of the defendant's ill-gotten gains,
to prove such amount.
In answering this question, the first issue is what standards to
apply in evaluating the rationality and, ultimately, the constitution-
ality of such a presumption. This, in turn, requires certain prelimi-
nary determinations as to the character and effect of the
presumption. Is it mandatory or permissive?3 54 Once made out,
does the presumption shift the burden of persuasion to the defend-
ant or merely the burden of production?
The § 853(d) presumption, like most statutory presumptions, is
silent about these key issues of interpretation, which the judge must
necessarily resolve in his or her jury charge. The legislative history,
however, clearly characterizes the presumption as "permissive."
Thus the judge must charge the jury that it may refuse to draw the
inference, even in the absence of countervailing evidence, lest he or
she usurp their function.355 The Third Circuit has so interpreted
the presumption.35 6
There is also little doubt that the presumption, once made out,
shifts the burden of production to the defendant but not the burden
of proof.3 57 The Supreme Court has held that the effect of an evi-
dentiary presumption must be so limited in criminal cases.358 It may
be objected that the § 853(d) presumption, unlike those considered
by the court, does not go to the existence of an element of the of-
fense but only to the penalty. This difference is not significant be-
cause the government has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt on the forfeiture issue359 just as it does as to each element of
the offense.3 60  It may not shift this burden through a
presumption.3 61
354 See County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156
(1979)(distinction between permissive inference and mandatory presumption).
355 "Once these factors are established, the trier of fact may reject.., the inference
... if it is not merited under the facts of the case or in light of evidence produced by the
defendant .. " S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3395 (emphasis added).
356 United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987).
357 For this distinction, see County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140, 157 n.16 (1979).
358 Id. at 157; see also Zan v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 425 (1982)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
359 United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1348 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987); contra United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869,
875 (3d Cir. 1987).
360 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512 (1979).
361 However, the government can use a statutory presumption to meet its burden of
proof in a criminal case, by proving the "evidentiary" fact, or premise of the presump-
tion, beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70 (1965). The
1988] 405
DAVID J. FRIED
To have these effects the § 853(d) presumption must command
an empirically valid inference in general as well as in each case
where it is applied. There is obviously a "rational connection"3 62
between ill-gotten gains and the subsequent acquisition of property,
once the government has demonstrated that the defendant had no
apparent legitimate means of acquiring them. The difficult question
is whether the inference is appropriate if it is "more likely than not"
to be true, or the "ultimate fact" must follow from the "evidentiary
fact" beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has so far
managed to avoid choosing between these standards of inferential
reliability for presumptions in criminal cases.3 63 The standard by
which to judge the § 853(d) presumption should be the same as that
applied to other criminal presumptions, however, because the gov-
ernment's burden of proof is the same.
To make an empirical evaluation of the § 853(d) presump-
tion,3 64 suppose that the defendant is charged with being the king-
late Justice Hugo Black consistently attacked this conclusion over three decades, insist-
ing that Congress does not have the power to determine as a matter of law what facts
will support what jury inferences. Statutory presumptions in criminal cases infringe
upon the defendant's right to a jury trial and are always unconstitutional. Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6, 55 (1969)(Black, J., concurring in the result); Gainey, 380 U.S.
at 74 (Black, J., dissenting); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 473 (1943)(Black, J.,
concurring).
The terms "evidentiary" and "ultimate" fact, used throughout this section to de-
note repectively the fact proven and the fact to be inferred, are drawn from County
Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979).
362 Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 66 (1965); Tot, 319 U.S. 463, 466 (1943).
363 Compare Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 (1973)(when inference was
clearly justified beyond a reasonable doubt it is unnecessary to fix a minimum standard)
with United States v. Leary, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969)(when inference is factually unsup-
ported, it is unnecessary to fix a minimum standard).
364 The courts cannot escape making their own empirical judgments as to the reason-
ableness of the inference and have often struck down criminal presumptions on the basis
of such analysis. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (invalidates statutory
presumption that possession of marijuana is sufficient evidence of the defendant's
knowledge that marijuana was illegally imported); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S.
136 (1965)(invalidates former statutory presumption that defendant's unexplained pres-
ence at an illegal still shows his possession, custody, or control thereof); United States v.
Moore, 571 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1978)(invalidates statutory presumption that a kidnapped
person held more than 24 hours whose whereabouts are unknown has been transported
in interstate commerce).
Leary is particularly interesting because the Supreme Court made its own review of
facts not on the record concerning the origin of marijuana smoked in the United States
and users' knowledge of such origin. The Court determined that there is no basis for
the inference that possessors of marijuana know that it was illegally imported. Cf.
United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. Cal. 1985), in which the court held that
it was obligated to pay great deference to the determination of Congress that serious
drug offenders are likely to skip bail, embodied as a mandatory statutory presumption in
the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985). The court did not
discuss the empirical validity of the presumption at all. Moore, 607 F. Supp. at 496.
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pin of a CCE conspiracy. The government has shown that the
defendant is a drug dealer, that he has no source of income apart
from crime, and that he owns substantial property acquired during
or after the period of the conspiracy. It is surely "more likely than
not" that the property is proceeds of the conspiracy; therefore, the
inference commanded by the presumption is constitutionally valid.
On the other hand, it cannot be said "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that the property is not the fruit of some other crime not charged in
the indictment. Upon these facts, the choice of standard would
seem to be crucial.
However, if the defendant is charged with a particular and iden-
tifiable criminal transaction, or indeed several transactions, it is not
"more likely than not" that specific later acquired property is the
fruit of such transactions. There is simply no way to assess the
probability of the inference without knowing the relationship be-
tween the offenses charged and all of the defendant's criminal activ-
ity. In other words, the inference is only valid when the defendant is
charged, not with particular offenses, but with a continuing course
of conduct, and the statute should probably be amended
accordingly.
This does not end the matter, however. The defendant has a
right to rebut the presumption. He will be exceedingly reluctant to
do so, however, if the inference is false because, for example, he
actually received $50,000 for committing a murder to which the
government has not yet linked him. Under these facts, has his fifth
amendment right not to incriminate himself been violated?
At first glance the answer is "no." After all, a criminal defend-
ant is often put under severe pressure by the weight of the evidence
against him to explain his activities, with a concomitant risk that he
will betray his guilt of some other crime. Such a situation may even
come about as the result of a presumption. A good example is the
statutory presumption that the defendant's presence at the site of an
illegal liquor still gives rise to the inference that he or she is carrying
on the business of a distiller without giving bond.3 65 A defendant
caught at the still might have to rebut the presumption by proving
that he or she was a mere customer or had come to the still for the
purpose of stealing some moonshine or burning it to the ground as
part of a vendetta. 366 The defendant's position, however uncom-
fortable, is no different from that of any accused whose true alibi
365 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(4) (1982), upheld by United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63
(1965).
366 Similarly, Dr. Timothy Leary admitted to the purchase and illegal possession of
marijuana in New York to rebut the presumption that he had transported marijuana
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unfortunately implicates him or her in another crime.3 67
This hypothetical, however, is different. The defendant is in-
duced to testify not to rebut evidence tending to show that he or she
is guilty of the crime charged, such as defendant's unexplained pres-
ence at an illegal still, but evidence introduced during trial which is
perfectly irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence. The defend-
ant's dilemma, far from being unavoidable, arises from the peculiar-
ity of entrusting criminal forfeiture to the jury and thus validating
the introduction of evidence that has no bearing on the offense
charged. The judge may prevent this difficulty, in part, by ordering
the complete bifurcation of the trial between the presentation of
and verdict upon evidence going to the defendant's guilt and evi-
dence going to the forfeitability of specific property. 368 Such a divi-
sion is desirable and common practice even in trials in which the
presumption is not invoked.3 69 The prosecutor may even be ethi-
cally required to seek such bifurcation. 370
illegally imported from Mexico with knowledge of such importation. Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
367 In United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895 (1st Cir
1987), the government sought the civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), as drug
proceeds, of money posted by a convicted defendant as an appeal bond. Apparently, the
government developed its prima facie case for forfeiture from the evidence presented at
a Nebbia hearing-"an inquiry into those who provided the defendant's bail and their
motives for the purpose of assessing the likelihood of flight." Id. at 898, n.7. See United
States v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966). Judge Wisdom rejected the argument
that the claimant was unconstitutionally deprived of his enjoyment of the privilege
against self-incrimination by having to meet the burden of rebutting the government's
forfeiture case. The court acknowledged that if the defendant testified, for example,
that "the money was proceeds from jewel thefts, it would not be subject to forfeiture,
but [the claimant] would have subjected himself to prosecution for theft" Id. at 901,
n.22.
368 In United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987), the trial judge held that
the defendant could not testify on his own behalf in the forfeiture phase after electing
not to testify in the liability phase. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new
trial confined to the forfeiture issues, holding that the trial court's refusal to allow the
defendant to testify on such issue unduly burdened his exercise of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 874. In dictum, the court added that
"[elvidence received in the forfeiture phase, and therefore not before the jury when it
determined guilt, may not be used in post-trial motion proceedings or on appeal to
sustain the conviction itself." Id.
369 See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 575 (11th Cir. 1985)(jury not in-
formed of the forfeiture counts in the indictment until they had found the defendants
guilty of racketeering), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); United States v. Cauble, 706
F.2d 1322, 1348 (5th Cir. 1983)(dictum)(bifurcation is the better procedure); United
States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482, 486 (S.D. Ala. 1986); United States v. Ragonese, 607
F. Supp. 649, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1985)(defendant waived jury on forfeiture issue), aff'd, 784
F.2d 403 (lth Cir. 1986). See generally Markus, supra note 206 (constitutional necessity of
bifurcation). But cf. United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1988)(upheld
denial of bifurcated trial, in part because defendant failed to allege actual prejudice.).
370 "The prosecutor should avoid introducing evidence bearing on sentence which
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The § 853(d) presumption raises general issues of due process
quite apart from the self-incrimination problem. To establish the
presumption, the government will commonly show that the defend-
ant is living in luxury which cannot be accounted for by legitimate
sources of income. Thejury cannot be restrained from drawing the
inference that the defendant is guilty of serious crimes,3 7' and the
further inference that he must therefore be guilty of the crime
charged, or, what is worse, that he should be convicted on the in-
dictment to punish him for the crimes that he has gotten away with
hitherto, whatever they may have been and regardless of the evi-
dence.3 72 In other words, allowing the government to prove the de-
fendant's possession of unexplained wealth is not essentially
different from allowing the government to prove the defendant's
history of crime. The fact that a defendant is a professional armed
robber, as shown by his history of convictions, is certainly relevant
in considering whether he has committed armed robbery in a given
case, but our system excludes it nonetheless for its prejudicial effect.
The § 853(d) presumption presents the identical risk. The risk can
only be avoided by strict bifurcation.373
The § 853(d) presumption may also have due process implica-
tions for third parties. Property acquired by the defendant during
the period of his or her criminal activities may be traceable to a third
person who nonetheless has no standing to contest the forfeiture
order, because such person has no legal interest in the property and
cannot claim to be a bonafide purchaser thereof3 74 For example, the
defendant may have funds in the bank traceable to an unsecured
loan. The defendant has little or no incentive to assert the superior
right of a creditor, especially in the context of a plea bargain in
which forfeited property is implicitly exchanged for a shorter prison
sentence or smaller fine.3 75
will prejudice the jury's determination of the issue of guilt." STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-6.1 (ABA 2d ed. 1979).
371 The Justice Department thinks it desirable to be able to demonstrate to the jury
the vast wealth that the defendant has accumulated from drug transactions generally in a
prosecution for a single drug transaction, so that the jury will recognize what is at stake.
Smith & Weiner, Criminal Forfeitures under the RICO and Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statu-
tues (November 1980)(Manual prepared for the Criminal Division), reprinted in 1981-82
Hearings, supra note 56, at 256, 273.
372 Id. at 1120.
373 Another solution is to make the factual determinations relating to forfeiture a part
of the sentencing process and entrust them to the judge alone. See infra notes 485-91
and accompanying text.
374 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A),(B) (Supp. III 1985); see infra notes 447-54 and ac-
companying text.
375 This point is made in the opinion in United States v. Reckmeyer (Reckmeyer I),
628 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Va. 1986), which concerned inter alia an unsecured loan from a
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In summary, the § 853(d) presumption, interpreted narrowly
and correctly, is of little real use. Interpreted broadly, it is an at-
tempt to work the forfeiture of all of a drug offender's property by
substituting an inference for adequate proof that such property is
the proceeds of the crime charged. The inference is unjustified in
most cases, particularly those involving single transactions. Even if
justified, its employment tends to deprive the defendant of proce-
dural due process.
IV. THE FORFEITURE OF PROFITS AS THE
USUAL PENALTY FOR CRIME
This Article has traced how criminal forfeiture was first revived
as a means of reversing the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate
business. Because the profits of crime, especially the very great
profits realized by the sale of narcotics, facilitate such infiltration,
such profits became forfeit through a process of statutory construc-
tion and amendment. This Article has shown, however, that forfei-
ture of profits, originally an afterthought, is in fact the only form of
criminal forfeiture which is justifiable in theory and practice. The
proof thus far has proceeded by exclusion. The Article has demon-
strated the impropriety of the forfeiture of derivative contraband
and of interests in a legitimate enterprise as a criminal punishment
in the large majority of cases. It has also shown the folly of expect-
ing criminal forfeiture to do too much: to deter offenders who are
not deterred by the fear of exposure, trial and imprisonment; 376 to
strip defendants in advance of trial of the means with which they
father to his son. The son pleaded guilty to engaging in a continuing criminal enter-
prise. The father was permitted to recover the amount of the past due principal from
the funds forfeited to the government, on the broad ground that the existence of a bona
fide obligation to a creditor overcomes the presumption of forfeitability. Id. at 622.
However, the court did not require any evidence, nor was there any, that the funds in
question were traceable to the loan. Rather, it implicitly indulged the opposite pre-
sumption or tracing fiction that, as the defendant's net worth was increased by the
amount of the loan, such amount must be exempted from forfeiture. Even if this alter-
native presumption is appropriate, it does not follow that the government must turn the
amount due on the loan over to the father, as the court ordered. The father had neither
legal nor equitable title to such funds. He therefore had no standing under 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(n)(6)(A), (B) (Supp. III 1985), but only possessed a contract right to be repaid.
The court conferred such standing upon him, however, explicitly holding that due pro-
cess requires the claims of innocent creditors to prevail over criminal forfeiture, and that
Congress must have so intended, notwithstanding clear statutory language to the con-
trary. Id. at 620-2 1. However desirable this result may be, this is not a legitimate mode
of statutory interpretation, as we have already had occasion to note. See supra notes 118-
23 and accompanying text.
376 See supra notes 173-94 and accompanying text.
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may defend themselves; 377 to deprive them of the proceeds of
crimes with which they have not been charged;378 and to stop all
relationships of friendship and commerce between criminals and
others.3 79
In contrast, the forfeiture of profits from all crimes committed
for the sake of economic gain seems to effectuate the old common
law principle that no one may benefit by his or her own wrong.380
Such forfeitures would seem to be an ideal minimum penalty, be-
cause they are necessarily proportional to the severity of the offense,
they restore the status quo ante as far as possible, and they assure, in
conjunction with appropriate fines, that the criminal will not find his
loot waiting for him when he leaves prison. If the amount of profit
can be determined with even rough accuracy, it should be taken
from the defendant's available property without the necessity of
tracing. Of course, the defendant should still forfeit any assets
which are in fact traceable to crime, although they may have appreci-
ated since their acquisition.
Finally, whatever property is extracted from the defendant,
whether under the rubric of forfeiture, fine or restitution, must be
made available to his victims, creditors, including defense counsel,
and even to a certain extent to his innocent dependents. This may
seem inconsistent with punishment and deterrence, because the de-
fendant will to some degree realize real and psychic benefit from
such a distribution of his property. As previously shown, however,
the forfeiture of profits is not a punishment and even under the
present state of affairs is not a very effective deterrent. The limited
benefit to the defendant may be offset by other punishments, chiefly
imprisonment, while the state must in fairness carry out its purpose
of punishing him or her with as little cost to the victims and inno-
cent bystanders as possible.
Far from being revolutionary, this proposal is an attempt to ra-
tionalize existing trends, which from several distinct starting points
are converging upon the surrender of criminal gains as an indispen-
sable minimum penalty. These trends include: the rise of white-
collar crime, or to be more precise the criminalization of administra-
tive violations and civil wrongs, making crime far more profitable
than ever before; a concomitant increased interest in restitution as a
377 See supra notes 89-131 and accompanying text.
378 See supra notes 343-75 and accompanying text.
379 See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
380 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-12, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889), is supposedly the




supplementary penalty; a new concern for "victim's rights," com-
monly defined to include the right of state compensation for imme-
diate injuries; and the extraordinary triumph since about 1970 of
"just deserts" as the only broadly accepted justification for punish-
ment, supplanting a long-lived liberal consensus that punishment
must be tailored to the circumstances of the offender and not the
offense.
These trends are of course interrelated. White-collar criminals
often inflict substantial quantifiable injury, usually have funds avail-
able for restitution, and are not in need of or are not good candi-
dates for rehabilitative punishment. More broadly, however, each of
these trends is symptomatic of the breakup of the public/private dis-
tinction. 8 1' The tripartite division between criminal offenses, which
are punishable by the state, civil wrongs, which are actionable by
private persons, and sins, which are left in a liberal regime mostly to
God, has broken down, as snorting cocaine and trading on inside
information come to be defined as equally serious offenses against
public order.38 2 As this has occurred, however, the interest of the
state in punishing the offender has come more and more pointedly
into conflict with the interests of his victims in compensation.
Under these circumstances, it is no longer satisfying to repeat bro-
mides about the impropriety of using the criminal justice system to
collect private obligations. A new system is needed which harmo-
nizes these conflicting interests as far as possible.
A. THE GROWTH OF RESTITUTION AS A CRIMINAL PENALTY
The idea that criminals should compensate those whom they
have injured was, of course, dominant during the long centuries
during which criminal law had no existence as an entity distinguish-
able from tort law.3 8 3 However, the developed common law in-
cluded rules which barred the victims of criminal offenses from civil
381 See, e.g., The Public-Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
382 See generally Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 391 (1963)(possible violation of due process and the establishment clause for the
government to prosecute breaches of traditional morality without a reasonable public
purpose distinct from the mere preservation of such morality).
383 j. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 412 (2d ed. 1979).
The purpose of monetary compensation [in the Anglo-Saxon period] is overtly re-
tributive, but it is also compensatory; in modern language, it is both a fine and
damages at the same time. In so far as feuds and their settlements were governed
by rules, there was a law of wrongs. But there was no division ofwrongs into crimes
and torts. And the main purpose of introducing law into the matter was to protect





recovery or at least made such recovery unavailing.38 4
The American common law courts rejected these rules, adopt-
ing restitution not as a punishment, but only as a condition of pro-
bation or as part of an informal settlement.38 5 In recent years,
however, many writers have advocated enforceable orders of restitu-
tion as the primary punishment for crime. Restitution, they claim, is
retributive, because the penalty is precisely equivalent to the gravity
of the offense measured by the harm done. It rehabilitates, because
the offender is forced to confront and make good the damage he has
done to an identifiable human being. For most crimes, and indeed
all nonviolent crime, it is thus far superior to imprisonment, given
the harm that prisons do to prisoners and to society at great public
expense. Finally, its advocates argue openly that in a criminal sys-
tem where punishment is based upon restitution there is no place
for so-called "victimless" crimes, those without an identifiable vic-
tim or quantifiable injury.386
These arguments are generally made in a liberal and reformist
spirit, and have in fact often been criticized as utopian.38 7 At least in
384 The original rule was that the victim's civil claims against the offender were
merged in the Crown plea; this rule was later modified to a suspension until after the
trial. See generally Shaul v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 131 Misc. 401,405-06, 227 N.Y.S. 163,
169-70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd mem., 224 A.D. 773, 230 N.Y.S. 910 (1928). If the
defendant was convicted, however, his goods were forfeit, making the further pursuit of
a civil remedy pointless. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 34, at 502-03. The victim was thus
naturally tempted to promise not to prosecute the offender as part of a civil settlement,
especially since criminal prosecution, though in the name of the Crown, was originally a
private affair. See generally Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17
AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 313 (1973). Such a deal, however, was itself the crime of com-
pounding a felony. See Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of its Past History and an Analy-
sis of its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71, 76 (1970).
To make matters worse, even stolen goods to which the victim had good title were
forfeit to the Crown. Originally the victim only recovered his goods if he promptly
brought an "appeal of felony;" if the Crown proceeded by indictment, he obtained noth-
ing. Later, when the appeal of felony fell into disuse, the remedy of a writ of restitution
was authorized by statute, At which time restitution would be made of goods stolen, 21
Hen. 8, ch. 11 (1529), if the victim was instrumental in helping to obtain the conviction
by his testimony or otherwise. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw
400-01 (2d ed. 1936).
385 Laster, supra note 384, at 83-85.
386 These arguments are worked out in detail in C. ABEL & F. MARSH, PUNISHMENT
AND RESTrrTrrION (1984)(the state has no ethical foundation for punishing private con-
duct that does not harm others). See also Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A
Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931, 939 (1984).
387 See generally J. Hudson & B. Galaway, Restitution and the Justice Model, in JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE JUSTICE MODEL 52, 60 (D. Fogel & J. Hudson eds.
198 l)(many of those sentenced to restitution would escape jail terms in the absence of
restitution; hence restitution increases punishment); Klein, Revitalizing Restitution: Flog-
ging A Horse That May Have Been KilledforJust Cause, 20 CRIM. L.Q. 383, 400-01 (1978)(in
the real world restitution is not likely to rehabilitate anyone); Scutt, Victims, Offenders and
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tone, they seem difficult to reconcile with the theory of "just
deserts." 388 Restitution as an authorized criminal punishment has
made its greatest gains, however, on both the state and federal
levels during just that period, roughly since 1970, during which the
retributivists were routing the utilitarians and social scientists from
the field. 38 9 In fact, retributivism is perfectly consistent with restitu-
tion. Retributivists mean to make the offender give up the unfair
advantage he or she has obtained over his or her fellows by crime,
an emphasis which is supposed to distinguish retribution from retal-
iation. 390 Restitution is a natural way of effecting this result.39'
However, because criminal restitution has been widely adopted as a
punishment during the heyday of "just deserts" with its emphasis on
determinate sentencing, it has not received the primary role desired
by its most ardent advocates. 39 2
Restitution: Real Alternative or Panacea?, 56 AusTL. L.J. 156, 163-65 (1982)(probation de-
partments, which usually administer restitution orders, are not institutionally concerned
with victim compensation).
388 "Just deserts" or "retributivism" are essentially the idea that punishment should
be retributive-graded to the public consensus as to the seriousness of the offense. See
Pugsley, Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 397-404
(1979).
389 For the current status of restitution in the 50 states, see generally Harland, Monetary
Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52
(1982). For the triumph of the "just deserts" theory, see Seidman, Factual Guilt and the
Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 436, 486-91 (1980)(convergence of liberals and conservatives on retributivism);
Plattner, The Rehabilitation of Punishment, in N. GLAZER, THE PUBLIC INTEREST ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT (1984).
390 Professor Packer has cogently attacked the validity of the distinction:
Each theory rests on a figure of speech. Revenge means that the criminal is paid
back; expiation means that he pays back. The revenge theory treats all crimes as if
they were certain crimes of physical violence: you hurt X; we will hurt you. The
expiation theory treats all crimes as if they were financial transactions: you got
something from X; you must give equivalent value.... This familiar version of the
retributive position, which I shall call the affirmative version, has no useful place in
a theory ofjustification for punishment, because what it expresses is nothing more
than dogma, unverifiable and on its face implausible.
H. PACKER, supra note 173, at 38-39.
391 Note, Retribution: New York's Answer to the Multiple Felony Offender, 12 FORDHAM URB.
LJ. 897, 919-20 (1984).
392 In fairness, it should be said that the theoreticians of retribution generally agree
that prison terms in America are too long. Pugsley, supra note 388, at 401 n.93, 403
("Retributivism ... is honest about punishment-as-pain, and therefore it seeks to limit
punishment."). Cf. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3582(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)("imprisonment is
not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation"). The "vulgar
retributivism" of legislators, however, has significantly lengthened average sentences
and enormously increased the prison population since 1970. In 1973, American courts
were already meting out the longest sentences of any industrialized nation by a wide
margin. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 58 (1973). By 1983,
American prisons held 455,000 convicts, more than double the number imprisoned in
1970 expressed as a percentage of the population. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's
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Until the passage of the Victim and Witness Protection Act in
1982, Congress had not authorized the federal courts to impose an
order of restitution as part of a sentence, but only as a condition of
probation.393 The restitution provisions of the Act, read together
with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,394 go a long way toward
making restitution the usual punishment whenever the victim suf-
fered a quantifiable injury. A fine, public service work, or sentence
of restitution is now mandatory when a defendant is placed on pro-
bation.39 5 The payment of restitution takes precedence over the
payment of any fine.3 96 The courts must give reasons whenever they
refuse to order restitution.3 97 Most significantly, whereas restitution
as a condition of probation may be limited to "actual damages or
loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had,"3 98 a de-
fendant may be sentenced to make restitution to a victim of [his]...
offense."'3 99 The courts have interpreted this difference to authorize
sentences, but not probation orders, requiring restitution of the full
losses of the victims, although such losses exceed those charged in
the indictment and indeed are not attributable to the counts upon
which the defendant was convicted.400
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 947 n.63 (1985). It is not clear what will be the effect of the
new sentencing guidelines, but some trials of the proposed guidelines against actual
cases resulted almost uniformly in harsher sentences than those actually imposed. Sen-
tencing Commission's First Effort Receives Outpouring of Criticism, 40 Crim. L. Rep. 2223, 2225
(BNA) (Dec. 17, 1986) (account of hearings held December 2-3, 1986). The constitution-
ality of the Sentencing Commission, and therefore of the guidelines, is in doubt, how-
ever. United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1465, (S.D. Cal. 1988)(use of article
III judges for legislative task of fixing sentence guidelines violates separation of powers).
393 The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5(a) 96
Stat. 1253, (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1982)), prospectively redesignated as 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663 effective November 1, 1987, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, § 212(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984), also prospectively repealed former 18 U.S.C.
§ 3651 (1982), authorizing restitution as a condition of probation, and replaced it with
new 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3) (Supp. III 1985), Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat.
1987 (1984).
394 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-37, 98 Stat. 1987-
2034 (1984).
395 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a) (Supp. III 1985).
396 U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Revised Draft § A541 (c) (revised draft), 40 GRIM.
L. REP. 3201, 3262 (BNA)(Feb. 18, 1987).
397 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
398 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The quoted language does not mean that the fact of
such loss must be an element of the offense, United States v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012,
1015 (3d Cir. 1987)(mail fraud; violation of employer's "intangible right" to faithful
service). In Sleight, however, the court held that the employer had suffered a real loss,
the amount of which was proved at trial. Id. at 1017-18.
399 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3) (Supp. III 1985).
400 See, e.g., United States v. Hawthorne, 806 F.2d 493, 499 (3d Cir. 1986)(full restitu-
tion of value of falsely obtained food stamps was appropriate after defendant pleaded
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This Article concluded in Section III.4 that it is inappropriate
for a court to require the criminal forfeiture of criminal proceeds in
excess of those provably derived from the very crime charged.40 1
The objections there stated do not apply with equal force to restitu-
tion orders. Because restitution is by definition limited to making
good the actual injuries of specific victims it cannot be a constitu-
tionally disproportionate punishment. The same is not true of crim-
inal forfeiture under current law, as the offender may be punished
by loss of the instrumentalities of crime40 2 or his or her interest in a
legitimate business legitimately acquired, 403 both unrelated to his or
her criminal profits. From the standpoint of due process, however,
an order imposing restitution for crimes of which the defendant has
not been convicted might seem worse than an excessive forfeiture
order which, due to difficulties of proof, sweeps in profits from
other crimes by a misapplication of the statutory presumption. In
fact, such "overcharging" is a systematic feature of restitution or-
ders, as the reported cases reveal, 40 4 and the amount of restitution
is fixed by the judge at a sentencing hearing based upon the presen-
tencing report.40 5 In contrast, the defendant in a forfeiture case is
entitled to present evidence before a jury.
guilty to only three of 63 counts, but defendant was not informed that full restitution
was a possible consequence of her plea, which was therefore not "knowing and volun-
tary"); United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1986)(after defendant was
convicted of the last of a series of thefts forming a common scheme, he might be or-
dered to make full restitution); United States v. Martin, 788 F.2d 184, 188-89 (3d Cir.
1986)(upheld restitution for all losses caused by defendant's scheme to defraud fur-
thered by separate mailings even though he pleaded guilty to only one count of mail
fraud, alleging one use of the mails); United States v. Anglian, 784 F.2d 765, 766-68 (6th
Cir. 1986)(defendant, convicted of conspiracy to receive stolen postal money orders,
ordered to make restitution based upon the proceeds of the conspiracy, although he was
convicted on only two substantive counts), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 148 (1986), contra
United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558, 1571 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1578 (1986)(dictum)("The amount of restitution under [the VWPA] ... may not exceed
the actual losses flowing from the offense for which the defendant has been convicted.").
Even under the Probation Act, it has been held that the amount of restitution may
exceed the loss alleged in the indictment if it conforms to the amount of loss actually
proved at trial. Sleight, 808 F.2d at 1018-19
401 See supra notes 343-75 and accompanying text.
402 See supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
403 See supra notes 281-84 and accompanying text.
404 Most reported cases concern plea bargains, in which restitution for the entire loss
is a condition of accepting a plea to one or a few "sample counts." In many such cases
the amount of loss is stipulated in the plea agreement. See generally United States v. Paul,
783 F.2d 84, 88-89 (7th Cir. 1986)(plea bargain impliedly limited restitution order to
amount which defendant admitted embezzling).
405 The report of the presentence investigation shall contain, "(D) verified informa-
tion stated in a nonargumentative style containing an assessment of the financial, social,
psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any individual against whom the
offense has been committed." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2).
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These apparently weighty objections have little force in prac-
tice, however. Restitution, unlike criminal forfeiture, is integrated
into the system of federal criminal punishment. Despite the statu-
tory bias toward compensating victims, restitution is not mandatory.
A restitution order must conform to the statutory purposes of crimi-
nal sentencing which explicitly take into account the good of society,
the offender, and the victim. 40 6 The sentencing judge must give his
or her reasons,40 7 providing a basis for appellate review.408 More-
over, the judge must consider the offender's earning ability, finan-
cial resources, and needs, as well as those of his or her dependents,
adjusting the order accordingly.40 9 Although courts have ordered
an indigent defendant to make restitution, 410 they are agreed that
probation or parole may not be revoked if the offender cannot pay
in good faith.41' Because a restitution order is essentially a punish-
406 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
Although restitution does resemble a judgment "for the benefit of" the victim...
[t]he victim has no control over the amount of restitution awarded or over the deci-
sion to award restitution. Moreover, the decision to impose restitution generally
does not turn on, the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of the State and the
situation of the defendant.
Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353, 362 (1986).
407 18 U.S.G.S. § 3553(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
408 18 U.S.C.S. § 3742(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
409 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (Supp. III 1985), (prosepectively redesignated as 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(a) (Supp. III 1985), Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 212(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987 (1986)). See United States v. Gomer, 764 F.2d 1221, 1222
(7th Cir. 1985)(plain error for the trial court not to consider the financial needs and
earning ability of the defendant's dependents). Opinions are divided as to whether the
court must make specific findings of fact as to the defendant's ability to pay. Compare
United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1986)(findings required), with United
States v. Atkinson, 788 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1986)(findings not required).
410 United States v. Purther, 823 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mounts,
793 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 673 (1986).
411 The sentencing court may make probation conditional upon satisfaction of a resti-
tution order, 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(3) (Supp. III 1985), and may revoke probation and
imprison the defendant for violation of such order. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (Supp. III
1985). Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supra note 394, parole has been re-
placed by a term of "supervised release" fixed as part of the original sentence. 18
U.S.C.S. § 3583(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). Payment of restitution may be a condi-
tion of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (Supp. III 1985). A term of supervised
release may be revoked for a violation of a condition of such release. 18 U.S.G.S.
§ 3583(e)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
Despite these statutory provisions, the courts agree that the decision to revoke pa-
role is governed by Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983)(fundamentally
unfair to revoke probation for failure to make restitution through no fault of the defend-
ant "without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the de-
fendant are available."), See, e.g., United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 479 (3d Cir.
1985)(the Victim and Witness Protection Act is constitutional because the trial court has
discretion to revoke probation for failure to make restitution, and will assumedly exer-
cise such discretion in accordance with constitutional standards); United States v. Ciam-
brone, 602 F. Supp. 563, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See Harland, supra note 389, at 112
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ment and only incidentally a means of compensation, 41 2 the process
constitutionally due the defendant is not significantly different from
that required in imposing a fine or term of imprisonment: essen-
tially the right not to be sentenced on the basis of materially false
information, which implies the right to review and contest such in-
formation.413  Current statutes provide such opportunity. 41 4
Neither is a restitution order invalid as a substitute for a civil judg-
ment, denying the defendant the jury trial to which he would other-
wise be entitled, because it is not functionally equivalent to such
civiljudgment. 41 5 The order may not include incidental and conse-
quential damages416 and such unliquidated items of loss as recovery
for pain and suffering. 41 7 The relatives of a deceased victim have no
standing to recover.4 18 The criminal conviction giving rise to resti-
("[W]here issues of contempt are not involved, revocation of probation for failure to pay
restitution is analogous to imprisonment for failure to pay a fine or debt.").
412 See generally United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1982)(because
restitution is primarily a rehabilitative punishment, rather than a means of compensating
a victim, an offender may be ordered to make restitution of a debt, induced through
criminal fraud, previously discharged in bankruptcy).
413 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948). See generally Note, Victim Restitu-
tion in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1984).
414 See 18 U.S.C. § 3552(d) (Supp. III 1985)(ten day advance disclosure of
presentence reports); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1)(C)(defendant's right to present informa-
tion in mitigation of sentence); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c)(3) (Supp. III 1985) (certification of
record on appeal, including "the information submitted during the sentencing
proceeding").
415 Several courts have rejected the argument that defendants are entitled to a jury
determination of the amount of the victim's losses for purposes of a restitution order.
United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 479 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Satterfield,
743 F.2d 827, 836-39 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985); United States v.
Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1984).
416 See generally United States v. Kenney, 789 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir. 1986)(improper
to require restitution for the wages of employees of the robbed bank who testified at
trial), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 586 (1986); United States v. Trettenaro, 601 F. Supp. 183,
185 (D. Colo. 1985)(Eastman Kodak Company, victim of theft of silver-bearing sludge,
may not recover through a sentence of criminal restitution such incidental and conse-
quential damages as the costs of its internal investigation, a reward it paid for informa-
tion leading to the defendants' arrest, the cost of actually recovering the silver from the
plant to which the sludge had been sold, and attorneys' fees).
4 Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, restitution is limited to the return of
property or payment of the value of property damaged, lost, or destroyed. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The offender may be required to make restitu-
tion for medical expenses, physical therapy, and lost income only if the offense resulted
in bodily injury to the victim 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See
United States v. Anglian, 784 F.2d 765, 770 (6th Cir. 1986)(Merritt, J., concurring)(tort
damages "do not fit within general principles of restitution"), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 148
(1986). Contrary to the ordinary "collateral source" rule, compensation paid to the
victim by third parties is deducted from the restitution order. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(e)(1)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). The court may order the offender to make restitution to such
third parties, but only after all other victims have been compensated. Id.
418 The victim's estate may recover "necessary funeral and related services" as well as
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tution does "estop the defendant from denying the essential allega-
tions of that offense" 419 in a later civil action brought by the victim.
There is no estoppel, however, as to facts determined by the judge
at the sentencing hearing upon which the restitution order is
based.42 0
Restitution does raise other potentially troublesome issues.
Chief among these is that the defendant's ability and willingness to
make voluntary restitution are inevitably taken into account when
the court decides whether to impose a fine, probation, or term of
imprisonment.421 As a practical matter, this puts the wealthy de-
fendant at an advantage. 422 Such advantage is heightened if the de-
fendant decides to plead guilty. The defendant's willingness to
consent to the entry of a restitution order in a specific amount is a
chip which he or she may barter for the opportunity to plead to a
limited number of counts, a lesser charge, or a recommendation of a
shorter sentence. 423 When an offender pleads guilty, he or she
knows the maximum sentence and fine that may be imposed, but the
amount of restitution ordered depends on the judge's findings of
fact at the sentencing hearing.424 The offender is therefore under
medical costs incurred while the victim was alive. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(2), (3) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
419 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
420 United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 838 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1117 (1985); United States v. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. 563, 566-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
421 See 18 U.S.C. § 3572 (Supp. III 1985)("The court, in determining whether to im-
pose a fine, [and its amount] ... shall consider... (3) any restitution or reparation made
by the defendant to the victim of the offense .. "). In its draft guidelines, the new
Sentencing Commission has provided that the court may reduce the "offense level" and
consequently the punishment if the defendant demonstrates that he has accepted per-
sonal responsibility for his crime by, inter alia, "voluntary payment of restitution to vic-
tim(s) prior to adjudication of guilt." U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines Revised Draft
§ C321, 40 CRIM. L. REP. 3201 (BNA)(Feb. 18, 1987). Such restitution may take the
form of a binding agreement between offender and victim. Such an agreement is itself
restitution, foreclosing the court from ordering further payment. United States v.
Bruchey, 810 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1987). In contrast, the court, in deciding whether
to put the defendant on probation or imprison him or her, is supposed to consider
merely "the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987). 18 U.S.C. §§ 3562(a), 3582(a) (Supp. III 1985).
422 Schafer, The Correctional Reuvenation of Restitution to Victims of Crime, reprinted in CRrr-
ICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF CRIME 214, 217 (S. Dinitz & W. Reckless eds. 1968); Klein,
supra note 387, at 397 (mitigating sentences on account of "voluntary" restitution agree-
ments discriminates against poor defendants under Canadian law).
423 See Project, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box-The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 566-67 (1984).
424 For the defendant's plea to be knowing and voluntary, he or she must be informed
of the maximum possible penalty. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (c)(1). Courts have held that the
defendant must be aware of the judge's power to determine the victims' losses and order
retribution accordingly, but the defendant need not, and indeed cannot, know in ad-
vance how much the judge may order. United States v. Hawthorne, 806 F.2d 493, 498-
1988] 419
DAVID J. FRIED
pressure to limit his or her risk by stipulating the amount of the
victim's losses.
B. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RESTITUTION AND FORFEITURE
The proceeds of crime cannot simultaneously be forfeited to
the government and remain available to satisfy either an order of
restitution or the victim's civil claim for damages. This conflict be-
tween the government and the victim, to the extent it arises, is now
resolved in an ad hoc manner, generally through administrative re-
mission in favor of the victim/claimant. 425 However, forfeiture of
the proceeds of crime cannot become a general penalty for eco-
nomic wrongdoing without reforms that grant legal standing and
explicit priority over the government to victims who claim restitu-
tion whenever forfeiture will interfere with their ability to collect.
First, it may be useful to examine the conflict as it might arise
under current statutes. Under RICO, a judge must order the forfei-
ture of the proceeds of the offense and of the assets of the enter-
prise conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity. 426 He or
she may order the offender to make restitution.427 In fact, the court
99 (3d Cir. 1986). See also United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1985)(judge
informed defendant of possibility of restitution order and gave him opportunity to with-
draw plea). It has been suggested that the defendant must be permitted to see the Vic-
tim Impact Statement before he or she can plead intelligently. Project, supra note 423, at
566.
425 Private communication with Paul Coffey, Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, Justice Department.
426 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(a)(3),(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
427 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), authorizes restitution orders for
any violation of Title 18, presumably including 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982). A peculiar
result, and one possibly unintended by Congress, is that restitution may be ordered
when the "pattern of racketeering activity" through which the offender conducted his or
her enterprise, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982), consisted of bankruptcy fraud in violation of
Title 11 or fraud in the sale of securities in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b.5
(1982). Congress, however, did not intend to confer the power to order restitution for
such offenses when it enacted the VWPA. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., re-
printed in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2515, 2539 ("restitution may not be
ordered in cases arising under the antitrust laws, the securities laws, or certain other
regulatory statutes"). Formally, of course, there is no conflict, because the RICO of-
fense is independent, but Congress was certainly correct in recognizing that a sentenc-
ing hearing is the wrong forum for determining what damages resulted from securities
or bankruptcy fraud, given the legal and factual complexity of such determination See
Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lOb-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Dam-
ages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 349 (1984). These considerations are no less applicable in a
RICO case. Faced with a request to order restitution in a case in which the underlying
offense is a violation of securities law, a court might invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3663(d) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), authorizing it to decline to order restitution "[t]o the extent that.., the
complication and prolongation of the sentencing process.. .outweighs [sic] the need to
provide restitution to any victims .... "
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is presumptively obligated to order restitution in a RICO criminal
forfeiture case, just as in any other case.428 Yet there is only one
reported instance of this occurring,429 and RICO has never been
revised to reflect the enactment of the restitutionary provisions of
the VWPA. At a minimum, RICO should permit the satisfaction of a
restitution order from the forfeited property. Because the validity
of the victim's claim and the amount of his or her injury have al-
ready been litigated, the victim should be permitted to assert his
claim against the forfeited property by way of motion or petition.
What claim does a victim have against property criminally for-
feited under RICO in the absence of a restitution order? Such vic-
tims are relegated to administrative petitions for the remission of
forfeiture. They have no standing to assert their equitable claims as
victims of fraud before the court which ordered the forfeiture. Only
third parties with a legal interest in forfeited property or who qualify
as bonafide purchasers without reasonable cause to believe that the
property was subject to forfeiture may intervene as of right after en-
try of the forfeiture order.430 Taken literally, this language excludes
all victims with equitable claims, including victims of garden-variety
frauds and most white-collar crimes. It also excludes all creditors
without a security interest in identifiable property, and defense
counsel in particular.
As already noted in the context of attorney's fees,43 1 however,
the courts have not literally enforced the limitation of standing to
persons with a legal interest in forfeited property. Rather, courts
have held that such a limitation would deprive bonafide creditors of
due process. Therefore, Congress could not have intended to im-
pose it.432 This mode of interpreting legislative intent is illegiti-
mate;43 3 moreover, the courts have provided no convincing reason
why an unsecured creditor has a due process right in property which
his or her debtor earned through criminal means, superior to that of
428 See supra notes 393-96 and accompanying text.
429 United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 944 (2d Cir. 1987)(separate forfeiture
and restitution orders against one defendant; money forfeited by another was ordered
paid to victims as restitution.). In United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir.
1987), the defendant was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $80,000 in connec-
tion with the predicate offense of mail fraud, apart from the RICO forfeitures.
430 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(l)(2),(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
431 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
432 See United States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820, 825, 829 (D. Nev. 1986)(un-
secured trade creditors have cognizable interests as bona fide purchasers under 18
U.S.C.S. § 1963(1)(6)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)); United States v. Reckmeyer
(Reckmeyer I), 628 F. Supp. 616, 621 (E.D. Va. 1986)(due process requires that lender
on unsecured promissory note have standing to assert claim).
433 See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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the government. 434 Having gone so far on behalf of creditors with a
mere contract right, however, the courts might readily grant stand-
ing under § 1963(m) to a victim who claimed "equitable title" in the
forfeited property. In a civil action, such a victim would be able to
demand the ordinary remedies of equitable lien or constructive
trust. The government, therefore, should hold the forfeited prop-
erty subject to the same equities. 435
RICO does provide for administrative petitions for mitigation
or remission of forfeiture and for the restoration of "forfeited prop-
erty to victims of a violation of this chapter.- 43 6 Unfortunately, the
Justice Department has not promulgated any regulations governing
such petitions despite specific statutory authority.437 The only regu-
lations now in effect govern civil and criminal forfeitures alike and,
like the statutory provisions for third-party intervention, are clearly
not directed toward the relief of victims but toward other innocent
third parties with interests in the forfeited property. 438 The regula-
tions do not provide for a hearing and thus in many cases are ill-
adapted to the proof of damages. 439
Congress should fill this gap by amending RICO to give vic-
tims, like owners and transferees, standing to advance their claims
against forfeited property. Such an amendment, however, would
raise difficult issues as to the appropriate measure of such claims, in
particular whether they should be co-extensive with any remedy
which a civil court might grant in equity. The current provisions for
sentences of criminal restitution cautiously limit the victim's claims
to actual damages narrowly defined. 440 This limitation contrasts
strongly with restitution as a civil remedy, which is often measured
434 The attorney's fee cases are different, of course, because the defendant's qualified
right to counsel of his or her choice is affected by fee forfeiture. See supra notes 110-35
and accompanying text. The creditor's case is stronger, both on due process and policy
grounds, if the forfeited property is the assets of a business conducted through a pattern
of racketeering activity and, thus, is only metaphorically tainted. See supra notes 293-314
and accompanying text.
435 One court has given effect to a constructive trust arising simultaneously with the
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture, without discussing the difficulty that 21
U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) does not on its face give standing to such a claimant. United States v.
Marx, 844 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir.)(shares in husband's name allegedly held in oral tyust for
wife; his breach of fiduciary duty by criminal activity gave rise to a constructive trust in
her favor).
436 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(g)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
437 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(h)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
438 Forfeiture Regulations, supra note 31. The Regulations do provide that the claims
of general creditors, to the extent allowed, are subject to "[t]he recognized claims of
victims of the related criminal activity." Id. § 9.6(a)(2)(iii).
439 Forfeiture Regulations § 9.3(d), supra note 31.
440 See supra notes 415-18 and accompanying text.
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by the defendant's profits traceable to his or her breach of duty
without reference to the plaintiff's provable losses, which may in-
deed be nonexistent. 44' Thus, the measure of civil restitution is
closely related to the most appropriate measure of criminal forfei-
ture: the profits of crime. This is not surprising, because the ration-
ale for permitting civil plaintiffs to recover more than their actual
losses is precisely to punish the defendants by depriving them of the
fruits of their wrongdoing.442
In theory, then, when a court determines the amount of restitu-
tion due to a victim after it enters an order of criminal forfeiture, it
should be free of the constraints now imposed upon sentences of
restitution in the absence of a forfeiture order. In the latter case the
court's goal is to impose an appropriate punishment without al-
lowing itself to be misused as an agency for the collection of civil
debts. 443 Once the court has ordered a mandatory proceeds forfei-
ture, however, it has the more ministerial task of allocating property
between the government and the victim. If the victim were limited
to the recovery of his or her actual losses, in many cases the victim's
chances of collection in a subsequent action for civil restitution
would be frustrated, as the forfeiture would leave the offender with-
out sufficient resources to pay the judgment. Clearly forfeiture
should not have this effect.
There are other cogent reasons, however, why the victim
should not be permitted to litigate his or her civil claim to restitutio-
nary damages in a § 1963(m) hearing. If the victim's potential
441 "When a fiduciary profits through breach of a fiduciary obligation, he will be held
accountable to his principal without regard to whether or not the profit is at the expense
of the principal." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 199, at § 2.11. "Fiduciary" clearly includes
anyone, such as an ordinary employee, who owes a duty of loyalty to another. The fidu-
ciary's profits need not have been diverted from the business of the principal. See, e.g.,
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (defendant author, a former CIA agent, held
accountable for profits of book published in violation of CIA's contractual right of prior
approval); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)(corporation may recover profits earned by
corporate insiders who abuse confidential information by selling personal stock hold-
ings). Indeed, the agent may have gained such profits through a wholly illegal abuse of
his or her position. See, e.g., Reading v. Attorney General, [1951] A.C. 507 (British Army
sergeant obligated to account to government for money he made by assisting in the
smuggling of whiskey in Army trucks).
442 1 G. PALMER, supra note 211, at 141.
443 Sentences of restitution are not discharged in bankruptcy. See Kelly v. Robinson,
107 S. Ct. 353 (1986). See generally Hennigan, Criminal Restitution and Bankruptcy Law in the
Federal System, 19 CONN. L. REV. 89, 91 (1986) ("Robinson effectively permits each state to
manufacture its own exceptions to discharge in federal bankruptcy proceedings by en-
acting criminal statutes and then authorizing their enforcement by restitution orders.");
Kratsch & Young, Criminal Prosecutions and Manipulative Restitution: The Use of State Criminal
Courts for Contravention of Debtor Relief, 1984 ANN. SURv. BANKR. L. 107.
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claims should exceed the value of the forfeited property, as they
might, the hearing would no longer be concerned solely with alloca-
tion. The defendant would surely have a due process right to dis-
pute the victim's claim in such a case. In any event, a criminal court
is not an appropriate forum to determine the measure and amount
of civil restitution due in, for example, a private securities fraud
action.444
In practice, then, it would be well to confine the victim to proof
of his or her actual damages measured just as they are for the pur-
pose of a sentence of criminal restitution. The victim would still be
free to bring a civil action in state or federal court for the full mea-
sure of equitable restitution. Once the criminal court judge has de-
termined that the victim's losses were causally related to the offense,
the conviction would have collateral estoppel effect in the subse-
quent civil action.44 5 Most importantly, once the victim has been
"certified" at the § 1963(m) hearing as actually or potentially enti-
tled to restitution, all property forfeited by the offender should re-
main available to satisfy a future civil judgment for a period of
years 446
C. CRIMINAL FORFEITURE AND THE JUST CLAIMS
OF THIRD PARTY CREDITORS
The preceding section concluded that victims with claims grow-
ing out of an offense should be able to reach property criminally
forfeited in connection with such offense. In a handful of cases the
courts have extended the same right to the defendant's unsecured
creditors. 44 7 These cases concern the standing of creditors to inter-
vene. The Justice Department, while rejecting such standing, has
recently recognized for the first time a right of trade creditors to
administrative remission of forfeiture, but the Department requires
that they demonstrate "a reasonable, good faith connection be-
tween the debt and the property subjected to forfeiture other than
the ownership of such property by the debtor."-448 Moreover, the
debt must be for "services or goods provided within four months
444 For an idea of the theoretical difficulties involved, see Thompson, supra note 427.
445 A sentence of restitution has just this effect under current law. 18 U.S.C. § 3664
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). See supra notes 418-19 and accompanying text.
446 As a practical matter, the victim, upon winning civil judgment, might merely ac-
quire a statutory lien upon the Assets Forfeiture Fund equal to the value of the property
forfeited plus interest. There is no reason to segregate or preserve the specific property
forfeited.
447 See supra notes 431-34 and accompanying text.
448 Forfeiture Regulations § 9.6(a)(1)(ii), supra note 31.
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prior to the seizure .... ,,449 In practice only suppliers and repairers
of identifiable goods will be able to make the required showing. Un-
secured lenders will not unless they can trace the proceeds of their
loan into the forfeited assets. Defense attorneys will certainly have
no claim to remission, as their services are not connected to particu-
lar property. Neither, of course, will tort creditors.
In effect, the new regulations impose a tracing requirement
upon creditors while establishing a presumption in favor of the gov-
ernment. The property seized is presumed to -be the proceeds of
crime or otherwise forfeitable unless the creditor can trace his or
her goods or advances into the forfeited property. At first glance
this seems appropriate. Without such a tracing requirement, if cred-
itors were given priority over the government, the defendant would
benefit because his or her pre-seizure expenditures would be
treated as having come from forfeitable assets while the defendant's
just debts would be discharged out of property otherwise subject to
forfeiture.
One can make, however, a strong case against the current re-
quirement that creditors trace their property into the forfeited as-
sets. After all, the government is no longer required to trace the
proceeds of crime into the defendant's property before the latter
may be forfeited, but may seize and forfeit substitute assets. 450 It
seems far less objectionable to give creditors priority in such substi-
tute assets than in property which is provably traceable to crime.
Moreover, the 'objection to letting the criminal benefit by settling
debts with forfeited funds is easily met. All such creditors should be
required to resort first to the defendant's non-forfeited assets. 451
After these are exhausted, however, the criminal will hardly care
how his or her forfeited assets are distributed, for they are lost to
him or her. The government should not reap a windfall while inno-
cent creditors go unpaid.
There remains the issue of the claims of those tort creditors
whose injury was not caused by the crime which resulted in forfei-
ture.452 There is no justification for leaving their claims unsatisfied
449 Id. at § 9.6(a)(1)(iii).
450 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
451 This is precisely what the new Regulations require. Forfeiture Regulations § 9.6,
supra note 31.
452 There is only one reported case in which such creditors attempted to assert an
interest in forfeited property. United States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820 (D. Nev.
1986). In Mageean, the defendant was convicted of RICO violations and ordered to for-
feit his shares, 100 of those outstanding, in a company determined to have been en-
gaged in racketeering activities. The company, Ark Distributing, had an interest in a
plane which crashed, killing several people. Persons with tort claims arising from the
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while the defendant has forfeitable assets. Yet an innocent trade
creditor or lender has made an uncompensated contribution to the
net wealth of the defendant and therefore has a claim to priority
over the government, but not over any victims, when the defend-
ant's assets are distributed. A tort claimant has made no such con-
tribution. Once the government has stripped defendant of his or
her property, however, there is no more reason to give the govern-
ment priority over tort claimants than there is to give it priority over
trade creditors. Moreover, tort claimants, or at least those whose
claims do not arise from any commercial dealings with the defend-
ant, arguably have a stronger claim of priority than contract claim-
ants, because they are not subject to suspicions about their good
faith or the reasonableness or propriety of their dealing with
criminals.
This last point raises the important issue of the standard of care
to which a creditor must have conformed in his or her dealings with
a criminal before such a creditor is entitled to priority over the gov-
ernment in forfeited assets. Obviously, persons who consciously as-
sist criminals in laundering their criminal proceeds or who engage
in sham transactions are not entitled to such priority. The difficult
question is whether it is wise to use the possibility of forfeiture to
enforce an inchoate duty not to deal, even legally and at arm's
length, with persons who are or might be criminals. In effect, ex-
isting statutes do this, by requiring that bonafide purchasers be with-
out reasonable cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture 453 and by permitting the civil forfeiture of instrumentali-
ties of crime from the true owner unless such owner meets a strin-
gent standard of care.4 54
As already noted in the discussion of such civil forfeitures, it is
unfair and impractical to make a lender or seller a surety for the
good behavior of a borrower or buyer.455 In general, if society
wishes to establish rules governing dealings of commerce and
friendship between ordinary citizens and known or suspected
crash moved that the forfeited property be held intact pending a judgment against Ark
for negligence. Their claim against Ark's assets, of course, would ordinarily be unaf-
fected by the forfeiture of Mageean's shares to the government. The government, how-
ever, claimed, and the court agreed, that the assets of Ark were also forfeit as proceeds
of racketeering activity. Id. at 825-27. Because Ark was not charged with RICO viola-
tions, this seems a dubious conclusion. Having held that the assets were forfeit, the
court applied the statute literally and concluded that the crash victims had no interest in
the property and were not bonafide purchasers thereof. Id.
453 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(e)(6)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
454 See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text.
455 See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
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criminals, such rules should be explicit and directly enforced, such
as the statute penalizing money laundering.456 If such rules are not
legislatively enacted and are invoked and defined only in the context
of third party losses through criminal and civil forfeiture, serious
unfairness is bound to result. Law-abiding citizens will have insuffi-
cient notice of the standard of behavior expected. The rules will
invite or demand discrimination against persons with criminal
records or reputations, extending their punishment capriciously and
making their reintegration into society more difficult. Perhaps the
most common result, however, is that reasonable businesspersons
will take no precautions at all, given the high level of care required
to avoid all risk of forfeiture and the extreme smallness of the risk in
any given case. Thus, the possibility that a trade creditor may suffer
a loss because his or her debtor's assets have been criminally for-
feited will deter either too broadly or not at all. In either case the
justification for giving the government priority in the forfeited as-
sets disappears.
This discussion has constantly weighed the government's inter-
est in forfeitable proceeds of crime against that of various sorts of
creditors. If the property forfeited under RICO is the defendant's
entire interest in an enterprise, the priority of the creditors' interest
is even clearer. While one can argue that creditors have no reason-
able expectation of repayment out of the proceeds of crime, the
government should not enrich itself by disproportionate and puni-
tive forfeitures at the expense of the defendant's creditors. It may
be objected that the government is free to punish by means of heavy
fines, which reduce the defendant's capacity to pay his debts and
which are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 45 7 In setting fines, how-
ever, the court takes into account the defendant's financial situation,
including his or her debts and obligations. Moreover the govern-
ment collects fines by civil means and criminal contempt. 458 It may
not seize the defendant's assets or restrain their transfer before trial
so that such assets will be available to satisfy a fine.459 The govern-
456 See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1956-57 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1987).
457 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982).
458 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3611-3615 (Supp. III 1985).
459 United States ex rel. Ferenc v. Brierley, 320 F. Supp. 406, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1970). In
Ferenc, the court granted a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner who was unable to
retain counsel of his choice because the Commonwealth refused to release cash which
was in his possession when he was arrested. The money was substantially in excess of the
sum which he was accused of stealing.
After the relator was convicted, the Commonwealth returned his money after de-
ducting his fine. The court rejected the argument that so little was left that it would not
have sufficed to retain counsel. Id at 408. "This assumes that the amount of money
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ment is thus on a more equal footing with the defendant's other
creditors, who may have attached the defendant's assets long before
the fine was levied. Finally, one commentator has advocated treat-
ing fines and forfeitures as one fund against which both victims and
creditors may claim. 460
Curiously, a statutory model already exists for a system of or-
derly redistribution of the forfeited proceeds of crime. The states
and the federal government have already enacted many statutes au-
thorizing victims, creditors, tort claimants, and dependents to claim
the "collateral profits" of crime in accordance with a scheme of pri-
orities. These statutes are the literary or collateral profits acts, more
popularly known as "Son-of-Sam" acts after David Berkowitz, the
"Son of Sam", whose serial murders were an important impetus for
their passage.461
Literary profits statutes, now enacted in thirty-three states,462
generally provide for the forfeiture of sums paid to a convicted
criminal for the rights to his or her story and royalties earned by the
criminal's own writings concerning his or her offenses. One impor-
tant motive for their adoption, of course, is abhorrence at the sight
of perpetrators of heinous or infamous crimes making profitable
deals for the rights to their story. The legislature wishes to deter
such deals by making them unprofitable.463 Yet, this motive is not
entirely consistent with the desire to secure the profits of such con-
tracts for the benefit of the offender's victims, which logically re-
quires their encouragement. 464 The matter is further complicated
by the indubitable free speech rights even of criminals, which might
used to pay the fine was always so earmarked by the Commonwealth, even before the trial,
when it should have been available to retain counsel. Such an argument has no basis in
law or logic." Id. at 408-09 (emphasis in original).
460 D. HODGSON, supra note 136, at 63, 130-31.
461 See In re Johnsen, 103 Misc. 2d 823, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979) (held the New York statute constitutional against the attack of David Berkowitz's
conservator).
462 For a current list of statutes, see Comment, The Expansion of Victim Compensation Pro-
grams: Today's "Son of Sam" Legislation and its Susceptibility to Constitutional Challenge, 18 U.
TOL. L. REV. 155, 163 n.51, 164 n.54 (1986). The federal statute was enacted by the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1406(a), 98 Stat.
2175 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-82 (Supp. III 1985)).
463 "These sections may serve as a deterrent to any contract ever being entered into
between a defendant and another party [for the depiction of the crime] .... As a result,
no funds may ever be deposited in the [Crime Victims' Assistance] Fund from this
source." OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUMMARY OF VIcTIMs OF CRIME ASSIST-
ANCE ACT OF 1984, reprinted in 130 CONG. REC. S2635, 2637 (daily ed. March 13, 1984).
464 See Comment, supra note 462, at 194 ("The vagueness of the statutes may well be
the result of the legislatures' vacillating focus between punishment of the criminal and
compensation of the victim.").
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be impermissibly burdened by simple forfeiture of all their earn-
ings,465 and by the problem of distinguishing between the reprehen-
sible exploitation of the defendant's notoriety and literary
productions unrelated to the defendant's crimes. 466
In their effort to resolve these tensions, the statutes generally
provide for the escrowing of all rights and royalty payments in the
hands of a Victim Compensation Board, which holds them for a time
subject to the claims of victims and creditors in accordance with an
explicit scheme of priority. The statutes differ as to whether any
surplus, at the end of the escrow period, is payable to the offender
or forfeit to the state.467 They also differ as to whether they make
provision for the claims of creditors who are not victims of the crime
of which the defendant was convicted. Some, like the federal stat-
ute, provide for the optional or mandatory payment of part of the
forfeited funds to the defense attorney, thus preferring him or her
to other creditors. 468 A few states further provide for the payment
465 See Comment, In Cold Type: Statutory Approaches to the Problem of Offender as Author, 71
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255 (1980)(the New York literary profits act and its imitators
are unconstitutional to the extent that they create a net disincentive for the offender to
tell his story); Comment, Compensating the Victim from the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story--The
Constitutionality of the New York Approach, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 93 (1978).
466 The constitutional problem is that this is discrimination based on content. From a
broader perspective, there is an ancient and honorable tradition of prison literature, or
at least literature written in prison, ranging from Wilde's "Ballad of Reading Gaol" to
Dostoevsky's THE HousE OF THE DEAD. Sometimes criminals write self-serving apologia;
sometimes they write cautionary tales. Such literature is at least clinically interesting,
even if its sales are due in part to the notoriety of the author and his or her crime. See
generally Note, The Son-of-Sam Laws: When the Lunatic, the Criminal, and the Poet Are of Imagi-
nation All Compact, 27 ST. Louis U.LJ. 207 (k983).
467 See, e.g., the New Jersey Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1971, NJ. STAT.
ANN. 52:4B-26, (West 1986)(balance of forfeited funds held in compensation fund to
pay reparations to other crime victims); Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime:
Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 52, 67 (1982).
When any surplus is payable to the offender after a certain period, the chief sub-
stantive effect of the statute is to avoid the statute of limitations, because victims may
claim against the escrowed funds even though the statute has run on their civil claims.
See Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 94 Misc. 2d 379, 404 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aft'd, 66
A.D.2d 604, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1979)(sums paid to one of the "Dog Day Afternoon"
hostage takers for the rights to his story could be escrowed for victims although the
statute of limitations had run on any civil claim).
468 [I]f ordered by the court in the interest ofjustice, [proceeds may] be used to-
(ii) pay for legal representation of the defendant in matters arising from the
offense for which such defendant has been convicted, but no more than 20 percent
of the total proceeds may be so used.
18 U.S.C. § 3681(c)(I)(B) (Supp. III 1985). See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-4.1-201(5)
(Supp. 1987)(release of funds to accused from escrow to pay attorney's fees only if the
accused does not have other funds sufficient to the purpose); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-218(a) (West 1985)(proceeds deposited with clerk payable to defendant for the ex-
penses of his defense); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(h) (1987)(not more than one-fifth
of literary proceeds to be paid for the expenses of the accused's defense); ILL. ANN.
1988] 429
DAVID J. FRIED
of a percentage of the forfeited funds to the criminal's depen-
dents.469 The experience thus gained in the allocation of collateral
criminal profits may serve as a guide if current forfeiture laws are
reformed to give legal standing to victims and creditors to claim
against forfeited proceeds.
D. THE REPLACEMENT OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURES
BY PROCEEDS FINES
Criminal forfeitures under RICO and CCE are mandatory in
that they are removed from the discretion of judges and are not de-
pendent on findings of fact. Substantial and automatic punishment
for serious crime, independent of the vagaries of individual judg-
ment and free from considerations of rehabilitation, has a powerful
appeal, but the complete separation of criminal forfeiture from the
traditional sentencing process and the dual role of the jury in deter-
mining guilt and fixing the punishment of criminal forfeiture give
rise to serious problems of due process. 470 One might guess that
when Congress originally reintroduced criminal forfeiture it deliber-
ately wished to take punishment out of the hands ofjudges, perhaps
seeing them as unduly lenient to organized crime.47' Congress was
also motivated by the inadequate and even nominal fines then avail-
able under federal law.472 However, since RICO and CCE were
adopted, Congress has significantly toughened criminal punish-
ments, constrained judicial discretion in sentencing, and abolished
parole.4 7 3
At the same time, as already described, the evolution of RICO
and CCE have made the forfeiture of criminal proceeds a central
remedy. 474  A further convergence has occurred between
STAT. ch. 70, par. 407-7(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)(state treasurer may make payments
from literary profits escrow account for legal representation).
469 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(2)(a) (West 1985)(25% of the literary profits
account to be distributed to the dependents of the convicted felon.).
470 See supra notes 364-73 and accompanying text.
471 There does not, in fairness, seem to be any contemporaneous expression of this
motive, perhaps for reasons of discretion. Proponents of criminal forfeiture may have
wished to disguise the extent to which they were motivated by distrust of and even hos-
tility toward the federal judiciary, based on the belief that judges were "soft on crime"
and could not be trusted to impose severe enough sentences, especially upon white-
collar criminals. Justice Department representatives have stated before Congress that
they prefer the subjection of substitute assets to forfeiture to the imposition of very
large fines, because fines are discretionary with the judge. H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1984)(available at Cong. Inf. Serv. H523-21 (1984)(microfiche)).
472 For example, in 1978 the maximum fine for a first offense of distributing a sched-
ule I narcotic drug was $25,000. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1976).
473 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987-92.
474 See supra notes 33-88 and accompanying text.
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RICO/CCE and the penalties for other crimes. Congress has pre-
scribed a fine equal to up to twice the criminal proceeds as an alter-
native fine for RICO and CCE offenses. 475 It has also prescribed a
similar alternative fine as a transitional punishment for all crimes
involving pecuniary harm to the victim or benefit to the perpetra-
tor.476 The question arises, therefore, whether there remains any
justification for retaining the forfeiture of criminal proceeds as an
independent remedy in RICO and CCE. Is its function adequately
performed by very large fines, in conjunction with restitution?
Should the criminal justice system replace forfeiture with a
mandatory general fine equal to criminal proceeds?
Fines, which by general agreement were both too small and too
rarely imposed,477 have been increased to a maximum for each
count of $250,000 if the offender is an individual, $500,000 if the
offender is an organization.478 In 1986, Congress enacted maxi-
mum fines of up to $8 million for a recidivist drug dealer and $20
million for an organization. 479 At such levels fines may in many
475 See supra note 83. Such fine is optional, and is in addition to the forfeiture of
proceeds, which remains mandatory.
476 Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, § 6(a), 98 Stat. 3136
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3623 (c)(1) (Supp. III 1985)), prospectively repealed effective Novem-
ber 1, 1987 by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 212(a)(2),
235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 98 Stat. 2031:
If the defendant derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in
pecuniary loss to another person, the defendant may be fined no more than the
greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine
under this subsection would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.
Curiously, Congress rejected the same provision as a permanent part of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984, on the grounds that it would virtually require a trial on the
issue of damages at the time of sentencing. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 106,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3289. Of course, the judge has dis-
cretion to avoid this problem under § 3263, and one commentator has suggested that
judges will usually shy away from proceeds fines for just this reason. Rezneck, The New
Federal Criminal Sentencing Provisions, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 785, 799-800 (1985).
477 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1982) (amended by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)
(Supp. III 1985)(maximum pre-1984 fine of $25,000 for a first offense of distributing a
schedule I narcotic drug); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 103, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. &. ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3286 ("fines generally have been an inappro-
priately under-used penalty in American criminal law ...).
478 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (Supp. III 1985). Perhaps by an oversight, the Sentencing
Reform Act, while recognizing RICO/CCE forfeiture, 18 U.S.C. § 3554 (Supp. III
1985), did not specifically authorize the alternative fine of twice the gross profits or
other proceeds permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (Supp. III 1985), and 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(a) (Supp. III 1985), which may exceed the statutory maximum.
479 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(b)(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)(for distribution or posses-
sion with intent to distribute very large quantities of specified drugs). These fines super-
sede the Sentencing Reform Act maxima. Id.
The statute 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(b)(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) imposes the remarka-
ble penalty of a maximum fine of $500,000 upon any individual who cultivates any quan-
tity of a controlled substance on federal property, and $1,000,000 upon a defendant
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cases be equivalent, or nearly so, to the forfeiture of proceeds, 480
without the evidentiary difficulties of tracing481 or a showing of in-
ability to trace.48 2 It remains to be seen how far the federal courts
will employ their new authority. A fine, a sentence of restitution, or
community service work is now mandatory, however, when a de-
fendant is placed on probation. 48 3 Fines have also been made far
more readily collectible by the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of
1984.484 As the courts gain experience with reformed sentencing,
prosecutors may come to see real advantages in asking for high fines
rather than forfeiture even in RICO and CCE cases.
The fact that criminal forfeiture is mandatory in those cases in
which it is a prescribed penalty is distinct from the fact that its impo-
sition is a jury function. The statute could ensure that the defend-
ant would be deprived of his or her criminal profits through a
mandatory fine, without involving the jury in determining the
amount. There is no hint in the legislative history, however, that the
draftsmen considered such a fine. Rather, they seem to have as-
sumed that a special jury verdict is constitutionally necessary for the
forfeiture of the defendant's interests in an enterprise either crimi-
nally acquired or criminally maintained and operated. 48 5 The facts
underlying such a forfeiture, involving the manner in which the of-
fense was carried out, are perhaps too closely intertwined with the
offense for fair determination at a post-conviction sentencing
hearing.
Once, however, the courts had decided that 1970 RICO did au-
thorize the forfeiture of proceeds, Congress recognized the utility of
"other than... an individual." Presumably Congress supposed that a substantial deter-
rent was necessary because of the attractions of cultivating marijuana on non-forfeitable
land.
480 The legislative history cited such substantial equivalence as a reason for rejecting
an optional fine measured by the defendant's gains. Thus "The Committee concluded
that an increase in the maximum fine levels for serious offenses would assure that a fine
could be imposed that would usually reach the defendant's ill-gotten gains while avoid-
ing undue complexity in the sentencing hearing." SEN. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 106, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3289. In cases where
the defendant made millions, restitution orders might compensate for any inadequacy in
the maximum permitted fines. Id.
481 See supra notes 343-47 and accompanying text.
482 18 U.S.C.S. § 1963(n) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); 21 U.S.C.S. § 853(p) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987). See supra note 78.
483 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
484 The Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-596, § 12 98 Stat.
3139 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (Supp. III 1986)), repealed effective Arovember 1, 1987 by
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(2), 98 Stat.. 1987. Su-
perseding provisions are to be found at 18 U.S.C. § 3611-3615 (Supp. III 1985).
485 Private communication of Professor G. Robert Blakey, Notre Dame Law School.
Professor Blakey was one of the RICO draftsmen.
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imposing a fine measured by the amount of criminal proceeds. 48 6
Such fine of up to twice the proceeds is an optional substitute for
other fines, but it could as easily be mandatory after a special hear-
ing to determine the amount of proceeds. Is ajury determination of
such amount, which does not go to the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence, constitutionally required? Under the Sentencing Reform
Act, the judge will in many cases determine the amount of the vic-
tim's loss or the defendant's gain in a sentencing hearing, because
such amount is relevant in fixing the amount of the fine4 87 and must
be determined before the judge enters a sentence of restitution. 488
The new requirement that the court shall "state in open court the
reasons . . . for the particular sentence" 48 9 and the availability of
appellate review490 seem to remove all due process objections to
"proceeds fines." The constitutional question may be resolved in
the near future, because such fines are already prescribed by federal
law in some instances. 491
Thus far it appears that very little turns on the distinction be-
tween proceeds fines and proceeds forfeitures. There is, however,
one important procedural difference: the possibility under current
law of attaching a defendant's assets or enjoining him or her from
transferring them before trial and even before indictment. 492 The
government's right to do this is obviously a consequence of concep-
tualizing forfeiture as the recapture of property which the govern-
ment already has title, in other words the "relation-back" fiction.493
It seems difficult to imagine the government asserting such a right
with respect to something called a "fine." By definition a fine is a
punishment imposed after conviction. Intuitively, the government
486 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)e(Supp. III 1985); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (Supp. III 1985).
487 In determining the sentence to be imposed, 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)(1) e(Supp. III
1985) requires the court to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense," 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985), and "the need for the sentence imposed (A) to
reflect the seriousness of the offense.., and to providejust punishment...." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
488 18 U.S.C.S. § 3556 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987)(authorizing restitution in accord-
ance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-64). The constitutionality of making such a determination
in a sentencing hearing without a jury is settled. United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d
790, 801 (7th Cir. 1985)("restitution is not some newfangled effort to get around the
seventh amendment, but a traditional criminal remedy."); United States v. Durham, 755
F.2d 511, 514 (6th Cir. 1985)(dictum); United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1089 (1984). But see Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal
Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REv. 931, 942 n.85 (1984).
489 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(c) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
490 18 U.S.C.S. § 3557, 3742 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
491 See supra notes 475-76 and accompanying text.




cannot have title to the funds needed to pay a fine even before in-
dictment. However, the availability of pre-trial restraining orders
need not and should not depend on making the jury the finder of
fact with respect to the amount of proceeds and calling the resultant
penalty a "forfeiture," if it is desirable for other reasons to lodge
this function with the judge at a post-conviction hearing. The due
process difficulties with pre-trial restraining orders were considered
earlier;49 4 in this connection it suffices to say that they are far less
objectionable if the funds are being sequestered ultimately to satisfy
the claims of victims, defense counsel, and creditors rather than to
remove the funds permanently from their reach.
The above argument presupposes, of course, that the govern-
ment will hold the fruits of a mandatory proceeds fine, no less than
the fruits of a mandatory forfeiture, subject to the prior claims of
victims and creditors. It is customary, however, to think of a fine as
a penalty paid to the government as the representative of a wronged
society. Once again the only difficulty is definitional. However, for-
mal categories should not prevent the just modification of the sys-
tem of criminal penalties.
V. CONCLUSION
Criminal forfeiture re-entered American law in a manner char-
acteristic of legal innovations. Its inventors saw criminal forfeiture
as a remedy for a peculiar problem: the infiltration of legitimate
business by organized crime. They did not foresee its revolutionary
implications. It was entangled at its birth in procedures drawn from
the inappropriate model of civil forfeiture. A principle of universal
appeal and applicability has quickly emerged to justify criminal for-
feiture: wrongdoers shall not profit from their crimes. This princi-
ple, once recognized, demanded that forfeiture should be extended
to criminal proceeds without a requirement of tracing, and so it was,
but only in the context of RICO and drug offenses. There is no
principled reason, however, for confining the remedy of proceeds
forfeiture to this context. It should be extended to all crimes com-
mitted for gain as a mandatory minimum penalty.
The forfeiture of interests in a RICO enterprise and of instru-
mentalities of crime appears to be a grave error. It leads to capri-
cious and disproportionate punishments and is capable of
dangerously discriminatory application. Even when particular inter-
est forfeitures are not constitutionally disproportionate, it is wrong
for the criminal justice system to surrender control over the deter-
494 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text,
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mination of punishment, replacing legislative penalties graded in ac-
cordance with the seriousness of the offense with penalties fixed by
accidents of circumstance. Any added deterrent effect attributable
to such penalties is purchased at too high a price. Forfeitures
should be generalized, but they should not be made to do work ap-
propriately reserved for traditional punishments such as fine and
imprisonment.
The imposition of criminal penalties always and inevitably in-
jures the innocent friends, associates and creditors of the guilty de-
fendant, and even his victims, because their interests are not
identical with those of society or of the state. The existing system of
criminal forfeitures tends to magnify these effects. At best, it largely
ignores the legitimate competing interests of such third parties, rel-
egating them to administrative remission available not as a matter of
right but of grace. Attorney fee forfeiture is only a special instance
of this general problem, which requires general rules of priority.
Defense attorneys should not have priority over victims, but should
have priority over other creditors of the defendant to the extent of a
reasonable fee for the services performed. "Reasonableness" in this
context must take into account the special complexities of criminal
defense under such statutes as RICO.49 5 The courts'must not limit
defense lawyers to the notoriously inadequate statutory fees paid to
appointed counsel. 496
The crisis in criminal forfeiture is, of course, related to larger
trends in the development of criminal law, especially federal crimi-
nal law. Legislators multiply crimes and multiply punishments for
such crimes. They scarcely ever repeal criminal statutes once en-
acted; they rarely make punishments less severe. At the same time,
wrongdoing in the semi-official and wholly private spheres, rele-
gated in the classic liberal state to the civil law or left entirely unreg-
495 In United States v. Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Six Dollars in U.S.
Currency, 677 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1987), the court held valid the assignment to his
defense attorney by a state criminal defendant of assets seized by the federal govern-
ment for civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). The government's interest in the
forfeiture did not outweigh the defendant's right to counsel of his choice. Id. at 645-46.
However, the court reserved the power to make an independent determination of the
reasonableness of the attorney's fees in view of the complexity of the case, the counsel's
level of experience, and the work which the attorney had already done.
496 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987)(maximum hourly rate for ap-
pointed counsel $60 per hour, and Judicial Conference may raise rate to $75 per hour
for particular circuit or district therein). Judge Murnaghan, concurring in In re Caplin &
Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637, 650 (4th Cir. 1988)(Murnaghan, J., concurring) said that "the
rate scale for appointees under the Criminal Justice Act tends to linger ... behind the




ulated, is criminalized by statutes of broad scope and uncertain
limits. Since government resources devoted to enforcement do not
expand in step, prosecution, always an inherently selective business,
becomes more selective over time. The likelihood of discrimination
and persecution increases, or, at least, the appearance of discrimina-
tion, which is almost as bad.
The existing system of forfeitures exacerbates this problem. It
has an odor of state self-interest about it, if not, indeed, of statism.
The forfeiture of criminal proceeds for the government's benefit at
the expense of victims and creditors makes the state a metaphorical
partner in crime. The forfeiture of a car for the purchase of ten
dollars' worth of drugs or of a private school for the filing of a false
report about class enrollments 497 shocks the conscience. The sub-
stantive content of the criminal law and its prescribed punishments
are a civil liberties issue just as are the forms of criminal procedure.
The limitation of criminal forfeiture to its proper place advocated in
this Article is intended not only to rationalize the system of criminal
penalties but to make it more just.
497 See supra note 312.
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